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WORLD POLITICS

VOL. XXVII · JANUARY 1975 · NO. 2

CONTENTS

On Systems and International Regimes — *Ernst B. Haas* — 147

Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict — *Andrew J. R. Mack* — 175

The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World — *Rupert Emerson* — 201

Political Demand Channels in the Processes of American and British Imperial Expansion, 1870–1913 — *Stephen Cooney* — 227

The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now — *James A. Nathan* — 256

REVIEW ARTICLES

Comparative Judicial Review and Constitutional Politics — *Donald P. Kommers* — 282

Insights into International Service — *Jean Siotis* — 298

The Contributors — ii

Abstracts — iii

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

ERNST B. HAAS is Robson Research Professor of Government at the University of California, Berkeley. Together with John G. Ruggie he directs "Studies on International Scientific and Technological Regimes" at the Institute of International Studies at Berkeley. His recent books include *Human Rights and International Action* (1970) and *Tangle of Hopes* (1969).

ANDREW J. R. MACK is a Research Fellow at the Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research in London. He is co-author of *War Without Weapons: Non-Violence in National Defence* (1974). At present he is engaged in a comparative study of imperialist wars.

RUPERT EMERSON is Professor of Government, Emeritus, at Harvard University. He is the author of *Malaysia* (1937) and *From Empire to Nation* (1960).

STEPHEN COONEY is completing his Ph.D. thesis in International Relations at the London School of Economics, on the subject of French, British, and American imperial expansion before the first World War.

JAMES A. NATHAN is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Delaware. He is the co-author of *The United States and World Order* and of a monograph entitled *International Socialization*, both scheduled for publication in 1975. Currently, he is director of a research project on international learning, and co-director of a project which involves exploring the relationship between naval missions, foreign policy alternatives, and naval force structures.

DONALD P. KOMMERS is Professor of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of *Judicial Politics in West Germany: A Study of the Federal Constitutional Court* (1975), and the co-author of *The Governments of Germany* (4th ed. 1975). He is currently engaged in doing a comparative analysis of German and American constitutional law, based on decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court.

JEAN SIOTIS is a Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva; a Consultant to the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Consultant to the newly established *Centre de Recherche sur les Institutions Internationales*. He has served as a member of the Greek delegation to the United Nations (1974). Among his writings are *Essai sur le Secrétariat International* (1963), *The ECE in the Emerging European System* (1967), and *The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in the Perspective of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (1974).

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ABSTRACTS

On Systems and International Regimes

By E. B. HAAS

As the consequences of science and technology impinge more and more on international relations, states attempt to deal with the promise and dangers implicit in these consequences by the creation of international regimes. The nature and scope of such regimes are justified, in part, by the scientific and technological givens with which they are to deal. Increasingly, however, the process of justification is dominated by constructs and arguments taken from systems theory, thus mixing the epistemological styles of the natural and the social sciences. It is often not clear whether justification in terms of systems theory is rhetoric or based on demonstrated isomorphisms. The article seeks to answer this question by presenting a four-fold typology of systems theories together with their assumptions and relevance to the creation of international regimes. The article then examines three specific proposals for international action on science and technology, prepared under OECD auspices, in order to demonstrate the extent to which they rely on systems theory and to determine how persuasive the systemic justification is. The conclusion: there is an inverse relationship between the elaborateness of the systemic justification and the acceptability of the regime on logical, empirical, and moral grounds.

Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict

By A. J. R. MACK

The Vietnam and Algerian wars have demonstrated that the overwhelming conventional military superiority of major powers is no guarantee against their defeat in wars against small nations. For external powers such wars are necessarily "limited," which constrains escalation above certain levels. With no direct survival interest at stake, fighting the war does not take automatic priority over the pursuit of other social, political, and economic objectives. Prosecuting the war consumes resources—economic, human, and political—which are thus not available for the pursuit of these other objectives. In the absence of a quick victory this creates the potential for those political divisions which historically have shifted the balance of forces in the metropolis in favor of withdrawal. For the insurgents, the fact of invasion and occupation generates cohesion, minimizes constraints on mobilization, and maximizes the willingness to incur costs. Precisely the opposite effects tend to characterize the war effort of the external power. A conceptual framework for the analysis of the evolution and outcome of such conflicts is presented and its applications and limitations discussed.

The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World

By R. EMERSON

The new Asian and African states have laid much stress on human rights, but have often not lived up to them. The basic right of self-determination has been limited to colonies only. Democratic institutions have generally given way to authoritarian regimes, often run by the military, with popular participation denied rather than encouraged. The right to life, liberty, and security of person has been grossly violated in the cases of millions of refugees, temporary and permanent, in Africa and the Asian subcontinent. Many hundreds of thousands have been killed in domestic conflicts, as in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Burundi. One of the results is the emergence of a double standard: an all-out African and Asian attack upon the denial of human rights involved in colonialism and racial discrimination, but a refusal to face up to massive violations of human rights in the Third World itself.

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Political Demand Channels in the Processes of American and British Imperial Expansion, 1870–1913

By S. COONEY

Before one can make conclusive statements about the causes of western imperialism, one must comprehend the network of political processes and administrative relations by which expansionist demands were fed into the political systems of imperial powers. The channels followed by demands which led to British and American imperial expansion are mapped through reference to historical studies based on a wide range of primary source materials. Expansionist demand channels are studied within the framework of Easton's concept of the political system, and of linkage theories concerning the relation of national political systems to the extra-societal environment. The British and American systems provide contrasting examples of simple and complex linkage. American expansion can be studied within the simple domestic-international linkage framework developed by contemporary authors; to comprehend the process of British expansion, one must consider the complicating factor of local imperial demands.

The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now

By JAMES A. NATHAN

The Cuban missile crisis has become something of a misleading "model" of the foreign policy process. There are seven central tenets of this model, each of which was considered "confirmed" by the "lessons" of the Cuban crisis: (1) Crises are typical of international relations; (2) Crises are assumed to be manageable; (3) The domestic sector is not especially critical in "crisis management"; (4) Crisis management is the practical ability to reconcile force with negotiation; (5) The process of crisis negotiation is not only manageable but can be "won"; (6) The Soviets seldom negotiate except under duress; (7) Crisis management can and must be a civilian enterprise. After the crisis, there were the beginnings of détente with the Soviet Union. The test-ban treaty, the hot line, and a more civil exchange between the two powers are widely believed to stem from the favorable resolution of the missile crisis. Yet the model and its inherent assumptions on the meaning of Cuba can be challenged. Nevertheless, Cuba stands as a watershed in the cold war and in the history of the international system.

Comparative Judicial Review and Constitutional Politics

By DONALD P. KOMMERS

The rapid spread of judicial review around the world has resulted in several studies of constitutional courts in various countries. Because of their differing methodological approaches and analytical frameworks, these studies are of limited theoretical value and, in some instances, only incidentally relevant to politics. Nevertheless, they constitute a foundation on which to build a meaningful and unified body of knowledge in the developing field of comparative judicial politics. Three research directions are proposed as a means of accomplishing this objective: to classify judicial review on a worldwide basis and chart its relation to legal and political variables; to systematically study the political roles of courts of judicial review in individual countries; and to embark upon cross-cultural studies of constitutional doctrine.

Insights into International Service

By JEAN SIOTIS

The concept and institutions of an international civil service have been studied by numerous authors. The works reviewed in this article, by Brian Urquhart, Shirley Hazzard, Henry Cabot Lodge, Richard Symonds and Michael Carder, and Alexander Szalai with Margaret Croke and Associates, are all related to the UN Secretariat, its successes and its failures. The practice of multilateral diplomacy as conducted by the Secretary General of the UN, personnel policies and national interference in the UN administration, relations between the international Secretariat and member governments on the one hand and with the media on the other, as well as the role of international civil servants in promoting social reform are discussed. The works under review are found to contain conflicting images of the UN and its Secretariat.

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ON SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

By ERNST B. HAAS*

DOES the ecosystem have a purpose? Is it the function of the human cultural and biological systems to improve adaptation to the environment? Can the weather system and the world political system be brought into equilibrium? Does the world energy system suffer from entropy?

These questions have some very practical implications as governments seek to come to terms with the international implications of the interdependencies forged by science and technology. Once such interdependencies are experienced by men, they call for the creation of international regimes—collective arrangements among nations designed to create or more effectively use scientific and technological capabilities. Moreover, international regimes are increasingly designed to minimize the undesired consequences associated with the creation and exploitation of such capabilities. Once it is decided to create such arrangements, the question soon becomes: Which technologies should be included in the regime? Which consequences—only the physical results, or also the educational, economic, and cultural features which may influence the use of the technologies and, in turn, be changed by them? The answer is likely to determine the administrative and legal scope of the regime.

Two illustrations will make the point obvious. United Nations efforts to cope with the deterioration of the global environment are confined to limiting the physical and biological damage associated with industrialism and urbanism. The regime now called "Earthwatch" is restricted to monitoring key substances in the environment. In the process, it draws on the scientific knowledge of a variety of disciplines and aims at delimiting the "system" of physical and chemical interactions. Once that "system" is better understood, it is hoped that more comprehensive regulatory measures will come into being. United

* This paper is part of "Studies on International Scientific and Technological Regimes," a project of the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley. The material in Part I is also used in a companion essay, "Is There a Hole in the Whole?" in John G. Ruggie and Ernst B. Haas, eds., *International Responses to Technology*, special issue of *International Organization* (Summer 1975). The paper could not have been written without the substantial contributions of (in alphabetical order) Peter Cowhey, Jeffrey Hart, David Laitin and John Ruggie.

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Nations efforts to deal with a number of technologies influencing the uses of the oceans, however, seek to address the ensemble called "ocean space," a holistic construct which stresses the interaction between shipping, mining, oceanographic research, economic development, fishing, pollution, and world trade. Again, the notion of "system" is frequently used to capture and describe these interactions, conceived primarily in physical, but increasingly in human and social terms.[1] It takes little imagination to project other problems which may soon be described in holistic images to facilitate discussion, regulation, and the determination of collective benefits: the uses of outer space, the development and delivery of energy resources, the utilization of new communications technologies.

I am arguing against the overly facile use of the notion of "system," not against the need to construct international regimes. If systems were straightforward entities whose identification gave no trouble, the term would be a distinct help to everyone. That, of course, is far from being the case. Descriptive difficulties apart, the word is also used to suggest an almost mystical wholeness, a just barely graspable reality "out there," a cognitive map for orienting our halting thoughts and steps. The term is made to subsume other constructs which are similarly used: complexity, connectedness, interdependence, structure, coherence, and evolutionary-adaptive movement. These terms appear in proposals for models, rules, and regimes to plan all or part of the international economy, international security and arms arrangements, natural resources, food, and energy. International planning there must be. Intellectual efforts to advance it are badly needed. This article is an attempt to further international planning by seeking to demystify the vocabulary and the concepts used in the process, to strip the vocabulary of some of its murkiness by showing the obstacles to clear understanding implicit in the assumptions and commitments that are sometimes hidden in the notion of "system."

Even though this paper is a critique of the use of systems theory in the advocacy of international regimes, I should like to stress at the outset that I am *not* arguing against all varieties and applications of that approach. I am in general agreement with the authors to be

[1] Examples in the current literature of systemic constructs being used to show the links between science, technology, and international politics include: Edward Wenk, Jr., *The Politics of the Ocean* (Seattle 1972); Lester R. Brown, *World Without Borders* (New York 1972); Richard A. Falk, *This Endangered Planet* (New York 1971); Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (New York 1971); John L. Hargrove, ed., *Law, Institutions and the Global Environment* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. 1972); Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order* (Princeton 1972), Vol. IV (especially Part I).

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analyzed that the forces and trends they wish to channel and reform indeed require a much more integrated and holistic approach if the world is to remain livable. But I wish to caution that a rhetoric is not a substitute for a theory, and that an epistemologically flawed theory makes for poor policy. The various kinds of systems theory to be identified *may well be useful and appropriate for the purposes they were designed to serve and in the contexts in which they were developed*. I fear, however, that their wholesale application to the designing of international regimes goes beyond their power. A given theory, obeying the logical and epistemological limits governing its application, can be judged on its merits. A problem arises only when the effort is made to fudge or ignore these limits, as in the attempt to combine the characteristics of theories inhabiting different cells in the typology to be presented. It is dangerous to "jump cells" if we wish to use systems theory to fashion a better world. It is equally dangerous to extend some systems theories from a field in which they proved useful into a new area—the social sciences—in which they seem to apply only as metaphors. I am eager to use some specific systems *theories* for specific purposes; I am fearful of using systems *theory* in general when we devise international regimes. Finally, I stress that I am not talking about systems-analytic techniques of studying the interaction of variables. These may or may not be appropriate in the operations of international regimes. A different type of critique is required to assess their benefits and drawbacks. Systems analysis is intellectually indebted to the superordinate imagery of systems theory, but its techniques really provide the material for a different story.

I. Some Hidden Doubts and Assumptions

Do systems have needs, and do the operations of systems serve functions *other than* the goals and purposes in the minds of the people who inhabit them? Most systems theorists suggest that they do. Such theorists thus attribute built-in teleologies to the constructs they create. Are natural systems and social systems similar constructs, obeying the same rules? If the answer is positive, the teleologies imputed to natural systems are automatically extended to their social counterparts. The law of the "survival of the fittest" is imputed to the relationships between living species and their natural environment; if man and his works are also part of that ensemble—as many cultural and biological evolutionists hold—then the same law applies to the character of human institutions insofar as these interact with man's ability to survive. Hence, it makes a big difference whether advocates of international

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regimes for the protection of the environment think in terms of a continuous system linking man with nature, or whether they make no claims to continuity. The implications of these opposing views come home to roost in the strategies imputed to the regimes proposed for the international order. The more holistic the system thought to underlie the "problem" to be tackled, the more comprehensive the regime to be created is going to be; if the parts believed to be in interaction are thought to be separable, the regime is likely to be more modest. The differences in hidden assumptions, in short, translate into strategies of total redesign as opposed to incrementalism when the understanding of systems is applied to the advocacy of new international arrangements for collective action.

> By a social system, then, I mean nothing more than an aggregation of human beings (plus their physical milieu) who are sufficiently interdependent to share a common fate . . . or to have actions of some of them usually affecting the lives of many of them. . . . It is up to the researcher to decide whether or not those entities existing at any given level of analysis are best treated as constituting separate subsystems in the nations in which they are found or as a single subsystem of some larger entity. . . . In addition social entities at any level may be treated as sets of systems in one study and as sets of subsystems in another, depending on the phenomenon under examination.[2]

Systems, as Singer defines them, have no purpose. They are taxonomies devised by the researcher to permit the specification of hypothesized non-random events and trends in the hope of gradually mapping reality. If everyone used the construct in this sense, we would have no problem.

But the systems used by the lawyers, ecologists, oceanographers, and genetic engineers in the discussion of regimes do have purposes. Singer wishes to confine the entities whose interdependence makes up the system to people, groups, states, or regions; others, however, use roles, activities, transactions, ratios, and symmetries as the components. When relationships are the component units, there is always a tacit or overt implication that the "right" relationship must (ought to) conduce to some condition which is "needed," "requisite," "optimal," or "natural." Hence, the system is teleological in that it should operate so as to realize its Aristotelian final cause.

[2] J. David Singer, *A General Systems Taxonomy for Political Science* (New York 1971), 9. For a perceptive critique of general systems theory applied to international issues and of other deductively constructed systems theories, see Jerome Stephens, "An Appraisal of Some Systems Approaches in the Study of International Systems," *International Studies Quarterly*, XVI (September 1972).

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Moreover, most designers of international regimes use *both* entities *and* relationships as components. Their systems are not exclusively physical or social; they are both. They seek to aggregate nature and society into a whole that permits projection into the future. Our problem arises because such wholes combine factual with normative considerations and prescriptions. We cannot always be sure which conditions what. Unless we can be sure, we remain in the dark as to the degree of expertise and certainty that underlie the prescription. How much of the language used is just metaphor, colorful rhetoric designed to persuade skeptical audiences and colleagues?

We have to know what—if any—purpose the designer has in mind; whether that purpose is shared internationally; and the extent to which the realization of the purpose eventually changes international reality. This suggests the following more specific questions: What is the "reality" to be grasped? Is it "real" in the sense that the components and interrelationships specified *are* the stuff of man, society, and nature? Or is that reality seen as approximate, as "constructed" by imaginative observers?

The answers suggest more questions: Are subsystems "natural" or constructed entities? Does it make a difference whether we specify the political system as a subsystem of the social or cultural? Make the social and/or cultural subsystem the superordinate system? Make the entire social-cultural subsystem subordinate to the biological or physical or genetic? Couple the genetic and cultural into one evolutionary system? Couple them how—as continua or in terms of breakpoints?

We begin by classifying the intentions of systems theorists. *What* do they want to explain or predict? The past and future state (or behavior) of the whole they identify as "the system." What assumptions underlie the projection? Systems theories can be divided into deterministic and heuristic constructs. Determinists see the components as relatively unchangeable and arrange them in an eternal preprogrammed dance; the rules of the dance may be unknown to the actors and are specified by the theorist. The recurrent patterns discovered by him constitute a super-logic which predicts the future state of the system. Deterministic systems are "concrete" in the sense that their designers believe them to be real; such systems *are* the reality "out there." Certainty about them facilitates prescription. Heuristic constructs follow the Durkheim-Weber pattern. They are analytic rather than concrete because they do not profess to represent the real world faithfully and accurately, but select for intensive investigation certain features deliberately isolated by the theorist as presumptively crucial in explain-

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ing a variety of events or trends. Careful heuristic-analytic theorists do not assert that what is being demonstrated is the whole reality. And their prescriptions are consequently more circumspect and contingent. As in the case of deterministic-concrete systems, however, what is discovered by the theorists still constitutes a super-logic of which the actors may be ignorant, and the patterns sketched also make up the rules of the system.

Systems theorists also differ in the methodological assumptions and procedures they employ; or, *how* do we determine the rules of the system? We can collapse the various modes into two: formal/deductive systems and informal/inductive systems. Formal systems methods place the observer on an extraterrestrial pedestal to watch the system from the outside. The perceptions and motives of actors are considered irrelevant because they are considered to be internalized and submerged in the system's rules. Hence the theorists treat such social systems much as biologists and physicists treat their systems in which the volition of the components is not an issue. Such a theoretical stance leads to the assumption that systems are "closed": the essential rules or specified attributes determine the outcome. The outcome, moreover, is usually specified by definition, and formal constructs are used to show how it is attained. That outcome is usually described as equilibrium, stability, or ultra-stability. The system's "needs" are to attain that state; the system's operations are "requisites" for the meeting of that need. Hence, closed systems are also called requisite systems. Their teleology is built in: it is to adapt in order to survive. Trends found to be in conflict with this end are discussed under the heading of entropy. The focus of the analysis is the system itself.

Informal/inductive systems are also known as "open" or "evolutionary" systems.[3] Their designers do not claim to be able to specify

[3] Not to be confused with genetic and cultural theories of human evolution couched in systemic terms. Such theories may or may not be open, depending on the future state programmed by the theorist, and depending on what he means by adaptation. If adaptation merely means the preservation of a certain gene pool to facilitate later cultural evolution, such formulations leave the outcome open. See I. Michael Lerner, *Evolution and Society* (San Francisco 1968), chap. 22. If the evolutionary pattern is subordinated to achieve a predefined spiritual condition, however, we have a case of adaptation meaning something very specific. See Theodosius Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (New Haven 1962), chap. 12. Hence, ecosystemic evolutionary theories stressing the trend toward a new human consciousness tend to be deterministic in intent and informal/inductive in method.

For evidence that my typology of systems theories is far from commanding universal acceptance, see the different and more demanding characterization devised by Kenneth N. Waltz in his "Theories of International Relations," Fred Greenstein and

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essential rules and attributes, and refrain from using formal constructs for predicting the state of the system. Instead, empirical studies of the actual behavior of the actors are featured so that the demonstration proceeds *upward* toward abstraction from the data, instead of downward from the system as a whole. The focus is on the parts, and the whole is projected from their interaction, rather than vice versa. There is no fixed outcome or needed state to be reached. Such systems thus leave room for the actors' learning to attain conditions of the system which cannot be prespecified; this can be done either in a deterministic or a heuristic fashion, depending on whether the theorist feels that he grasps the real and has the transformation rules under control.

The combinations of these dimensions are shown in the matrix below. Each cell implies a different degree of certainty in the projection of needed or desired futures, with Cell 1 representing the most, and Cell 4 the least, certainty. We can now see that the use of systemic constructs poses problems for the design of international regimes, since most physical scientists would inhabit Cell 1, biologists hover between Cells 1 and 2, and social scientists in either Cell 3 or Cell 4.

THEORIST'S METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT REALITY	THEORIST'S INTENT AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ATTRIBUTES VS. RELATIONSHIPS	
	Intent: Deterministic *Assumption*: Relationships central	Heuristic Attributes central
Method: Deductive; System is reality; Closed	1	3
Method: Inductive; Actor is reality; Open	2	4

I return to the question of purposes. It is essential that we distinguish between the goals and objectives actors have in mind when they engage in activities that could be described in systemic terms (as in the construction of regimes), and the essential characteristics ascribed by

Nelson Polsby, eds., *The Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. VII (forthcoming). Waltz is unwilling to consider informal/inductive constructs as genuine systems theories, preferring to remain closely identified with the general systems approach which I consider to be merely one species in a more comprehensive genus. The difference in approach is significant because the terms used by me are not synonymous with the same terms as employed by Waltz, notably the words "open" and "closed."

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theorists to systems in Cells 1, 2, and 3. Both are "purposive" in that they are thought to conduce toward the achievement of some end or outcome.[4] Even the systems in Cell 2 partake of the built-in teleology in that the outcome is still considered to be some form of equilibrium, though the specification takes the form of a range of possibilities rather than one predetermined end. I shall refer to human goals and objectives as "purposes," and use the term "function" for the systemically defined end. In that way, I underline the difficulty of combining natural and social systems into a single construct; although the weather system may be thought of as having functions, it can hardly be said to be endowed with purposes.

My emphasis on the distinction between functions and purposes is inspired by an underlying doubt about the finality and utility of the knowledge used in the construction of regimes. Certainty regarding the whole of which pieces of disciplinary knowledge are the constituent parts will furnish the "scientific" warrant for postulating as "known" or "knowable" the functions implicit in the more deterministic and deductive systems constructs. Scientific knowledge will thus be used as a legitimating device for policy. If the functions were truly known and generally accepted, a natural/social system continuum could come to take the place of political bargaining based on perceptions of short-run advantage, thus making obsolete the incremental-heuristic and tentative systemic formulations contained in Cell 4. If a new paradigm of knowledge were to emerge simply on the basis of the persuasive rhetoric of its advocates or the religious zeal of its prophets, a systemic ideology heavily indebted to natural science might become the guide

[4] For a thoroughgoing critique of the epistemological qualities of structural-functional systems theory, see A. James Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (June 1968). For a discussion of the ambiguity of "functions" in the analysis of international phenomena, see Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford 1964), chap. 3 and especially pp. 62-68. The difficulty of imputing systemic properties to human purposes, while retaining a systems framework for the presentation of the overall argument, is avoided by James N. Rosenau in *The Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political System Behavior and Transformation* (New York 1970). Rosenau throughout uses biological and evolutionary arguments as *analogies*, not as determinants of human behavior, thus keeping the presentation within the bounds of heuristic/inductive systems theorizing. In Ervin Laszlo's treatment of the same concerns, however, this epistemological distinction tends to get lost. While Laszlo treats natural systems and social systems as different entities, he interprets the behavior of social systems as subordinate to the imputed requirements of the natural systems within which social life must operate. His prescription for cognitive adjustments necessary to assure survival and adaptation follows from this conceptual hierarchy. His argument therefore straddles several cells in my matrix, because—he insists—inferences about *actual* conduct cannot be made from deterministic systemic assertions, but *normatively desirable* assertions about conduct can. See his *The Systems View of the World* (New York 1972) and *The World System: Models, Norms, Variations* (New York 1973).

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for international regime construction even if the constructs were not able to pass very rigorous epistemological tests.

Innate skepticism, however, keeps me from taking too seriously either of these possibilities. Natural scientists do not now agree on the character of the whole or the identity and meaning of the parts. Therefore, they do not now function as a priesthood eager and able to spread the word that the uniformity of nature is a clear guide to international politics. As long as that is true, a service is being performed by stressing that human purposes remain in the saddle as definers of new regimes, even though these purposes are heavily influenced by whatever scientific knowledge is offered as being reasonably final. Hence the constructs captured in Cell 4 remain the *only ones* now free of unwarranted mystical implications with respect to charting a desirable course in the design of a more integrated world order. They alone are able to capture the combination of initial purposes and the later cognitive reordering of goals which may come about as new knowledge constraints are introduced into the international debate.

II. Incrementalism and Holism: Three Cognitive Maps Compared

Three claims to systemic wholeness, all developed under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, will now be scrutinized. Two are the products of committees of experts;[5] one is the work of a former consultant to OECD.[6] I shall compare the three in order to discover why a new international regime is being advocated; how complex the reality to be regulated is conceived to be; how science and technology are conceived to relate to international society and politics; and what role is being attributed to values. These are the components of the larger question: What intellectual construct is explicitly or implicitly included in these claims?

[5] *Science, Growth and Society: A New Perspective*, Report of the Secretary-General's *Ad Hoc* Group on New Concepts of Science Policy; Harvey Brooks, Chairman [hereafter referred to as the *Brooks Report*] (OECD, Paris 1971). Erich Jantsch, ed., *Perspectives of Planning*, Proceedings of the OECD Working Symposium on Long-Range Forecasting and Planning, Bellagio, October 27–November 2, 1969 (OECD, Paris 1969). Use is made primarily of the joint statement of the group [hereafter referred to as the *Bellagio Declaration*], 7-9.

There was a certain amount of overlap among the participants in the Bellagio meeting and the Brooks panel. Moreover, Jantsch testified before the Brooks panel. It should also be noted that prominent members of the Club of Rome participated in both events; although they did not speak with one voice, the impact of the Club's approach is more visible in the *Bellagio Declaration* than in the *Brooks Report.*

[6] Erich Jantsch, *Technological Planning and Social Futures* (London 1972). Even though the formulations of Jantsch were not part of the OECD approach in the sense of having organizational endorsement, most of the ideas involved were developed by Jantsch while working for OECD.

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WHY HAVE AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME?

The three proposals agree in their identification of the "trigger" for a new international approach, and they also agree on the solution. The trigger is the Janus-headed nature of science and technology, and the solution is the need to "plan internationally." "Social institutions face growing difficulties as a result of an ever-increasing complexity which arises directly and indirectly from the development and assimilation of technology."[7] "Policies concerned with science and technology in the next decade will have to take into account, much more explicitly than in the past, the benefits and disbenefits, actual and potential, that may result from the application of science or the deployment of technology."[8] And, more ambitiously: "The time is past . . . when long-range planning might have been regarded as a fancy means to contribute to individual aims or crude business policies such as 'maximization of profit.' Today, long-range planning is becoming an integral part of the search for a new cultural basis, new sets of values to be brought into play, and new and flexible responses to a rapidly changing world."[9] All three share the fear that the demons unleashed by very rapid technological change will make an already complex life yet intolerably more complex—not only because of the obvious externalities associated with technology, but also because of the public resentment associated with dependence on decisions resulting from technological considerations. Only a changed—a more highly planned—science is thought capable of saving us from these demons. All three agree that by planning science and technology, and by including such plans in an improved planning of public policy in general, a solution can be found.[10]

The solution is international planning of science and technology. That requires a regime. What should such a regime do? What actions should it foster or constrain? What visions or models should inspire it? Which values should it serve? How technocratic should it be, and how participatory?

In the first place, it is not obvious why the solution must be international. The *Brooks Report* confines itself to asserting that the "problem" is international because environmental pollution does not respect frontiers, because the economic implications of technological inequality exacerbate trade relations, and because the phenomenon of the multinational corporation makes national planning and regulation in-

[7] *Bellagio Declaration*, 7. [8] *Brooks Report*, 15. [9] Jantsch (fn. 6), 3.
[10] *Brooks Report*, 96; *Bellagio Declaration*, 8; Jantsch (fn. 6), chap. 11.

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effective.[11] The *Bellagio Declaration* makes much the same points,[12] but expresses these sentiments in a vocabulary of interdependence which Jantsch formulates as a "total systems perspective," to which I shall return later: "If technology is at the roots of processes such as world unification, population explosion, environmental deterioration, and the widening of various 'gaps' (especially the one between the rich and the poor), it is also capable of contributing to attempts to cope with these sets of problems if developed and applied at a higher degree of rationalization than generally accepted today. Above all, it must be guided by a truly international, or even global, policy for science and technology."[13] In short, the international character of the solution is due to a perception that the problem involves a large number of interdependencies. What about the character of the regime?

The *Bellagio Declaration* does not contain any suggestions for new international regimes even though it uses language suggesting that any mechanism for comprehensive planning would be highly desirable. In the *Brooks Report*, the emphasis is on studies and reviews to be conducted by the OECD and specific new practices to be adopted by the member governments. Governments are advised to plan the development of science, technology, education, and the economy as a coherent package, and to consider the future demand for socially desirable technologies the major independent variable. R & D looking toward this end is to be fostered. Member states are advised to create a top-level mechanism, responsible to the head of government, for technology assessment and planning. Members are also urged to gear their science policies to the needs of the developing nations, in line with UN programs.[14] As for OECD, the glimmers of an international regime are barely discernible in the following suggestions: systematic studies clarifying the links between technological innovation and the behavior of the economy are to be launched; the impact of educational policies on social change and stability is to be scrutinized; the techniques of technology assessment are to be perfected; plans for more collaborative international basic research are to be drawn up, à la CERN; OECD is to become the main clearinghouse for all information relating to environmental degradation, and to develop international pollution standards; perhaps most importantly, OECD is given the task of developing a set of international social indicators in order to enable governments to monitor the welfare of their citizens.[15] In short, the regime would consist of standardized data-gathering and

[11] *Brooks Report*, 23-24.
[12] *Bellagio Declaration*, 7.
[13] Jantsch (fn. 6), 177.
[14] *Brooks Report*, 76-107.
[15] *Ibid.*

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analysis. To the extent that such practices are accepted as authoritative by member governments, their net effect might well be to constrain action, to suggest policies, and to preempt domestic and inter-state conflict. But the proposals contain no cognitive master paradigm, no unified vision, and no clear statement on the balance between expertise and participation.

Jantsch's proposals, however, do. The task is nothing less than "to shape the future of mankind"; the specific sectors of concern to the Brooks Committee—science, technology, education, economic growth—are redefined by Jantsch to include all programs "in such areas where the need for global policies and strategies imposes itself."[16] His emphasis is on bundles of technology—food, population, oceans, environment, information—rather than on policies. Since everything interacts with everything else, only global planning of the *ensemble* makes sense. But the regime he proposes is less a codex of rules than an agenda for research which is heavily weighted on the technocratic side. It is to prepare the world for total planning.

Fundamental research *per se*, fundamental research applicable to technological innovation, and specific research designed to pioneer new technologies in the important areas of global policy would be internationally coordinated. Governments and the large corporations would participate, with extensive capabilities for innovation at the more operational levels being left to private firms. Overall guidance through systems analysis and normative forecasting must be superimposed on such relatively decentralized innovation. Jantsch therefore provides for an International Systems Analysis Institute and for an International Research Planning Center. The two, designed to "invent the future," engage in normative forecasting, "to explore, assess and evaluate alternative 'possible futures' and consistent sets of technological elements, and to map out alternative paths to achieve them."[17] On the basis of such exercises, specific guidance would then be provided for lower-level organisms to produce the desired technologies.

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY: SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Our three suggestions for an international regime for science and technology also show very substantial substantive agreement. All concur that science and technology, *as now practiced*, do not automatically contribute to the evolution of more perfect societies, that they tend to exacerbate international tensions and misunderstandings, and that—at least thus far—science and technology resist rational planning by those

[16] Jantsch (fn. 6), 178. [17] *Ibid.*, 187.

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most qualified to do it. They agree, further, that science and technology tend to pit the rich and developed against the poor in the global arena. They also share a faith in the ability of science, by enabling man to understand society better, to make a contribution to the evolution of a more moral and a more efficient society. In short, the faith in science as a superior guide to public choice remains very much in the forefront of their thinking.

Despite a unanimously expressed concern for better modes of public participation in policy making, a distinct technocratic thrust is also incorporated in all three proposals. They insist on the improved use of large-scale quantitative models to assist in making policy choices designed to rescue man and society from bad planning. The character of technological R & D and the associated expenses make for the blurring of the distinction between the public and the private sector, thus leading the authors to suggest that R & D be increasingly considered a collective good. Moreover, the dependence of this complex of activities on "knowledge" and the possessors of knowledge as a crucial component, in addition to strengthening the technocratic aspect of the argument, also suggests a special concern for universities as crucial contributors to better policy.[18] The *Brooks Report* implies, and Jantsch argues forcefully, that institutions for the creation and application of new theoretical and practical knowledge are becoming, and ought to become, a kind of fifth estate able to clarify *how* our social and economic relations are becoming more complex. The expense and the complexity of the research and forecasting that are advocated here also call for the internationalization of the effort. All are mindful of the social dislocation and malaise brought about by the past unplanned and unpredicted impact of science and technology; all see as one of the purposes of scientific and technological planning the amelioration of such dislocations through better methods of forecasting and of determining trade-offs. A policy *for* science and technology is thought to minimize social strife; infusing politics with more scientific rigor is expected to do the same.

At one crucial point Jantsch suggests a line of thought with wide-ranging implications for an international regime. He believes that even though scientific and technological planning is deeply flawed and shows strong signs of the dominance of "technique" over purpose

[18] The *Brooks Report* puts the emphasis on the protection of academic freedom and the continued support society should give to unguided fundamental research in universities; Jantsch also favors continued fundamental research, but wishes to redefine the mission of universities so as to put them into the role of actively demonstrating how society should be reorganized. See his chaps. 15 and 16.

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(along the lines of the argument developed by Ellul), there inheres in it a rationality which is potentially able to unify world thinking along functional lines. Specialists and institutions who devote themselves to regrouping and rethinking links among social purposes and innovative technologies would, in overcoming the dominance of technique, also impose their superior rationality on currently ruling specialists and institutions. The upshot of the argument is to relocate Mitrany's trend of thought within the nexus of scientific problem-solving.

COGNITIVE MAPS: COMPLEXITY AND VALUES

What shared perceptions of reality we have encountered so far now rapidly begin to fade. It would be idle and misleading to count the number of subjects or topics enumerated by each approach in order to determine the scope of cognition. It would be equally futile to sketch the arrows of causation between the subjects in order to map the complexity of the perceived linkage patterns. A more impressionistic way of summarizing the differences and similarities must suffice.

The *Brooks Report* is interested in determining linkages between science, technology, education, industry, and economic performance. Economic growth, stagnation, and saturation are dependent variables; the other subjects are the independent variables of key concern. "How much and what kind of each determines how much and what kind of the other?" is the main question. We might consider these the *core subjects* of the argument.[19] On the periphery of these core subjects, however, we encounter less clearly identifiable subjects, such as social demands and "needs," the pace and kind of social change, social conflict and harmony, the degradation of the environment. These *peripheral subjects* are intended to highlight the values subserved by the core subjects; they also illustrate the difficulty in discussing within a single construct the concrete and the more ephemeral. Finally, reference is frequently made to institutional and behavioral *patterns*, which

[19] The coding of linkage statements was done as follows: All major statements asserting links between subjects were identified in the *Brooks Report* and the *Bellagio Declaration*. In the case of the *Brooks Report*, I used the summary chapter entitled "Assumptions Concerning Science, Technology, and Society," pp. 15-25. Subjects were then sorted in terms of their centrality to the overall argument by examining the strength of the predicates used to link them together. Assignment to the "core" or the "periphery" depended on the strength of the claim made—i.e., on the degree of certainty as to the nature of the linkage expressed by the authors. It would have been simpler if the authors had explicitly differentiated between social values and social/economic processes, but since they did not, a more indirect coding scheme had to be adopted. Institutional concerns were treated instrumentally by the authors—i.e., simply as a way of obtaining a better fit between core subjects or between core and peripheral subjects.

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are also treated as subjects. These include science policy-making, participatory decision-making, bureaucracy, the behavior of the public and private sectors of the economy, public opinion, multinational corporations, and international organizations. These *pattern subjects* are brought into the discussion whenever linkages between core subjects are criticized as not properly serving the peripheral subjects. What matters to us, therefore, is the determination of certainty of knowledge to be imputed to the authors in establishing the linkages. To do this we study the strength of the predicates used to express the linkages between the types of subjects.

The strongest predicate would affirm that *A* is necessary and/or sufficient to bring about *B*. Such statements are actually found in the *Brooks Report* only when links are asserted to exist among the core subjects themselves. Connections between the core and the peripheral subjects tend to take the form of "*A* is known, or is very likely, to precede *B*." From this cautious formulation, the bulk of the "ought-claims" take the forms "*A* is better than *B*," or "*B* depends on *A*," or "*A* is necessary for *B*." Ought-claims are confined to specifying the changes which are desirable for the pattern subjects in order better to serve the cautiously linked core and peripheral concerns. Causative and prescriptive imputations between and among these components lack rigor, and the solutions reflect this uncertainty over the cognition of complexity by calling, for the most part, for further studies.

The *Bellagio Declaration* compensates for its terseness by the sweep of its assertions. It avoids the enumeration of concrete sectors of social activity, the specification of social processes, and the examination of institutions. Instead, it asserts as "known" that the contemporary social crisis is the result of a nonsystemic view; that the increase in misunderstood complexity will deepen the crisis because past planning has ignored the "whole system"; that the only acceptable definition of planning is "systems design"; and that all these things are indisputably clear because they are based on world-wide and irresistible trends. From this cognitive base the *Declaration* then concludes that planning is necessary to save us from chaos. Moreover, better planning requires the identification of values, new social experiments, maximum participation, the accelerated use of better quantitative models, and the integration of institutions at higher levels of action.

Jantsch's cognitive map self-consciously rejects the tendency to link important subjects in such a way as to assert causative connections. His map is a more elaborately and carefully constructed version of the Bellagio group's. His units of analysis are bundles of technologies con-

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sidered in terms of their social functions, not in the sense of the social use actually made of technology, but rather in that of the application he wants to see imposed. In short, the functional constraints of the map are his personal preferences regarding the proper use of technology. The identification and manipulation of the functions are aspects of the massive systemic overlay which defines the boundaries of his map.[20] We must look to that systemic construct and the values explicitly and implicitly interwoven with it if we wish to expose the cognitive structure. It must be said, furthermore, that the claim to certainty implicit in all this is quite unqualified. Necessary steps, institutional and cognitive, are derived as absolute imperatives for survival and salvation; everything takes the form of a factual assertion: current practices, preferred futures, systemic visions, institutional reforms, reorientations of consciousness. Jantsch quotes with approval Rutherford's dictum that "it is the first step that counts." The first step on the road to certainty is the acceptance of his map as the new dispensation.

The authors agree that planning which is divorced from the values and norms of society is an abomination. They inform us over and over that the only acceptable form of planning is one which is forever conscious of the purpose of the plan and the kind of society—national and international—which the plan is to produce. But how can one be sure of what these norms and values might be? Are we talking about a nation's values, the world's, or the authors'? Are these values known beforehand or should planning be open and flexible so as to allow the introduction of new values as the scheme unrolls? If society's values are not presumed to be fully known and weighted, a participatory bent dictates such flexibility. Moreover, the authors seem to share a belief that, as new knowledge is made available, values are likely to change, as will the methods found most appropriate for planning. This conclusion further necessitates open and flexible planning.

Whose values dominate the cognitive maps? How can we know what they are? The *Bellagio Declaration* suggests that it is inspired by its authors' understanding of society's values. These are stipulated to be the desire to avoid alienation, social dislocation, and the degradation of the environment. All schemes agree that society's values cannot be fully known and will not remain fixed, and must therefore be constantly rediscovered in the planning process. However, the authors of the *Brooks Report* imply—and I infer—that they take for granted society's preference for a high standard of living, social harmony, an

[20] Jantsch (fn. 6), 6, 31-36, 173.

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unspoiled environment, and freedom for scientific inquiry! The same values are implied as applicable to international society. I stress, however, that the imputation of society's values by the authors is based on nothing more substantial than assertion, and that no empirical effort is made to determine who in society wants what from whom. There is no appreciation that the interplay of clashing values-in-action *is* politics, that values are in dispute, and that this may be the human condition![21]

Jantsch, on the other hand, advances *his* values as central to the proposals. The very purpose of planning is social self-renewal, flexibility, openness. These are not only instrumentally necessary because of gaps in knowledge, but are positive values in their own right. Hierarchy, status, and bureaucracy are the legacies of the bad planning of the past which the new vision is designed to banish. Beyond these generalities, Jantsch argues that technology should be adapted to "human purposes" and that both technology and economics should be redefined in terms of their contribution to "broadly conceived political and cultural change."[22] Privacy, self-realization through social mobility, higher personal consumption, freedom for artistic expression or research—such specifics are not treated by him as values but as "subsystemic functions." With respect to the international arena, however, he advocates economic equality among nations, respect by the materialistic West for the spiritual East, and a cultural pluralism in which

[21] The *Brooks Report* cautions against excesses in participatory democracy as inconsistent with the making of stable and informed decisions, while lauding maximum feasible popular participation in planning. The *Bellagio Declaration* contains similar evidence of ambivalence on this issue.

It is important to recall that what I have identified as the cognitive map of the *Brooks Report* is not as epistemologically crisp as one might wish because the members of the panel were far from being in complete agreement on some fundamental propositions relating to the nature of the science-society interface. Interviews and correspondence with four of the ten members convinced me that they disagreed on two rather basic points. (1) The majority felt that the purpose of the *Report* was to improve the utilization of science in public policy-making in order to link more closely the planning of science and of scientific thinking to comprehensive international planning for economic and social development, and to rely on more systematic technology assessment in doing so; a minority, however, thought that this objective should be attained by deliberately fostering a greater international consciousness of ecological interdependence. (2) This difference coincides with slightly divergent views on the power of scientific knowledge to influence political choice. While almost all members shared the view that scientific knowledge is different from (and superior to) political knowledge because it is trans-ideological, the majority felt also that while there may be comprehensive systems of knowledge, they contribute to problem-solving only by indicating the limits on effective choice; such knowledge is facilitative rather than determinative. The minority felt that such knowledge should dictate choice rather than simply aid in the making of political decisions.

[22] Jantsch (fn. 6), 6-7.

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the dominance of Western ideas would give way to notions of man's harmony with nature.

It is quite unclear, in all this, whether these values preexist the unfolding of the dynamic planning process which is advocated, or whether they are to be realized as the process unfolds. Jantsch's determination to avoid "linear cause-effect" statements also obscures when and where values are to make their appearance. Hence it is idle for us to ask him, "planning for what?" He is much more interested in asking, "what values will facilitate planning?" And he pins his hopes to an evolutionary change in human values—conducive to better planning—as technology brings about environmental changes. Process seems to discover human purposes, not the other way around: "industry and the university have to become political institutions in the broadest meaning, i.e., active participants in the planning for society. In particular, science and technology can be brought to interact with society in a truly normative way only if all three institutions in the triangle: government-industry-university change considerably (or are replaced by new institutions)" [*sic*].[23] Does not even the process have a normative purpose? Perhaps Jantsch considers the psychocultural evolution of mankind to be that meta-purpose: "The real and undivided responsibility for the continuity of mankind's evolution falls back on man himself and on the amplification of his capabilities through the institutions of society. There can be no doubt it is in mankind's power to obtain the necessary control through the implementation of integrative planning."[24] Prometheus simply wished to make the world safe for man; Jantsch seems to want to make it safe for planning.

III. Systems: Reality, Aids to Thinking, or Mythology?

Processes, values, outcomes—these are the parts from which wholes are built. When they are included in a comprehensive cognitive map, we call them systems. The "system" in Jantsch consists of the totality of the interactions between these entities: nature, technology, man, and society. These are arranged so as to consist of six subsystems: nature-technology, man-technology, society-technology, man-nature, man-society, nature-society. What interests him is to identify the "functions" performed by each subsystem, to assess the normative implications of each function (in terms of the role technology plays), and to redefine or eliminate or substitute functions that are found wanting. Functions performed by the man-nature subsystem include various forms of ex-

[23] *Ibid.*, 25.

[24] *Ibid.*, 29.

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ploiting, dominating, or aesthetically appreciating nature. But the society-technology subsystem shows such functions as education, transportation, public health, automation, population control, and urban development; in short, "functions" include such diverse categories as simple activities, deliberate policies, and social objectives. The functions of the man-technology subsystem include all of the pollution-producing and privacy-invading activities of which we usually complain; here "functions" become the equivalent of alienation-inducing side effects. Planning is the process of managing all of the subsystems in such a way that the man-nature and society-nature functions control and guide the technology-man and technology-society links—i.e., a reversal of the current process. Integrative planning is required "to gain control over the interplay of the functions."[25] Gaining control implies that normative anticipations be made to determine the needs of superordinate subsystems with respect to the to-be-subordinated subsystems. This calls for the forecasting of technological processes already underway and for the planning of desirable counter-processes and the technologies appropriate for them. Toward what end? Apart from banishing alienation and assuring human fulfillment, it is not clear what the end is, since the functions that animate the system *and* the critique the philosopher makes of them are simply a grab-bag of disparate items, distinguished from one another by his personal preferences. The essence of normative forecasting is to show *why* one future state of affairs is better than another and *how* it can be attained, not simply the projection how *any* desired future can be realized. But without the stipulation of some specific values it is difficult to tell the better from the worse.

And yet, the essence of this orientation is its explicit teleology. Systems—if they are not to lead "to grotesque excesses of reductionist and behaviorist thinking"[26]—must have a purpose. For that very reason,

[25] *Ibid.*, 37. My summary of the system covers material in Jantsch's chapter 3. For a more popularized version of the same argument, see Aurelio Peccei, "How to Survive on the Planet Earth," *Successo* (February 1971). Peccei includes a number of practical suggestions for immediate steps to be taken at the international level. In *Successo* (December 1973) Peccei spells out the argument as to why an ecologically holistic perspective is required for the solution of concrete international problems involving population, resources, food, economic growth, and war. The research program of the Club of Rome with respect to these is described in *The New Threshold* (London 1973). Portions of this approach were endorsed with a call for a comprehensive review of international planning procedures at the Salzburg meeting of the Club of Rome (February 4, 1974), which was attended by six heads of government (Mexico, Austria, Sweden, Senegal, Canada, Netherlands) and four ministers (Pakistan, Switzerland, Ireland, Algeria). Among the members of the Club of Rome in attendance, two had been members of the Brooks panel.

[26] Jantsch (fn. 6), 174.

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science is not and should not be value-free. It follows that Jantsch would attempt to incorporate his systems construct into purposeful behavior via organization theory.[27] However, the purpose is *not* to solve problems; that is the shortcoming of "stratified systems thinking," as in the use of systems analysis for policy-making. The purpose is managing the system in its entirety. Jantsch's "system," then, is both a description of good reality and a normative political theory for manipulating that reality. Integrative planning is both purpose and instrument. What happens when "stratified systems thinking" is applied to solving problems is illustrated by the chaos which is the other reality, the bad one. Peace, for instance, instead of being the master concept for ordering the entire system, is construed to mean nation-centered and selfish behavior at lower strata in the system. Economic "problems" are never solved, because they are construed to be made up of economic elements and actors only. The UN First Development Decade failed because of such stratified thinking. Jantsch finds the essence of the contemporary crisis in the lack of superordinate purpose, the inadequacy of cognitive integration, and the misdefinitions of issues by actors who merely seek to "solve problems."

Jantsch's remedy is the "multiechelon system" of organizational action through multiechelon coordination.

> Multiechelon systems are composed of echelons (or levels) of subsystems, some or all of which—at all levels—may be goal-setting and decision units at the next higher hierarchical level. It is important to understand that the function of the higher-placed units is not one of rigid control, but of coordination. In a multiechelon system, no goal is defined *a priori*, or from the top, for the overall system—it results from the interaction of subsystemic goals, to the extent that they can be coordinated, and it may become modified if goals or coordinability change anywhere in the system. Energies and ambitions at *all* systems levels are brought into play, and the system is "alive" in many or all of its elements, thereby justifying the hierarchical structure.[28]

This organizational counterpart of the vision imposed on reality, both descriptively and prescriptively, permits the redefinition and relocation of otherwise insoluble problems at higher levels of abstraction and consciousness. For Jantsch the system *is* the truth; grasping the truth will make us, if not free, at least into integrative planners with the purpose to plan—the system. Circular normative theories, if they do

[27] Jantsch accepts Mesarovic's mathematical theory of organizational behavior for this purpose. See his chapter 11. Mihajlo D. Mesarovic, D. Macko, and Y. Takahara, *Theory of Hierarchical Multilevel Systems* (New York and London 1970).

[28] Jantsch (fn. 6), 171-72.

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not seem to help much in the construction of international regimes, at least make stirring mythologies.

If systems language were merely a pleasing metaphor, it would not matter very much that so much of a "definite fix" is being claimed; since much more than metaphor is involved, however, the mythology becomes mystification unless the scientific claim can be made a bit more definite. In 1968 Andrei Sakharov argued that the scientific societies of Russia and America, because of their built-in trends and impulses (subsystems), must tend toward *both* détente and internal democratization in Russia; in 1973 he ruefully admitted that détente can come about without democratization. Do systems have a life of their own irrespective of the volition of their human inmates? Can Kissinger and Brezhnev change the system of actual or potential convergence? Does it depend on the skill of the observer who defines and sketches the system? Does the system even exist outside the imagination of the observer?

The issue becomes acute when systemic properties of automatic adjustment or adaptation are being claimed. In Jantsch's case it seems that the "real" system (the one Jantsch prefers) exists side by side with the stratified system brought into existence by the foolish conduct of statesmen and scientists (or by the imagination of systems analysts?), and that the good will supplant the bad by virtue of consciousness raising. In the *Bellagio Declaration*, things are murkier still. The key sentence reads: "The need is to plan systems as a whole, to understand the totality of factors involved and to intervene in the structural design to achieve more integrated operation. All large, complex systems are capable of some degree of self-adaptation. But in the face of immense technological, political, social and economic stresses, they will have to develop new structures. This can easily lead to grave social disturbances if the adaptation is not deliberately planned, but merely allowed to happen."[29] The "system" is held capable of self-adaptation, i.e., of evolution toward a new equilibrium. That supposedly happens as a

[29] *Bellagio Declaration*, 8. The drafters of the declaration, in addition to Jantsch himself, included four distinguished futurists on whose work Jantsch often relies: Jay W. Forrester, Dennis Gabor, Hasan Ozbekhan, and Aurelio Peccei. Since the group also included a dozen others, it is apparent that no comprehensive consensus on the details of "the system" could be expected. In fact, many of the separate papers presented at the meeting display conceptions of social, physical, and biological "reality" which do not fit Jantsch's conceptualization. For an elaborate presentation with ample epistemological justification which is close to Jantsch's, see H. Ozbekhan, "Toward A General Theory of Planning," *ibid.*, 47-158. For a biological emphasis which hedges the question of how determinative adaptive-evolutionary systems are without human intervention, see René Dubos, "Future-Oriented Science," *ibid.*, 159-78, and Dubos, *Reason Awake* (New York 1970).

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result of dialectical strains and stresses triggered by various incongruent trends, including technological innovation. Fine. Then why the need to intervene? The new structures will evolve anyway. It is not clear whether the *evolution* of these new structures or their *lagging* will cause grave social disturbances. Probably the drafters meant the lag, because it is the adaptation that has to be planned. In other words, the "system" is not capable of self-adaptation after all. Evolution has to be helped along by the planners. Toward what end? As long as scientists did not link biological evolution to social life, the question of a teleology was never finally settled in Darwinian theory. But values assert themselves in the *Bellagio Declaration* because the evolution is clearly meant to lead to some better state of affairs, toward a "richer life." The drafters indulge in mystification by superimposing a systemically defined view of reality on political choice while being unwilling to opt on whether the system constrains the actors or whether the actors shape the system.

If Jantsch is the Jeremiah of international planning and the Bellagio group a more modest Hosea, the *Brooks Report* appears in the role of a pragmatic King Solomon. "Science and technology," the *Report* says, "form parts of a single system within national and international frameworks, interacting with other systems within those frameworks."[30] Unlike the more prophetic systemic visions, the "other systems" retain autonomous importance in this scheme; therefore, the approach remains essentially problem- and problem-solving-oriented. Science and technology interact with and intersect education, public health, and industry; they do *not* subsume them. Nor are the boundaries, though stipulated to exist, outlined with care, because:

> We lack an adequate science for the management and measurement of complex interacting systems and a rationale for breaking them down into sufficiently isolable sub-systems such that analysis of the sub-systems yields results that are relevant for the policies to be used in dealing with the system as a whole. . . . The essential method of science is to break down global problems into discrete and soluble problems, and we must be prepared to do this in tentative ways, realizing that any particular breakdown is only a first approximation, and we may have to start over again and proceeding some considerable distance.[31]

[30] *Brooks Report*, 17. But the "other systems" are sometimes called "subsystems" in the *Report*. The differences of opinion among the members of the panel may also be responsible for the inconsistent use of the systems construct. One member told me that he was not motivated by any commitment to systems thinking, and that he considered the use of systems language little more than a rhetorical flourish.

[31] *Ibid.*, 57.

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This comes perilously close to equating "system" with "big problem" and "sub-system" with "partial solution," an assumption actually featured in the systems-analytic approach to design.

Such an approach to planning does have a purpose. Subsystems, if left to themselves, do not develop in an orderly fashion. Economic growth, in particular, is found to be disruptive, discontinuous, nonlinear, and possibly destructive of an underlying sociobiological equilibrium between man, society, and nature (at which the *Report* hints in somewhat elusive terms). The purpose, then, is the stimulation of *orderly* subsystemic growth in such a way that social conflict is minimized, an increasing understanding of the harmony between man and nature is stimulated, and the pure knowledge-generation function of science is safeguarded.[32] As in the case of Jantsch, the specification of functions for science is heavily intertwined with the group's values, with the major difference that the *Brooks Report* is articulate about its value aspirations. Scientific research is desirable in its own right and, on balance, has contributed more good than ill to society. Science should provide more guidance in the choice of new technologies in order to bring the externalities currently associated with growth under control, and restore the social-biological-economic equilibrium. But since there can be no master plan, all this has to be done on a much more piecemeal basis than favored by the other two proposals under review. The major function of science should therefore not be the integration of the whole system of thought but the facilitation of political choice. The values of society cannot be definitely fixed, and therefore should be worked out through the normal process of democratic bargaining between interests. It is the function of science to improve the method of choosing between alternatives by demonstrating which future courses of action are more feasible than others, by suggesting which problems can be solved technologically, and by the early assessment of second-order consequences associated with technological change. The group argues that goals can be clarified by conducting extensive technology-economy-social welfare cost-benefit analyses prior to the unregulated introduction of new techniques. This requires better use of social science and especially of a set of social indicators.[33] In this sense alone does science acquire a guidance-and-control function, and only in this modest way can improved rationality be considered the reformer of presently fragmented reason.

[32] *Ibid.*, 18-20, 30-36.
[33] *Ibid.*, 38-39, 56-57, 62-65.

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IV. Systems and International Regimes

Our previous discussion of the use of systems theory in international relations has shown some of the perils of obfuscation associated with this prevalent mode of thought. Whenever normative assertions are associated with this approach, the risks of mistaking a mythology for a scientifically-validated claim to truth are greatly enhanced. In the present context this danger is compounded because the systems construct enjoys so much legitimacy in the natural sciences, especially in biology and ecology. The difference between real and hypothetical variables, demonstrated interaction patterns and those which are merely posited for heuristic purposes, thresholds, boundaries, and tolerances based on experimentation or observation as opposed to analytically phrased questions—all these need not preoccupy the natural scientist as they do the social scientist. It is understandable, if not condonable, that when biologists and engineers turn to international planning, they carry over into their discourse the concepts with which they are at ease. For others, however, mistaking metaphor or analogy—however suggestive—for demonstrated truth with practical consequences remains a grave risk. Social systems, even the "social system of science," are *not* natural systems in the same way as the ecology of alpine grazing lands, inshore waters, or the global temperature balance. In the "real" world they are the result of the will of man—and therefore subject to a different will when he changes his mind. In the "analytical" world they ought to be simply heuristic devices to aid our thinking. Hence they are never determinative. To pretend that they are is to play sorcerer's apprentice by introducing self-fulfilling prophecies.

Natural scientists seem less bothered by this distinction because they feel they can afford to "black-box" the units (molecules, cells, insects) so long as their "inside" can make no appreciable difference as far as the interactions are concerned. And since hypothetical variables are expected to be falsified or confirmed, the distinction between concrete and hypothetical systems is not an important one in natural science. It becomes very important, however, when natural science is applied to social relations and especially when a scientific rationality enriched by social science is supposed to be linked to international planning. The difficulty is acutely illustrated in Jantsch's treatment of systems; it is also manifest when systemic theorizing about biological/ecological phenomena is translated into the manipulation of evolution for social systems. The concrete function or chief attribute of the natural system

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(usually equilibrium) is then transferred to the social system as if it were a "fact" to be confirmed by proper policy, when it really is no more than a metaphor or a personal preference. The *Brooks Report* manages to escape this semantic confusion because the drafters never commit themselves to a straightforward usage of the systems construct at all, though they come close to treating the "system of science and technology" as a set of concrete variables which have produced determinate outcomes in the past but will no longer do so in the future.

This said, I can now summarize the quality of the two major proposals. For Jantsch, there seems to be no difference between natural and social systems; he treats all systems as if they were the same. A single perspective dominates his enterprise, and the attributes of both natural and social systems are either known or can be known. The proper use and place of science can integrate the two perspectives at a higher level of consciousness. His intent is to show that systems are made up of concrete variables. He shows how these variables *should be* thought of as constituting a whole (the good system), and why they *are actually* thought of as fragmented (the bad system). The intent is to assert that the good system is *simultaneously* a description of reality and an intellectual construct capable of turning the bad into the good. Both apparently are equally concrete, and the good is immanent in the bad. (One must be steeped in the invincible ignorance of linear-consecutive thinking not to appreciate this formulation.) The intent is also deterministic in that the rules discovered by the observer constitute a strong dynamic, even though the actors themselves may not be aware of this. Past behavior constitutes a historic super-logic which will come to a bad end; immanent behavior another super-logic leading to salvation. As to the method of analysis, Jantsch's is formal and deductive. His focus is on the whole, and the parts are interpreted in terms of their congruence (or lack thereof) with the whole. If the components do not act as the logic of the whole dictates, they tend to be classed as either fools or knaves. The ensemble of the method thus leads to what we have called a requisite or closed system. It is designed to move toward a specified end, although that end is a little fuzzy in this instance. The end then dictates the needs or requisites which have to be met in order to attain fulfillment, for which Jantsch formulates "functions." Their fine calibration then makes possible the attainment of the end.

In the *Brooks Report,* we cannot tell from the text whether natural and social systems are similar constructs. In any event, the authors express considerable modesty in talking about the use of science for

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their integration. The concreteness of the systems being talked about is in doubt as well. Certain statements, particularly about the links between science, technology, and industrial innovation suggest a concrete intent; but when syntheses are attempted between what is said about technology on the one hand and the economy and social arrangements on the other, the language becomes "analytical" in that no clear claim to picturing the "real" world faithfully is being made. In short, the intent of the authors is more heuristic than deterministic. They argue that conduct will follow certain patterns, but always under *ceteris paribus* conditions and without a claim to precise foreknowledge. While the patterns discussed are considered a historic superlogic of which the actors may be unaware, the ensemble is more of a reasonable checklist as to possible futures than a prediction. As to method, the lip service paid to the whole is less impressive than the attention lavished on the parts. Central attributes are not clearly defined. Essential rules of behavior are not specified. Transformations between system states are evoked rather than described. The demonstration proceeds upward from the sectors or parts to a dimly illuminated whole. It focuses on the actors rather than on the system. The method is that of open or evolutionary systems-theorizing which goes with informal and inductive investigation. There is a purpose of sorts—survival of the system, well-being, harmony—but it is so fuzzy as not to provide a focus for assessing the interaction of the other variables in a "purposive" manner. In short, the system is so open-ended as to leave us to wonder whether its announced evolutionary purpose carries any kind of teleological punch.

This brings us, finally, to the matter of international regimes. Heuristic/open systems-formulations are unlikely to suggest clear international options and institutions. They usually call for more studies, more precise measures of interactions, more satisfactory mapping of suspected linkages. While they may opt for many partial solutions to specific problems, they also shy away from comprehensive formulas because they cannot tell us with clarity toward what they wish to evolve. It may be true, as in the case of the *Brooks Report*, that the social values assumed to prevail are an accurate reflection of reality. But that, given the permeability and changeability of political conviction, is not the same as a holistic stance. Deterministic/requisite systems, on the other hand, attempt to specify with care the particular institutions needed for making the good prevail, as, in Jantsch's case, the International Systems Analysis Institute. But in keeping the final purpose well within sight,

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little effort is spent on working out how actors would have to behave (or behave differently) toward one another in order to make the good prevail. The value commitment of the system's designer now becomes central. He will tailor the system's purpose to the values he wishes to maximize. He will then say that his values should become the values of all. But he cannot tell us how this is to come about. And if his values happen not to coincide with those of important segments of society, the prophetic vision may become a totalitarian nightmare.

The case for an international regime is much weaker for the open-systems theorist. In the *Brooks Report* (the role of the multinational corporation apart), there is no overwhelming reason why the studies and the design of social indicators must be an international responsibility. If the work is persuasive enough, it should eventually influence governments and conduce toward harmonized policies even if done nationally or privately. If the world is defined in holistic terms, by contrast, the case for an international regime becomes considerably stronger. The difference in stance amounts to this: the *Brooks Report* represents the incremental reformist position which believes in the improvement of planning through slight institutional tinkering; science should be more systematically but humanely related to policy-making—thus once more making science safe for society and society for science; Jantsch and the *Bellagio Declaration* stand for the "total design" approach, which also aims at making science safe for society but is less concerned about making society hospitable to science.

"Total designers" opt for regimes which claim comprehensive functions involving the "total welfare" of the world. The tasks assigned to the regime are sweeping but, consequently, lack specificity. Moreover, they are highly controversial when compared to what governments and interest groups seem to recognize as necessary. Nor are they necessarily in harmony with the scientific consensus of the specialists involved—in part because the functions reflect values that are personal rather than being demonstrably diffused throughout the global society (which is the designer's "client"). Incrementalists, on the other hand, insist on tailoring their regimes to what they sense the public mood and its values to be. Hence the tasks are more modest in scope but more specific in detail. They can claim to rest on a degree of social consensus and, at least, on a minimum common denominator among scientific specialists. The *Brooks Report*, no doubt, is relatively modest in its suggestions; but it offers a reasonable and feasible international regime, given the limitations of the actors whom it addresses. To

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accept the proposals of the "total designers" requires an act of faith in the prophetic vision, since the intellectual gaps of the proposals foreclose acceptance on the basis of more consensual knowledge. And so their whole, perhaps, is left with even more holes than the more modest incrementalist suggestions.

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WHY BIG NATIONS LOSE SMALL WARS: THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

By ANDREW MACK*

A cursory examination of the history of imperialist expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century reveals one thing very clearly: Third-World resistance, where it existed, was crushed with speedy efficiency. In terms of conventional military thinking such successes were not unexpected. Indeed, together with the Allied experience in the first and second World Wars, they served to reinforce and to rigidify the pervasive notion that superiority in military capability (conventionally defined) will mean victory in war. However, the history of a number of conflicts in the period following World War II showed that military and technological superiority may be a highly unreliable guide to the outcome of wars. In Indochina (1946–54), Indonesia (1947–49), Algeria, Cyprus, Aden, Morocco, and Tunisia, local nationalist forces gained their objectives in armed confrontations with industrial powers which possessed an overwhelming superiority in conventional military capability. These wars were not exclusively a colonial phenomenon, as was demonstrated by the failure of the United States to defeat its opponents in Vietnam.

For some idea of the degree to which the outcome of these wars presents a radical break with the past, it is instructive to examine the case of Indochina. The French successfully subjugated the peoples of Indochina for more than sixty years with a locally based army only fifteen thousand strong. The situation changed dramatically after 1946, when the Vietnamese took up arms in guerrilla struggle. By 1954 the nationalist forces of the Vietminh had forced the French—who by this time had deployed an expeditionary force of nearly two hundred thousand men—to concede defeat and withdraw their forces in ignominy. Within twenty years, a vast U.S. military machine with an expeditionary force five hundred thousand strong had also been forced to withdraw.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to provide a "pre-theoretical

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perspective" within which the *outcome* of such "asymmetric conflicts" may be explained. In the field of conflict research, the study of the outcome and the conduct of wars, as against that of their *etiology*, has received remarkably little attention.[1] The outcome of "asymmetric conflicts" as described in this paper has been almost totally neglected.[2]

Arguably, it is easier to explain why the insurgents were *not* defeated than it is to explain the related but more interesting question—namely, how and why the external power was forced to withdraw. Since the former problem has been the subject of intense investigation both by specialists in counter-insurgency and strategists of guerrilla warfare, the greater part of this paper will deal with the latter problem. However, a few fairly obvious points need to be made before going on.

In analyzing the successes of the British at Omdurman against the Sudanese and the Italians in their war against local insurgents in Abyssinia, Mao Tse-tung has noted that defeat is the invariable outcome where native forces fight with inferior weapons against modernized forces *on the latter's terms*. Katzenbach writes in this context: "By and large, it would seem that what made the machinery of European troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to die, with glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain."[3] Second, it should be noted that in general this type of war met with little domestic opposition; success only served to increase public support.[4] Two interesting exceptions were the Boer War and the Irish Rebellion (1916–22); it is significant that in these conflicts the resistance to the British was both protracted and bitter and, in the metropolis, generated domestic opposition to the war.[5] Thus, the first condition for avoiding defeat is to refuse to confront the enemy on his own terms. To avoid being crushed,

[1] See Berenice A. Carroll, "War Termination and Conflict Theory," and William T. R. Fox, "The Causes of Peace and the Conditions of War," both in *How Wars End, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 392 (November 1970); and Elizabeth Converse, "The War of All Against All: A Review of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1957–68," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XII (December 1968).

[2] Exceptions are found in E. L. Katzenbach, "Time, Space and Will: The Politico-Military Strategy of Mao Tse-tung," in Lt. Col. T. N. Greene, ed., *The Guerrilla and How To Fight Him* (New York 1962); Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea* (New York 1965); and Joseph S. Kraemer, "Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare and the Decolonization Movement," *Polity*, IV (Winter 1971).

[3] Katzenbach (fn. 2), 15.

[4] See, for example, H. Wehler, "Industrial Growth and Early German Imperialism" in Robert Owen and Robert Sutcliffe, eds., *Theories of Imperialism* (London 1972).

[5] Two excellent recent studies dealing directly with domestic opposition to these wars are: Stephen Koss, *The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement* (Chicago 1973), and D. G. Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918–22* (London 1972).

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the insurgent forces must retain a degree of invulnerability, but the defensive *means* to this end will depend on the conditions of the war. In guerrilla warfare in the classical sense, the "people sea" forms a sanctuary of popular support for the "guerrilla fish"; in urban guerrilla warfare the anonymity of the city provides protection. Operating in uninhabited areas and supplied from without (e.g., the post-1968 North Vietnamese operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Vietnam War), the insurgents may simply rely on the mountains and forests to conceal and protect them.

For students of strategy the importance of these wars lies in the fact that the simplistic but once prevalent assumption—that conventional military superiority necessarily prevails in war—has been destroyed. What is also interesting is that although the metropolitan powers did not *win* militarily, neither were they *defeated* militarily. Indeed the military defeat of the metropolis itself was impossible since the insurgents lacked an invasion capability. In every case, success for the insurgents arose not from a military victory on the ground—though military successes may have been a contributory cause—but rather from the progressive attrition of their opponents' *political* capability to wage war. In such asymmetric conflicts, insurgents may gain political victory from a situation of military stalemate *or even defeat.*

The most recent and obvious example of this type of conflict is the American war in Vietnam, which has brought home several important lessons. First, it has provided the most obvious demonstration of the falsity of the assumptions that underlie the "capability" conception of power.[6] Not only does superiority in military force (conventionally defined) not guarantee victory; it may, under certain circumstances, be positively counter-productive.[7] Second, the Vietnam conflict has demonstrated how, under certain conditions, the theatre of war extends well beyond the battlefield to encompass the polity and social institutions of the external power. The Vietnam war may be seen as having been fought on two fronts—one bloody and indecisive in the forests and mountains of Indochina, the other essentially nonviolent—but ultimately more decisive—within the polity and social institutions of the United States. The nature of the relationship between these two

[6] Problems with different conceptions of power in this context are examined in Andrew Mack, "The Concept of Power and its Uses in Explaining Asymmetric Conflict," Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research (London 1974).

[7] The least ambiguous demonstrations of this apparently paradoxical assertion are to be found in the relatively rare cases of successful nonviolent resistance to armed aggression. See Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, *War Without Weapons: Non-Violence in National Defence* (London 1974).

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conflicts—which are in fact different facets of the same conflict—is critical to an understanding of the outcome of the war. However, the American experience was in no sense unique, except to Americans. In 1954 the Vietminh destroyed the French forces which were mustered at Dien Bien Phu in a classic set piece battle. The direct military costs to the French have been much exaggerated; only 3 per cent of the total French forces in Indochina were involved. The psychological effects—like those of the Tet offensive some fourteen years later—were shattering, however. The Vietminh did not of course defeat France militarily. They lacked not only the capability but also any interest in attempting such a move. Dien Bien Phu, however, had the effect of destroying the *political* capability ("will" in the language of classical strategy) of the French Government to mobilize further troops and to continue the struggle—this despite the fact that the greater part of the financial costs of the war were being borne by the United States. Third, the Vietnam war, which for the Vietnamese revolutionaries has now lasted over a quarter of a century, has emphasized the enormous importance which guerrilla strategists place on "protracted warfare." This is articulated most clearly in Mao Tse-tung's works, but it is also found in the military writings of General Giap and Truong Chinh and in the works of the leading African guerrilla strategists, Cabral and Mondlane. The certainty of eventual victory which is the result of intensive political mobilization by the guerrilla leadership is the key to what Rosen sees as a critical factor in such conflicts—namely, the willingness to absorb costs.[8] Katzenbach has noted of Mao's strategic theory that it is based on the premise that "if the totality of the population can be made to resist surrender, this resistance can be turned into a war of attrition which will eventually and inevitably be victorious."[9] Or, as Henry Kissinger more succinctly observed in 1969: "The guerrilla wins if he does not lose."[10]

Above all, Vietnam has been a reminder that in war the ultimate aim must be to affect the will of the enemy. Most strategic theorists would of course concur with this view. But in practice, and at the risk of oversimplification, it may be noted that it is a prevalent military belief that if an opponent's military capability to wage war can be destroyed, his "will" to continue the struggle is irrelevant since the means to that end are no longer available. It is not surprising that this

[8] Steven Rosen, "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer," in Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (London 1972).

[9] Katzenbach (fn. 2), 18.

[10] Henry A. Kissinger, "The Vietnam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVII (January 1969), 214.

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should be a prevalent belief in modern industrial societies: strategic doctrine tends to mold itself to available technology, as critics of strategic weapons deployment have forcefully pointed out. Neither is it surprising that guerrilla strategists should see strategy in very different terms. Lacking the technological capability or the basic resources to destroy the external enemy's military capability, they must of necessity aim to destroy his political capability. If the external power's "will" to continue the struggle is destroyed, then its military capability—no matter how powerful—is totally irrelevant. One aim of this paper is to show how and why, in certain types of conflict, conventional military superiority is not merely useless, but may actually be counter-productive. The implications for those military systems which rely almost wholly on industrial power and advanced technology need hardly be spelled out.

As I have noted above, in none of the asymmetric conflicts did the local insurgents have the capability to invade their metropolitan opponents' homeland. It *necessarily* follows that insurgents can only achieve their ends if their opponents' *political* capability to wage war is destroyed. This is true whether the insurgents are revolutionaries or right-wing nationalists, whether they rely on guerrilla warfare, urban terrorism, or even nonviolence. The destruction of the external power's forces in the field places no *material* obstacle in its path which will prevent it from simply mobilizing more forces at home and dispatching them to the battlefront. The constraints on mobilization are political, not material. In none of the conflicts noted was more than a fraction of the total *potential* military resources of the metropolitan power in fact mobilized. The U.S. war in Vietnam has by any measure had the greatest impact on international and American domestic politics of any conflict since World War II, but the maximum number of U.S. troops in Vietnam at the peak of the ground war in 1968 amounted to less than one quarter of one per cent of the American population. The political constraints operating against full mobilization of the metropolitan forces arise as a consequence of the conflicts in the metropolis—both within the political elite and in the wider society—which the war, *by its very nature*, will inevitably tend to generate. To paraphrase Clausewitz, politics may become the continuation of war by other means. Therefore the military struggle on the ground must be evaluated not in terms of the narrow calculus of military tactics, but in terms of its political impact in the metropolis: "Battles and campaigns are amenable to analysis as rather self-contained contests of military power. . . . By contrast, the final outcome of

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wars depends on a much wider range of factors, many of them highly elusive—such as the war's impact on domestic politics. . . ."[11] The significance of particular battles does not lie in their outcome as "self-contained contests of military power." Thus, although the United States could contend that the 1968 Tet offensive marked a dramatic defeat for the revolutionary forces in terms of the macabre military calculus of "body counts," the offensive was in fact a major strategic defeat for the U.S., marking the turning point in the war. The impact of Tet on American domestic politics led directly to the incumbent President's decision not to stand for another term of office. And, for the first time, military requests for more resources (a further 200,000 men) were refused *despite the fact* that the military situation had worsened.

Even where military victory over the insurgents is unambiguous—as in General Massu's destruction of the FLN infrastructure in the notorious Battle of Algiers—this is still no sure guide to the outcome of the conflict. Despite the fact that the FLN never regained the military initiative, the French abandoned their struggle within four years. Indeed, the barbarous methods used by Massu to achieve that victory, including the widespread use of torture, were instrumental in catalyzing opposition to the war in metropolitan France.

The Algerian war is an instructive example of our thesis. Between 1954 and 1962 there was a radical shift in the balance of political forces in metropolitan France. The *colon* (white settler) class of Algeria was the chief political victim. A few days after fighting broke out, the leftist Minister of the Interior, François Mitterand, responded to a suggestion that Paris should negotiate with the rebels by stating flatly that in the Algerian *départements* "the only negotiation is war." Yet seven and a-half years later, De Gaulle had not only granted the rebels all their initial demands (including some they had not even considered when fighting broke out), but received overwhelming support from the majority of the French population in doing so. Significantly, the last task of the French Army (which had itself attempted a coup against the Gaullist government) was to hunt down the terrorists of the OAS—the diehard remnants of the *colon* class in whose interests the military had intervened in the first place.

French policy throughout this conflict—as metropolitan policy in other asymmetric conflicts—was beset by what Mao Tse-tung calls "contradictions." The initial military repression directed against the rebels achieved for the militants what they had been unable to achieve

[11] Fred Charles Iklé, *Every War Must End* (London 1971), 1-2.

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for themselves—namely, the political mobilization of the masses against the French.

As the rebellion became more broadly based, more numerous forces and ever more extreme methods were used to attempt to quell it. The French also tried to buy off nationalist aspirations by offering to grant some of the political demands which had initially been made by the insurgents—only to find that these had been radically escalated. Offers of concessions were—as is frequently the case in such conflicts—both too small and too late. The more forces the French deployed (ultimately four hundred thousand men), the greater was the impact which the war had in the metropolis. It was not so much the inhumanity of the war *per se* that generated opposition in France; the majority of French men and women were no more sympathetic to the FLN than were the majority of Americans to the NLF in Vietnam. The major cause of opposition lay not in the enormous costs of the war to the *Algerians* (though this was a factor), but in the costs of the war to the French themselves. The progressively greater human, economic, and political costs gave rise to the phenomenon of "war weariness" which many writers have described without analyzing, and to the "loss of political will" of the government to which the military invariably ascribed the defeat. Thus it can be seen that the shift in the balance of political forces in metropolitan France was of critical importance in determining the outcome of the war. Political leaders in such conflicts do not grant insurgent demands because they undergo a sudden change of heart. They concede because they have no choice.

Why are asymmetries in structure important, and what do we in fact mean by "asymmetry" in this context? We must first note that the *relationship* between the belligerents is *asymmetric*. The insurgents can pose no direct threat to the survival of the external power because, as already noted, they lack an invasion capability. On the other hand, the metropolitan power poses not simply the threat of invasion, but the reality of occupation. This fact is so obvious that its implications have been ignored. It means, crudely speaking, that for the insurgents the war is "total," while for the external power it is necessarily "limited." Full mobilization of the total military resources of the external power is simply not politically possible. (One might conceive of cases where this is not the case—as in a popularly backed "holy war" for example—but such possibilities are of no relevance to the present discussion.) Not only is full mobilization impossible politically, it is not thought to be in the least *necessary*. The asymmetry in conventional military capability is so great and the confidence that military might will prevail

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is so pervasive that expectation of victory is one of the hallmarks of the initial endeavor.

The fact that one belligerent possesses an invasion capability and the other does not is a function of the differences in level of industrial and technological capability of the two sides. The asymmetric *relationship* is thus a function of the asymmetry in "resource power."

Some strategic implications of symmetric and asymmetric conflict relations may now be spelled out. The insurgents, faced with occupation by a hostile external power, are able to capitalize on those powerful forces to which political scientists have given the label "nationalism." What this means essentially is that disparate and sometimes conflicting national groups may find a common unity—a national interest—in opposing a common enemy. In that case the cohesion generated is only *indirectly* a consequence of the asymmetry in resource power: its social and psychological bonds are to be found in the common hostility felt toward the external enemy.

Clausewitz noted that war only approximates to its "pure form" when a "grand and powerful purpose" is at stake.[12] Only then will the full mobilization of national resources become a possibility, and only then will the diverse and sometimes conflicting goals that various national groups pursue in time of peace be displaced by a single overriding strategic aim—"the overthrow of the enemy." In a *symmetric*, "total war" situation where the survival of *both sides* is at stake, both have a "grand and powerful purpose" to defend. Thus, other things being equal, the potential for internal divisions arising in either camp is small relative to the potential for domestic conflict in the homeland of the metropolitan power involved in an *asymmetric* conflict. In symmetric conflicts, *ceteris paribus,* the absence of constraints on the mobilization and the use of conventional military force maximize the strategic utility of conventional warfare. Examples of *symmetric* "total wars" are the first and second World Wars and civil wars in which the struggle can be seen in zero-sum terms—as one of survival. However, although the external-enemy/internal-cohesion thesis of sociologists like Simmel and Coser has been widely accepted, the relationship is not as simple as some writers appear to think. Coser follows Williams in agreeing that there has to be a minimal consensus that the group (or nation) is a "going concern," and that there must be recognition of an outside threat which is thought to menace the group *as a whole*, not just some part of it. Coser notes of the second World War that "attempts at centralization by the

[12] The final chapter of Boserup and Mack (fn. 7) discusses Clausewitzian strategic theory and its application to "asymmetric conflicts."

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French Government were unavailing and could not mend the basic cleavages nor remedy the lack of social solidarity."[13] We may add to this two more conditions which will affect national unity in the face of external threat. First, resistance must be perceived as a viable alternative to surrender. It is noteworthy that after the collapse of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in the second World War, resistance to the Nazis in occupied Europe was very often led by Communists for whom surrender meant extermination. A majority of the population of the occupied countries perceived surrender as a more viable alternative than resistance—at least until it appeared that the tide of the war had turned against the Nazis. Resistance movements whose members share a revolutionary ideology which has as one of its basic tenets the belief that "protracted war" will ultimately be victorious, will, by definition, see resistance as an obvious alternative to surrender. Second, since occupation is likely to have adverse consequences for all groups, but much worse for some than for others, such national unity as does occur will not be unshakable. But it will be enormously reinforced by what may be called the "bandwagon effect."[14] Dissent will be heavily proscribed and sanctioned socially as well as by the leadership.

Even though it is not possible to be precise about the conditions which *necessarily* generate national solidarity in the face of an external threat, we may note the following two points with respect to asymmetric conflicts:

(a) An external threat is a necessary if not sufficient condition for the emergence of a popular front.

(b) Occupation and military repression by the metropolitan power has *in fact* produced the nationalist unity predicted by the Coser-Simmel thesis. (One interesting exception is the confrontation in Malaysia, where there was a deep cleavage dividing the Chinese insurgents from the Malays.) Indeed, it is possible to argue that in some cases the repression did not so much intensify a pre-existing basic consensus as create one.

(c) More importantly, there was no comparable unifying external force in the case of the metropolitan power. On the contrary, in every case where the insurgents won, the war was a profoundly divisive issue.

Those scholars who are expounding the "paradox" that external conflict will both increase and decrease domestic conflict (see below) are guilty of creating a false dichotomy. Contrast the situation in the United

[13] Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York 1956), 87-110.
[14] Boserup and Mack (fn. 7), chap. 1.

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States, as the war escalated in Vietnam, with that of Britain facing the Nazis in the second World War. In the former case we see the progressive escalation of domestic opposition to the war creating deep divisions within U.S. society. In the latter, "The Nazi attack appreciably increased the internal cohesion of the British social system, temporarily narrowing the various political, social and economic fissures that existed in British society."[15] In Britain the electoral process was suspended for the duration of the conflict in order to form a coalition "national government." In the various "wars of national liberation" we see precisely the same process in the formation of "popular fronts." Indeed, the label "National Liberation Front" is found in some guise in nearly all these conflicts, though rarely in civil wars.[16]

It is my contention that the process of political attrition of the metropolitan power's capability to continue to wage war is *not* the consequence of errors of generalship, though these may well occur. Rather, it is a function of the *structure* of the conflict, of the nature of the conflictual relationship between the belligerents. Where the war is perceived as "limited"—because the opponent is "weak" and can pose no direct threat—the prosecution of the war does not take automatic primacy over other goals pursued by factions within the government, or bureaucracies or other groups pursuing interests which compete for state resources. In a situation of total war, the prosecution of the war *does* take automatic primacy above all other goals. Controversies over "guns or butter" are not only conceivable in a Vietnam-type conflict, but inevitable. In a total-war situation they would be inconceivable: guns would get *automatic* priority. In contrast to the total-war situation, the protagonists of a limited war have to compete for resources—human, economic, and political—with protagonists of other interests—governmental, bureaucratic, "interest groups," and so forth. Clearly, if the war is terminated quickly and certain benefits are believed to be accruing from victory (as in the case of the mini-wars of colonial expansion) the *potential* for divisive domestic conflict on the war issue will not be realized. But this is simply another way of stating that if the insurgents are to win, they must not lose.

In his highly prophetic paper published in 1969, Henry Kissinger observed of America's war in Vietnam: "We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we

[15] Coser (fn. 13), 87-110; quotation from p. 95.

[16] The obvious point here is that "nationalism" is normally a meaningless concept except in relation to an external environment. "Nationalism" may be significant in civil wars that are based on an ethnic conflict but not on class conflict.

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lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win."[17]

In a similar vein, E. L. Katzenbach in 1962 described Mao Tse-tung's general strategic approach as follows: "Fundamental to all else, Mao says, is the belief that countries with legislative bodies simply cannot take a war of attrition, either financially or, in the long run, psychologically. Indeed, the very fact of a multi-party structure makes commitment to a long war so politically suicidal as to be quite impossible.... When the financial burden increases from month to month, the outcry against the war will itself weaken the ability of the troops to fight. The war that Mao's theory contemplates is the cheapest for him to fight and the most expensive for the enemy."[18]

In order to avoid defeat, the insurgents must retain a minimum degree of invulnerability. In order to *win*, they must be able to impose a steady accumulation of "costs" on their opponent. They must not only be undefeated; they must be *seen* to be undefeated. Strategically, the insurgents' aim must be to provoke the external power into escalating its forces on the ground. This *in itself* will incur economic and political costs in the metropolis. Such a process of escalation did in fact mark the history of the conflicts in Indochina, Algeria, Portuguese Africa, Vietnam, and the current conflict in Ulster. The *direct* costs the insurgents impose on the external power will be the normal costs of war—troops killed and matériel destroyed. But the aim of the insurgents is not the destruction of the military capability of their opponents as an *end in itself*. To attempt such a strategy would be lunatic for a small Third-World power facing a major industrial power. Direct costs become of strategic importance when, and only when, they are translated into indirect costs. These are psychological and political: their objective is to amplify the "contradictions in the enemy's camp."

In the metropolis, a war with no visible payoff against an opponent who poses no direct threat will come under increasing criticism as battle casualties rise and economic costs escalate. Obviously there will still be groups in the metropolis whose ideological commitments will lead them to continue to support the government's war policy; others (munitions manufacturers, for example) may support the war because they have more material interests at stake. But if the war escalates dramatically, as it did in Algeria and Vietnam, it makes a definite impact on the economic and political resources which might otherwise have been allocated to, say, public welfare projects. Tax increases may be

[17] Kissinger (fn. 10), 214.

[18] Katzenbach (fn. 2), 18.

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necessary to cover the costs of the war, a draft system may have to be introduced, and inflation will be an almost certain by-product. Such costs are seen as part of the "necessary price" when the security of the nation is directly threatened. When this is not the case, the basis for consensus disappears. In a limited war, it is not at all clear to those groups whose interests are adversely affected why such sacrifices are necessary.[19]

But that is only part of the story. Just as important is the fact that the necessity for the sacrifices involved in fighting and risking death will appear less obvious to the conscripts and even the professional soldiers when the survival of the nation is not directly at stake. American soldiers fought well in the second World War, but the last years in Vietnam were marked by troop mutinies, widespread drug addiction, high levels of desertion, and even the murders of over-zealous officers intent on sending their men out on dangerous patrols. This in fact led to a strong feeling among some senior U.S. Army officers that it was necessary to get out of Vietnam before morale collapsed completely. It is impossible to explain such a dramatic deterioration of morale within the army and the massive opposition to the draft without reference to the *type* of war being fought.

There is also the question of the morality of the war. When the survival of the nation is not directly threatened, and when the obvious asymmetry in conventional military power bestows an underdog status on the insurgent side, the morality of the war is more easily questioned. It is instructive to note that during World War II the deliberate Allied attempt to terrorize the working-class populations of Dresden and other German cities generated no moral outrage in Britain. This despite the fact that the thousand-bomber raids were designed to create fire storms so devastating in effect that more people died in one night of bombing over Dresden than perished in the Hiroshima holocaust. On the other hand, the aerial bombardment of civilian localities in Vietnam, the use of herbicides and defoliants, napalm, and anti-personnel weapons have been all met with widespread controversy and protest. One should not deduce from this that the British public was more callous to the effects of human suffering than was the American.

[19] Some interesting and recent theoretical work in the "issue area" literature is relevant to this discussion; see in particular Theodore J. Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World: National Politics," in James Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York 1967); and William Zimmerman, "Issue Area and Foreign Policy Process," *American Political Science Review*, LXVII (December 1973). The literature on "bureaucratic politics" and "linkage politics" is also relevant.

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Moral outrage is in large part a function of the interests perceived to be at stake in the conflict. Where survival is the issue, the propensity to question and protest the morality of the means used to defeat the enemy is markedly attenuated.

As the war drags on and the costs steadily escalate without the "light at the end of the tunnel" becoming more visible, the divisions generated within the metropolis become *in themselves* one of the political costs of the war. The government—or, more precisely, that faction of the government which is committed to the war—will continue to argue that prosecuting the war *is* in the national interest, that vital security interests *are* at stake, that the international credibility and prestige of the nation is at issue, and so forth. Whether or not these claims bear any relationship to reality—whether they are wholly true or wholly false—is quite immaterial. What counts in the long run is what the opponents of the war believe to be at stake and how much political capital they can muster.

Finally, another word about "contradiction." Mao and Giap have repeatedly emphasized that the principal contradiction which the imperialist army must confront on the ground derives from the fact that forces dispersed to control territory become spread so thinly that they are vulnerable to attack. If forces are concentrated to overcome this weakness, other areas are left unguarded. For the external power to overcome this contradiction requires a massive increase in metropolitan forces; but this immediately increases the domestic costs of the war. On the other hand, if the imperialists wish to pacify the opposition at home by withdrawing some of their forces, the contradiction on the battlefronts is sharpened. Any attempt to resolve one contradiction will magnify the other. The guerrilla strategists understand perfectly that the war they fight takes place on two fronts and the conflict must be perceived as an integrated whole. From this perspective, those who oppose the war in the metropolis act *objectively*—regardless of their subjective political philosophies—as a strategic resource for the insurgents. Governments are well aware of this, since it is they who have to confront the political constraints. Yet government accusations that those opposed to the war are "aiding the enemy" are contemptuously rejected. They are nevertheless objectively correct. From this perspective we can also see why the slogan "imperialism is a paper tiger" is by no means inaccurate. It is not that the material resources of the metropolitan power are in themselves underestimated by the revolutionaries; rather, there is an acute awareness that the political constraints on their

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maximum deployment are as real as if those resources did not exist, and that these constraints become more rather than less powerful as the war escalates.

Few attempts have been made to analyze the outcome of asymmetric conflicts systematically. Among those few, even fewer have seen the asymmetries which characterize the conflict as being critical to an understanding of the outcome. However, some aspects have been touched on. Rosen considers the asymmetry in power and "willingness to suffer costs"; Katzenbach examines the asymmetry in "tangible" and "intangible resources"; Galtung distinguishes between "social" and "territorial defense" (asymmetry in goals); Kissinger, as already noted, mentions asymmetry in overall strategy (physical versus psychological attrition); and Kraemer distinguishes "colonial" versus "non-colonial" guerrilla wars.[20] An examination of the conflict in the light of any of *these* asymmetries provides certain insights into particular aspects of the war, but misses the overall picture. The asymmetries described in this paper—in the interests perceived to be at stake, in *mobilization*, in *intervention capability*, in "*resource power*," and so forth—are abstracted from their context for the sake of analytical clarity. But the whole remains greater than the sum of its parts, and it is the conflict *as a whole* which must be studied in order to understand its evolution and outcome.

Some writers interested in the *etiology* of conflict have argued that the nature of the state polity mediates the link between internal and external conflict.[21] The same question is of relevance with respect to the relatively neglected problem of understanding the *outcome* of international conflicts. *Is* the process of attrition of the political capability to wage war, which we observe so clearly in the Vietnam and Algerian conflicts, a function of the nature of the polity of the metropolitan powers involved? Some writers clearly believe that it is. With respect to Vietnam, Edmund Ions notes: "Whilst the freedom to demonstrate —even for defeatism in foreign policy—is clearly one of the strengths of a free society, *it is also one of its weaknesses so far as power politics is concerned*."[22] The argument of Ions and other writers is roughly as follows. In contrast to "open" societies, where dissent is permitted, dissent is repressed in "closed" or "totalitarian" societies. Therefore

[20] Rosen (fn. 8); Katzenbach (fn. 2); Kissinger (fn. 10); Kraemer (fn. 2); see also Johan Galtung, "Mot et Nytt Forsvarsbegrep," *Pax*, No. 1 (Oslo 1965).

[21] E.g., Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Models for the Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of States," in Russett (fn. 8).

[22] Edmund Ions, "Dissent in America: The Constraints on Foreign Policy," *Conflict Studies*, No. 18 (London 1971); emphasis in original.

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totalitarian societies will not be troubled by the domestic constraints which have bedeviled U.S. policy-makers on Vietnam, for instance. In some of the best-known examples of asymmetric conflict in which the insurgents gained their objectives—Indochina, Algeria, Cyprus, Aden, Palestine, and Indonesia—the metropolitan power which conceded defeat was a "democracy." Asymmetric conflicts in which the external power successfully crushed the opposition (or has yet to be beaten) include Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Portugal's ongoing war in Africa. In these cases, the metropolitan regime may be described as "closed," "centrist," "totalitarian," or whatever; in any case, popular domestic opposition is not tolerated. In addition to the government proscribing opposition, it may be withholding information. The brutalities inflicted on civilians may go unreported, the costs of the war to the economy concealed, and the number of troops killed minimized. Ions in the paper quoted, and other supporters of the U.S. war in Indochina, have come close to recommending censorship for precisely these reasons. The French military strategist Trinquier, with greater concern for logic than for political reality, argues that in order to prevent the rot of "defeatism" or "lack of political will" from betraying the troops in the field, the entire structure of the metropolitan society must be altered.[23] The general point has some validity. In Laos, a greater number of civilian refugees was created by U.S. bombing missions than in Vietnam, yet the "secret war" in Laos attracted far less attention and controversy because the press was specifically excluded from the battle zones. Despite these obvious points, my main contention—that limited wars by their very nature will generate domestic constraints if the war continues—is not disproved. In terms of the argument put forward here, "politics" under *any* political system involves conflict over the allocation of resources. In closed or centrist polities, these conflicts will by and large be confined to the ruling elite—but not necessarily so. The argument may be exemplified by examining the case of Portugal.* Clearly, popular opposition to the war in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau could not manifest itself in Portugal as did opposition to the Vietnam war in the United States. But there were nevertheless major controversies within the ruling Portuguese elite concerning the desirability —the costs and benefits—of continuing war in Africa: "[T]here seem

[23] P. Trinquier, *Modern Warfare* (New York 1964).

* This article was completed before the Spinola coup in Portugal in the spring of 1974. A brief discussion of the implications of the coup, and those of the recent developments in the Ulster crisis, has been added to the conclusion.

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to be three main currents when it comes to the major direction of orientation for Portugal: the colonialist tradition in various versions which still believe in 'Portuguese Africa,' the old 'Lucitanian tradition' that would base Portuguese future on the Portugal/Brazil axis, and the 'Europeans' for whom the European Community must appear as a very attractive haven of escape."[24] The younger generation of "modernizing technocrats" clearly see Portugal's future as allied with the European Community and realize equally clearly that the price of a closer association with the EEC is the cessation of the war in Africa. Portugal is also an interesting case in the sense that, in addition to domestic constraints, there are also powerful *international* constraints, Portugal being critically dependent on the NATO countries for the arms needed to fight the war in Africa. This support is, needless to say, highly undependable, not only because it has already come under sustained attack from some of the north-European NATO powers, but more obviously because Portugal has a far greater dependence on NATO than NATO has on Portugal. Finally, popular domestic opposition has in the past manifested itself *indirectly*, as thousands of Portuguese "voted with the feet" by emigrating to the European Community.

It remains to be explained why Portugal, the oldest and weakest of imperial powers, should have clung to her colonies long after her more powerful rivals surrendered by granting independence to their colonial dependencies. The usual explanation is that it is a matter of an ideological—and essentially irrational—obsession with "manifest destiny." However, without denying that there may be a powerful contingent of genuine ideologues within the Portuguese polity who support the war for these reasons, this does not provide the whole answer. Those most loyal to the "Portuguese connection" are the Portuguese settlers in the territories themselves—loyal in the sense of total opposition to black rule. But this loyalty—like the loyalty of Ulster Protestants, white Rhodesians or white *colons* in Algeria—is highly unreliable.[25] The settler class will bitterly resist any attempt to hand over control to the

[24] Johan Galtung, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (London 1973), 166.

[25] As Emmanuel notes of the "settler class" in "colonial" situations: "They benefitted from colonialism and therefore promoted it, without reserve or contradiction—and for that very reason they were basically anti-imperialist, however paradoxical that may seem. From the very beginning they were in conflict with their parent countries . . . objectively so at all times, subjectively so at times of crisis, going so far as to take up arms against it." Argirihi Emmanuel, "White Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism," *New Left Review*, No. 73 (May/June 1972), 38-39.

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indigenous population; it thereby provides a powerful brake on any move towards independence.

For the settler class, *qua* settler class, the granting of independence to the indigenous population poses a direct threat to local European hegemony in both the political and economic spheres. If pressures in the metropolis are such that withdrawal from the colonies appears likely —as seems highly possible following the Spinola coup of the spring of 1974—there may well be moves by the settlers to attempt a type of go-it-alone, Unilateral Declaration of Independence strategy along Rhodesian lines. The *colons* in Algeria tried this strategy when it became obvious that De Gaulle was going to give in to Moslem demands for independence. They failed, but the white Rhodesians succeeded. In the current Ulster crisis there is little doubt that such a strategy would be attempted—and would most likely succeed if it became clear to the Protestant majority that the British were going to withdraw—as seems increasingly possible. The "settlers" exhibit "ultra-loyalism" towards the "mother country" up to the moment at which they appear to have been deserted. If the break *does* succeed, the structure of the conflict changes completely. If the metropolitan power does not intervene against the settlers' rebellion (Algeria) but instead simply makes nonmilitary protests (Britain against Rhodesia) then the conflict becomes symmetric: a zero-sum struggle for ascendancy, essentially a civil war in which the settler class has a survival stake in the outcome. The settlers will in many ways prove to be a more formidable enemy than was the vastly more powerful metropolitan power, because the constraints against the use of force will be almost completely absent in their case. Thus the task of nationalist movements trying to bring down the settler regimes in Israel, Rhodesia, and South Africa is extremely onerous. The question for these regimes is not *whether* to fight the insurgents but *how*. In other words, despite superficial similarities in tactics and in descriptive language—"Palestinian guerrillas," "national liberation struggle,"—the "settler-regime" conflicts are fundamentally different from asymmetric conflicts.

There is another, perhaps equally powerful reason why the Portuguese resisted independence so bitterly. It is extremely difficult to calculate the economic costs and benefits which Portugal derives from her overseas territories, in part because exchange controls are artificially manipulated. However, even if it could be unequivocally demonstrated that the costs of the war exceed by a wide margin the *present* economic benefits which Portugal derives from her colonies—most particularly

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Angola—it would not invalidate the hypothesis that a major Portuguese interest in maintaining the colonial possessions is economic. Oil in large quantities has already been discovered in the overseas territories, and there are also extensive and as yet barely exploited mineral reserves. Portugal therefore has a considerable economic interest in trying to maintain control in these areas.[26] When France and Britain relinquished their African colonies, they relinquished also the economic costs of administration while retaining whatever benefits they derived from their investments and from special trade relationships. Portugal is in a very different position. Since Portugal is relatively underdeveloped economically, the benefits she derives from her overseas territories are based on political rather than economic control. The key economic enterprises in the overseas territories are increasingly dominated by non-Portuguese capital (in contrast to the situation in French and British African colonies before independence). If Portugal were to relinquish political control in Africa, she would lose not only the present economic benefits but also the more important future benefits. The so-called neo-colonial solution is not a possibility for the Portuguese.

In discussing Portugal by way of exemplification of my argument, I have raised three possible hypotheses, which might be formulated as follows:

(1) The political attrition of the metropolitan power's war-making capability appears to be positively correlated with the degree of "openness" of the political system and negatively correlated with the degree of "closeness" of the political system. Democratic polyarchies are apparently most susceptible to internal opposition to external wars, while totalitarian "centrist" states are less susceptible to such opposition. This argument is subject to severe qualification (see below).

(2) Where a metropolitan settler class exists in the insurgents' homeland, it will have a survival interest in the conflict and will thus act as a powerful countervailing "brake" to forces in the metropolis which favor a pull-out. If the latter forces prevail, there will be a strong push from the settler class for a U.D.I.-type break with the metropolis along Rhodesian lines. If this succeeds, the conflict ceases to be asymmetric as defined here.

(3) In a limited war, despite the fact that there is no direct threat to physical survival of the metropolis, there may well be other power-

[26] For a detailed argument of this point see Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, *Portuguese Colonialism from South Africa to Europe* (Freiburg 1972).

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ful interests to be protected. The greater the salience of these interests, the greater the resistance to withdrawal will be in the metropolis.

The last point brings us to the two other examples noted above—the Russian interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). It is obvious that one of the necessary conditions noted earlier for the process of political attrition to manifest itself was absent. In both cases the local resistance was effectively and rapidly crushed.[27]

From the Soviet point of view, the security interest, while not one of a direct threat of invasion, was nevertheless highly salient. For example, Russian interests in maintaining Czechoslovakia under Soviet control were two-fold. As Zeman notes, Czechoslovakia had a key position in the Soviet system: "It is a workshop where a lot of Russian and East-European raw material is processed; the country's territory forms a tunnel leading from western Europe directly to the Soviet Union."[28] Second, for the U.S.S.R., twice invaded this century from the West at a cost of millions of lives, a certain fixation on security interests was understandable. But the strategic costs of relinquishing control over Czechoslovakia were not simply the direct costs of creating a *physical* gap in the chain of satellite buffer states. The real risk from the Soviet point of view was that the subversive ideology of national determination, of "socialism with a human—i.e., non-Russian—face" might spread first to the other satellite states of Eastern Europe and ultimately to the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 is a similar case in point.

These examples show that it is virtually impossible to produce a model of asymmetric conflict which would be sufficiently flexible to account for the outcome of the cases of conflict that might be included under that rubric. Neither is it evident that this would be desirable. The problem with using models to explain conflicts is that there is a natural tendency to attempt to force the data to fit the requirements of the theory. The risks lie in ignoring other factors which might fall within the category sometimes labeled "accidents of history," but which may nevertheless be of critical importance in determining the outcome of a particular conflict.

Most of the discussion thus far has dealt with the *domestic* constraints which will be generated in the metropolis as a consequence of asymmetries in the structure of the conflict. We can quite easily point to the

[27] For an analysis of the breakdown of the resistance in the Czech case see Boserup and Mack (fn. 7), chap. VI.

[28] Z. A. B. Zeman, *Prague Spring* (London 1969).

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mechanisms that generate such constraints—though the *form* they will take in practice will vary according to the interests perceived to be at stake and according to the nature of the polity of the external power. But little or nothing can be said with respect to *external* constraints. For example, there were few external constraints bearing down on British policy in the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, yet in the case of the nationalist struggle in Indonesia against the Dutch the situation was very different. The critical factor here was the U.S. threat to cut off Marshall Plan aid to the Dutch if they failed to make a settlement with the Indonesian nationalists. A completely different set of potential external pressures could be brought to bear against Portugal vis-à-vis the Portuguese wars in Africa, and so on.

In an asymmetric conflict, the *potential* for the generation of internal divisions in the metropolitan power exists *regardless* of the historical epoch, the nature of the polity of the external power, the interests perceived to be at stake, and the international context in which the conflict takes place. Though these factors may influence the form and intensity taken by these internal divisions in any particular conflict, the *cause* of these divisions is independent from all of them. It arises from the nature of the asymmetric relationships which exist between the belligerents. On the other hand, nothing can be said in the abstract about any *external* constraints which may be brought to bear on the external power. These are dependent on the conditions of a particular historical epoch.

Summary

The initial problem was one of explaining how the militarily powerful could be defeated in armed confrontation with the militarily weak. This was not just idle speculation; in a number of critically important conflicts in the post-World War II epoch, industrial powers *have* failed to gain their objectives in wars fought on foreign soil against local nationalist forces. In all of these cases the superiority in conventional military capability of the external power was overwhelming. In a sense, these wars may be seen as a replay of the mini-wars of colonial conquest which took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but with a critical difference. In the earlier era, the industrial powers used minimal force to achieve rapid success, whereas in the post-World War II conflicts, the same industrial powers confronted the same Third-World countries with massive forces and lost.

In explaining the successes of the "weaker" party, I pointed out that

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an obvious minimal requirement for victory was that the insurgents should not lose. They achieved this by refusing to confront the industrial powers on their own terms and by resorting instead to "unconventional" forms of warfare—guerrilla war, urban terrorism, or even nonviolent action. However, I did not examine this aspect of the problem in any detail. I took the fact that the insurgents did not lose as a "given" when I inquired into the more interesting problem—namely, how did they *win*? I noted that one of the key asymmetries which characterized the relationships of the belligerents was that, as a consequence of the asymmetry in wealth and economic and technological development, the insurgents lacked the physical capability to attack the metropolitan power. It thus followed *logically* that the metropolitan power could not be defeated militarily. In turn, victory for the insurgents could only come about as a consequence of the destruction of the external power's *political* capability to wage war. The historical evidence of the outcome of the post-World War II conflicts confirms the logic of the argument.

As a next step, I examined the dynamics of the process of political attrition, arguing that the asymmetries which characterized the conflict provided the basis, not only for the initial restraints on mobilization of military forces, but also for the emergence of internal divisions as the war dragged on and costs accumulated. The fact that the war was by definition "limited" also provided the basis for a sustained moral critique of the military means employed—from torture to napalm—while reducing the willingness of troops to risk their lives in combat and of the domestic population to make economic sacrifices. However, the process of attrition was not seen as arising primarily from a steady across-the-board increment of "war weariness," as some writers have suggested; still less was it seen as a process of conversion at the top whereby the political leadership was gradually persuaded of the immorality or undesirability of its policies. The controversies *themselves* became one of the costs of the war. Time is a resource in politics, and the bitter hostilities such wars generate may come to dominate political debate to the detriment of the pursuit of other objectives. Provided the insurgents can maintain a steady imposition of "costs" on their metropolitan opponent, the balance of political forces in the external power will *inevitably* shift in favor of the anti-war factions.

Although the main discussion dealt essentially with domestic constraints, I also recognized that *international* constraints were often of great importance in asymmetric conflicts. However, whereas the mech-

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anisms giving rise to internal constraints could be identified, it was impossible to say anything in the abstract about external constraints.

Having outlined in fairly general terms the conditions under which the process of political attrition might be expected to manifest itself in practice, I then briefly examined the countervailing forces. I noted that the nature of the polity of the external power might either inhibit or facilitate the generation of domestic conflict. But I also argued that internal divisions were primarily a function of the conflict *relationship* and not of differences in the political structure of the metropolis. Finally, I noted that the salience of the interest which the external power —or rather factions within it—had in pursuing the war would also affect the process of political attrition.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

Examples of the types of hypotheses which this analysis might suggest were given earlier in the paper. It would be easy to think of others, for instance:

> The greater the interest a particular metropolitan faction has in the prosecution of the war and the wider the basis of its domestic support, the greater will be the support for continuing the war.

Another example would be:

> The weaker and more dependent the external power is on external support in order to prosecute the war, the more important external constraints will be in determining the outcome.

The objections to these alternative approaches—other than for the purpose of illustrating points in the argument—are several. First, they would slice the conflict up into parts (either temporally or spatially) which are then examined in relative isolation. I have argued that a full understanding can only come from an analysis of the conflict as a whole. Second, there is the technical problem of operationalizing such vague concepts as "interest" or "faction." Third, even if operationalization were possible, the hypotheses would remain untestable by the traditional statistical significance tests. That is a problem which has been largely ignored in most of the quantitative studies in conflict research where conflicts tend to get lumped together—symmetric and asymmetric and across periods of up to a hundred years or more—in order to obtain a sufficiently large sample for statistical manipulation. Thus the quantitative studies undertaken by Rummel and Tanter with the object of testing the relationship between external and internal conflicts arrive

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at the conclusion that no such relationship exists.[29] However, the relationships may well exist but be hidden by precisely the methodological methods intended to reveal them. Contrary to writers like Stohl and Wilkenfeld, there is no "paradox" in the *apparently* contradictory assertions that, on the one hand, external conflicts cause internal conflict and, on the other, that they create internal solidarity.[30] Whether or not this *is* the case is a function of the nature of the conflict. But since the *type* of conflict is not identified, the relationships are lost in the aggregation of data. It is not possible to consider asymmetric conflicts (as defined here) on their own, since the size of the sample is far too small. The only way out of this dilemma is to attempt a "time series" analysis.[31] Here, instead of many conflicts being examined once, the data matrix is filled by examining one conflict (or a few) over many time intervals. The methodological and epistemological problems with this type of analysis are enormous, however, and the results produced thus far are extremely modest.

If we move away from the quantitative literature to examine other attempts at explaining the outcome of asymmetric conflicts, different problems arise. The literature on counter-insurgency, for example, concentrates almost exclusively on the development of the war on the ground and ignores its impact on the metropolis. Iklé notes: "When it comes to actual fighting, the scores that count are, for instance, the number of enemy units destroyed, square miles of territory gained, and other successes or failures in battle. Where such an attitude prevails, professional military men would consider it unusual, if not somewhat improper, to ask whether these 'mid-game' successes will improve the ending."[32] Counter-insurgency theorists can thus provide a partial explanation of why insurgents may *lose*, but they cannot, almost by definition, grasp how it is that they may *win*. Awareness that insurgent successes are a consequence of "lack of political will" or "defeatism" on the part of the metropolitan governments is of course there, but this is seen as a contingent phenomenon almost wholly unrelated to the con-

[29] R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," *General Systems Yearbook*, VIII (1963), 1-50; and Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958–60," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (March 1966), 41-64.

[30] Michael Stohl, "Linkages between War and Domestic Political Violence in the United States, 1890–1923" in J. Caporaso and L. Roos, eds., *Quasi-Experimental Approaches* (Evanston 1973); and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Introduction" to Wilkenfeld, ed., *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics* (New York 1973).

[31] See Robert Burrowes and Bertram Spector, "The Strength and Direction of Relationships Between Domestic and External Conflict and Cooperation: Syria, 1961–67" in Wilkenfeld, *ibid.*; also Stohl (fn. 30).

[32] Iklé (fn. 11).

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duct of the war. More sophisticated works in the counter-insurgency field *do* consider political factors in the *insurgents'* homeland—namely, the payoffs of social and economic reform as a means of reducing popular support for the insurgents. But only Trinquier provides a sustained analysis of the political and social changes necessary in the *metropolis* if such wars are to succeed—and in this case the demands of logic are followed with no regard for political reality.

Although much of the research literature on conflict deals with events leading up to the outbreak of war, there has been a recent renewal of interest in "war-termination studies."[33] However, these concentrate on the final phases of the war, in particular those leading to negotiations or offering possibilities for third-party mediation. The *evolution* of the war and its wider sociopolitical dimensions are largely ignored.

A number of excellent historical case studies of the various asymmetric conflicts have been mentioned in this paper. Many of them have a virtue manifestly lacking in other works, namely that of treating the conflict as a whole rather than examining particular "technical" dimensions or temporal slices. However, individual case studies can provide no conceptual basis for distinguishing between what might in this context be called "structural necessity" from historically unique factors. Since narrative history is unable to discriminate between the universal and the particular when analyzing conflicts, it is a most unreliable guide to the future. Military history is replete with "Maginot lines," illustrating the dangers of relying on historical precedents.

Specific problems raised by these different methodological approaches to asymmetric conflicts and the different foci of interest which have been employed will be dealt with in depth in a forthcoming study.[34] In particular, that study will examine the writings of the leading revolutionary strategists. In the present paper, I have dealt essentially with the *process* of attrition as a function of the asymmetries which characterize the conflict. An asymmetric *strategy* would be one which sought to amplify this process of attrition *indirectly*. An outline of the basic requirements of such an "asymmetric strategy" (derived from the strategic writings of Clausewitz, Glucksman, and Mao Tse-tung) is provided in the final chapter of *War Without Weapons*.[35]

Finally, it should be obvious that my aim in this paper has not been to provide a "model" which may then be "tested" by applying it

[33] Carroll (fn. 1); Fox (fn. 1); Iklé (fn. 11); and R. F. Randle, *The Origins of Peace* (New York 1973).

[34] Andrew Mack, "Working Papers on Asymmetric Conflict," Nos. I-VI, Richardson Institute (London 1974).

[35] Boserup and Mack (fn. 7).

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mechanically and ahistorically to a wide range of conflicts. Rather, it has been to construct a conceptual framework which will provide a focus for empirical studies. Like the "paradigm" of the physical sciences which Thomas Kuhn has described, this conceptual framework functions essentially to direct the researcher's attention toward particular aspects of the real world—to distinctions and relationships which "common sense" often does not take into account. The framework defines the necessary questions which must be asked; it does not seek to provide automatic answers.

Conclusion

Recent developments in two ongoing asymmetric conflicts have tended to bear out the main thrust of my argument. The most dramatic development has been the Spinola coup in Portugal which clearly has far-reaching implications for the wars of national liberation in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau.* The second is the conflict in Ulster. The spring of 1974 saw the emergence, in England, of significant domestic opposition to the war, with several campaigns for troop withdrawal attracting growing support from very different political constituencies. Since the British Government has exhausted all the obvious "initiatives" (juggling the local Ulster leadership, direct rule, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the Council of Ireland) to no avail, and since the I.R.A. remains not only undefeated but capable of escalating its offensive where necessary, it seems certain that the campaign for withdrawal will gather strength. One of the most significant aspects of current I.R.A. activity is its role in maintaining and solidifying Protestant "extremism." The bombing functions essentially to prevent the "moderate" political solution, favored by the Westminster government and the Catholic and Protestant center groups which dominate the Assembly, from coming to fruition. The Spinola government in Portugal faces a similar problem. Having explicitly abandoned the belief that the war is winnable, the regime's current strategy is to seek a "political" solution. General Spinola advocates greatly increased autonomy, but "the overseas territories must be an integral part of the Portuguese nation." It is already obvious that such a solution is ac-

* Since this conclusion was written, the new Portuguese Government has abandoned the earlier insistence that the "overseas territories must be an integral part of the Portuguese nation." The threat of a possible settler bid for a unilateral declaration of independence was briefly raised in Mozambique, but evaporated with the considerable exodus of whites to Portugal and South Africa. In Angola, with a larger settler population, far greater mineral resources, and deep divisions between competing liberation movements, the situation remains unclear.

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ceptable neither to the European settlers nor to the liberation movements. Withdrawal is now clearly a serious political option for both metropolitan powers. In admitting that the colonial wars are unwinnable, General Spinola has in fact admitted defeat: "the conventional army loses if it does not win." In both countries the key question is no longer whether to withdraw but rather when and how.

To conclude, it hardly needs pointing out that—if correct—the implications of the foregoing analysis for industrial powers which become embroiled in long drawn-out wars in the Third World are far-reaching. Governments which become committed to such wars for whatever reason should realize that, over time, the costs of the war will inevitably generate widespread opposition at home. The causes of dissent lie beyond the control of the political elite; they lie in the structure of the conflict itself—in the type of war being pursued and in the asymmetries which form its distinctive character. Anti-war movements, on the other hand, have tended to underestimate their political effectiveness. They have failed to realize that in every asymmetric conflict where the external power has been forced to withdraw, it has been as a consequence of internal dissent. Thus, any analysis of the outcome of asymmetric conflicts must of necessity take into account and explain not only the tenacity and endurance of the nationalist forces, but also the generation of internal divisions in the homeland of their metropolitan enemy. In this type of conflict, anti-war movements—and this includes all the social forces that oppose the war—have, despite their short-term failures and frustrations, proven to be remarkably successful in the long run.

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THE FATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE THIRD WORLD

By RUPERT EMERSON*

THE new states of Asia and Africa have come into being and taken their place in the world at a time when human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the dignity and worth of the human person are—at least as words and phrases—familiar themes of political and social discourse. The countries of the Third World have relied upon them to justify and strengthen their claim to independence and their attack upon white-dominated southern Africa. One question, however, has become increasingly inescapable: Emerging from a detested colonial rule, have the new states lived up to the brave hopes and expectations that marked their birth, and—perhaps the most searching query of all—have they been prepared to apply to themselves the admirable principles which they have insisted upon for others?

Drawing for inspiration on the ideals and pledges of World War II, the Charter of the United Nations incorporated fundamental human rights and the dignity of human beings as goals at which it aimed. In addition to countless resolutions in which they appear in one or another guise, they have been lent more precise definition through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenants on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1966. That was, it might be noted, a year when the bulk of the dependencies coming to freedom were already members of the UN and thus entitled to use their voting strength in the framing and adoption of the Covenants. In winning independence and subsequently, the new states have time and again reiterated their faith in and devotion to human rights and the dignity of man, although only eight of them had ratified the two Covenants by December 1, 1973.[1] As one multilateral demonstration of this faith, the Charter of the Organization of

* I am indebted to Brian Weinstein for his helpful criticism of an earlier draft.

[1] Barbados, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Syria, and Tunisia were the Third-World ratifiers as of that date. Thirty-five ratifications are required to bring each of the Covenants into effect, but only twenty-three had been received. The United States had neither signed nor ratified. The Soviet Union and four members of the Soviet bloc, plus Yugoslavia, were among the most recent ratifiers. See E/CN.4/907/Rev. 10 (December 13, 1973).

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African Unity affirmed adherence to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

A well-known African political scientist, Ali A. Mazrui, has contended that the new Asian and African states, demonstrating their special attachment to the ideals of human rights and dignity, would have preferred to reverse the preambular priorities which the framers of the UN Charter assigned to the purposes of that body.[2] Where the framers put first their determination to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," he believed that the new states, judging by their "policies, attitudes, and stands," would have given top priority to the reaffirmation of their "faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person," downgrading the attack upon war to secondary rank. Insofar as war is concerned, this downgrading went a significant step further when the new states secured acceptance by the General Assembly and other UN organs of the principle that the struggle of the colonial peoples may legitimately be carried on "by all the necessary means at their disposal."[3]

"The call now goes abroad," as one UN political officer has put it, citing resolutions of 1970 and 1971, "to states, international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and individuals, explaining that all material and moral assistance given for the armed fight for freedom in Africa is legitimate and should be encouraged."[4]

The essential issue raised in the present inquiry is whether, in deeds as well as in words, the "policies, attitudes, and stands" of the new Asian and African states do in fact justify the assumption that their first faith is vested in fundamental human rights and freedom and in the dignity of the human person.

I am amply aware that this is a hazardous venture into most sensitive terrain. Let me at the outset lay down a basic and essential disclaimer: This inquiry is at no point intended to be, and should at no point be interpreted as, the setting up of a scale of superior Western values and ideals, measured by which Asian and African practice is

[2] Ali A. Mazrui, "The United Nations and Some African Political Attitudes" in Robert W. Gregg and Michael Barkun, eds., *The United Nations System and Its Functions* (Princeton, N.J. 1968), 47.

[3] See General Assembly Resolution 2105 (XX) of 1965 and its successor resolutions in other years.

[4] Yassin El Ayouty, "Africa's 'Burning Issues' and United Nations Action," *Issue* (African Studies Association, Waltham, Mass.), III, No. 3 (1972), 46. In a companion article in the succeeding number of *Issue*, he pointed out that Afro-Asian states were generally unwilling to accept a condemnation of terrorism where it was invoked as a weapon in national liberation struggles (p. 43).

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held to be backward or inferior. Where reliance is placed on any particular definition of human rights and freedoms, other perhaps than those asserted by Asian and African spokesmen themselves, they will be drawn from the Universal Declaration and the two Covenants—although it is certainly arguable that these key documents derive unduly from the more individualist Western outlook.

Even aside from the fact that Western values have obviously no automatic applicability to other peoples, times, and climes, it would serve no useful purpose to attempt a listing of Western sins and shortcomings, all of which are prominently spread on the public record, as are such virtues as the Western contribution may be held to have. Let it suffice to mention a few salient examples. A staggering total of wealth has been spent and continues to be spent on wars and armaments when poverty and underdevelopment are the fate of most peoples, including a substantial number of Americans. The evils of imperialism are too familiar to require elaboration, particularly at a time when anti-colonialism is a dominant global theme. The squandering of the world's limited resources and the pollution of the environment are becoming more and more evident. If the West has been the fountainhead of liberal constitutional democracy, it has also been the breeding ground of Fascism and Nazism.

The present issue, then, is not one of imposing alien values or setting them up as the standard by which others should be judged, but of attempting to discern, at least in large and summary terms,[5] how the new countries have met the challenge of human rights and the dignity of man, held to be especially dear to them after the experience of colonialism. In the preamble of each of the two Covenants it is stated that "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family . . . derive from the inherent dignity of the human person." Has that dignity actually been preserved, and have the rights, including the right to life itself, been regarded, in working fact, as equal and inalienable for all human beings?

Self-Determination

A strong case can be made for the proposition that the right, although not so called in the Charter, to which the Asian and African

[5] David H. Bayley has rightly pointed out that completeness in empirical researching into human rights in the new states cannot be expected because of the number of these states and their unwillingness to confess to restrictions of human rights. "A survey of the fortunes of liberty in all of these nations would be a task for many men and would require the expenditure of years of effort." *Public Liberties in the New States* (Chicago 1964), 5.

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countries have attached the greatest importance is "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples," particularly if it is linked to the closely related outlawing of racial discrimination. Both self-determination and the attack on discrimination have been pressed upon the UN by substantially the same constituencies and both, as a currently practical matter, are aimed at different aspects of the same basic problem: white domination or supremacy over peoples with darker skins. Transformed into an inalienable and unchallengeable right by the multitude of ex-colonial states, the principle of self-determination, in its present anti-colonial and anti-racist guise, has come to take top billing among the UN's functions, reducing all other functions to subordinate importance insofar as they conflict with it or derogate from its centrality.

I do not intend to elaborate here on the changing fortunes of self-determination, explored in detail elsewhere,[6] I only intend to single out certain aspects which bear particularly on the present theme of human rights and dignity in the practice of the new states. Despite the broader language, embracing "all peoples," which appears in various key UN documents, self-determination in its contemporary manifestation can for almost all practical purposes be defined as the UN-sanctioned right of every colonial people (assumed to constitute a single and indivisible whole) to achieve its independence as speedily and completely as possible—be it by agreement with its imperial master or, if necessary, by force of arms, with the aid of other states and international agencies. A second and less controversial meaning of self-determination is the right of peoples to determine the internal structure and functioning of their societies without interference.

In the Wilsonian aftermath of World War I, the guiding principle in the reordering of Eastern and Southeastern Europe at least purported to be that each nation was entitled to its own state. In contrast, in the more recent turn to self-determination as the instrument for decolonization, the colonial boundaries, more often than not lumping diverse peoples together and cutting across ethnic lines, have not been redrawn to bring state and nation into closer accord. On the contrary, they have with generally trivial variations, if any—the partition of India and later of Pakistan is the great exception—been taken over

[6] See Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), Part Four; Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization*, Occasional Paper No. 9, Harvard University Center for International Affairs (December 1964); and "Self-Determination," *American Journal of International Law*, LXV (July 1971). See also A. Rigo Sureda, *The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination* (Leiden 1973).

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intact by the nationalist regimes which replaced the colonial governments.

This basic circumstance has led to a significant difference between the two periods in relation to human rights. Since Wilsonian self-determination was specifically a right of nations, international protection was extended to national minorities whose claim to some measure of separate identity and to safeguards in relation to language, religion, education, and non-discrimination was recognized. That focus on the rights of ethnic groups or individuals as members of such groups was virtually eliminated after World War II, when human rights were held to be universal, with individuals as beneficiaries thereof apart from any ethnic identification.[7] Furthermore, where in the earlier period the League of Nations was endowed with enforcement machinery, however inadequate, the UN provision for the protection of minorities has been close to non-existent. That may be attributed in part to the League's record, which did not inspire emulation, and in part to the fact that it stirred up bitter resentment through its intrusion on state sovereignty and its discriminatory imposition on only a few states in Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans. At all events, the idea of an international right of intervention to protect actual or potential victims of denial of rights has found no substantial favor among the newly freed, whose ardent championship of full domestic jurisdiction and non-intervention no doubt derives largely from the memory of colonialism's blatant intrusion into their affairs.

For the Third-World countries, the key phrase in relation to human rights and freedoms has been: "All peoples have the right to self-determination." The extensive array of other rights contained in the Covenants and elsewhere is likely to be pushed into the background, save as any of them can be brought into play to aid the attack upon colonialism and racialism, most notably in white-dominated southern Africa. The focus on the rights of individuals which predominates in the Universal Declaration and particularly in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—due no doubt to their being drawn primarily from Western models—gives way to emphasis on the communal freedom of "the people," effectively defined as the indigenous inhabitants of each of the colonies or its independent successor state. The ending

[7] Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does provide that persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities "shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language," but very little use has been made of this provision.

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of white colonialism and racialism is the heart of the matter, with only incidental concern for what follows after, so long as government is in indigenous hands. The firm rules laid down for others as to egalitarianism, non-discrimination, and active participation in political life are not considered applicable to the postcolonial states themselves.

With some plausibility it has been contended that self-determination is the foundation on which all other rights and freedoms rest. At the Bandung Conference of 1955, where the Asian and African states met for the first time under their own auspices to deal with their own and the world's problems, it was laid down in the Final Communiqué that the "subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights" and that "the right of peoples and nations to self-determination . . . is a prerequisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights."[8] This theme has been enthusiastically reiterated ever since.

The existence of an alien ruler can be seen as being in itself an immediate and potentially all-embracing denial of freedom, jeopardizing all other rights or at best turning them into alien channels, even though it may be that under given circumstances an alien regime provides more in the way of stable and protected rights than does rule by fellow subjects or citizens. What is unhappily not established, and cannot be, is that the desired rights and freedoms spring to life automatically when the alien ruler is banished.

An inevitable major complication appears when, as is true in the overwhelming majority of the new states and in many of the old, the population of the state does not consist essentially of a single homogeneous people—i.e., a nation—but embraces two or often many more ethnically distinct peoples who, however much they may jointly differ from the alien rulers in the colonial situation, have not much more in the way of a deep-running tie with each other than that they have for some limited number of decades been members of the same colonial polity. Here one comes up squarely against the central question always raised when self-determination is put into practice: What is the *self* which is entitled to do the *determining*? The first, obvious answer is that it is the colonial people at large in their unmistakable difference from their expatriate rulers; but as soon as the overthrow of the latter is seriously contemplated or under way, the next step becomes inescapable: Who is to assume the governing roles which the departing colonial officials abandon as they leave? Did the Ibos, in a Nigeria dominated

[8] George McT. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1956), 80-81.

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by the Hausa-Fulani of the North, achieve a true self-determination in which their version of human rights prevailed? the Hutu in Burundi? the Chinese in Malaysia? the Bihari in Bangladesh? or the Tamils in Sri Lanka? It is written large on the record that much of the Muslim population of India did not feel that it could entrust its destiny to what it regarded as the *Hindu* Congress Party; and minorities in a number of countries confronting independence have been wary of subjecting themselves to rule by fellow citizens with whom they do not identify themselves, and whom they mistrust or fear.

Where major ethnic cleavages divide the people of a state, the principle that self-determination underlies all human rights may well be found incompatible with the principle that no continuing right of self-determination for any part of the population survives once independent statehood has been achieved.

Problems of Government

For many, probably for most, of the nationalist leaders and intelligentsia of the Third World—the two categories tend to fall together—it appears to have been the hope and the expectation that the winning of independence would inaugurate the transformation of colonies into liberal constitutional democracies based on recognition of the dignity of man.[9] The dream which seemed not impossible of fulfillment was a brave new world of human and civic decency, replacing the inequities and iniquities of racialism and colonialism by a society endowed with human rights safeguarded by the rule of law.

The political institutions which the newly freed peoples gave themselves, or worked out in agreement with the departing colonial authorities, were designed to achieve, among other things, at least an approximation of this desired goal. As a rule, they were based on some version of parliamentary government and included universal manhood suffrage, to which the new countries had often had a brief introduction in the last years of colonial rule. Indeed, the newly independent governments were, with rare exceptions, only mildly revised editions of the last phase of the colonial institutions, with the ruling Europeans now replaced by a small, new, Western-educated elite. It was evident from

[9] "There are no new states in Asia or Africa, whether monarchies or republics, in which the elites who demanded independence did not, at the moment just prior to their success, believe that self-government and democratic government were identical . . . something like liberal democracy was generally thought to be prerequisite for the new order of things." Edward Shils, "The Fortunes of Constitutional Government," in John H. Hallowell, ed., *Development: For What?* (Durham, N.C. 1964), 103, 113.

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the outset that these governments were based on European political and administrative models generally quite unfamiliar to the people at large and intimately known to only a few. Moreover, their administration was largely conducted in a language of which most of the people were ignorant.

It is too prominently spread on the public record to need elaboration here that these first institutional ventures were for the most part short-lived. Although the administrative structures inherited from the colonial regimes tended to live on in much their old guise,[10] the roles and relationships characteristic of parliamentary regimes usually underwent drastic transformations in substance even where the original forms survived more or less intact and where the European-derived terminology continued to embellish political systems that had developed along quite different lines.

The presumption of a right to full and equal participation in government for all citizens, and of a growing popular demand for the free exercise of this right, has come to be accepted as one of the key elements in political development. This conception has been embodied in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the former it is laid down in Article 21 that "Everyone has the right to take part in the Government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives" and to equal access to public service. The fundamental provision is surely that "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government," expressed in periodic and genuine elections by universal and equal suffrage, and by free voting procedures, specified in Article 25 of the Covenant as a secret ballot.

It is a far cry from these and a number of other provisions in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to the actuality of civil and political life in most of the new countries. To take a single example, the intricate set of provisions outlawing arbitrary arrest or detention, asserting the right of anyone arrested or detained to take proceedings before a court, and seeking to guarantee humane treatment, presumption of innocence till proved guilty, and fair and speedy trial are remote from a world in which, leaving aside other abuses, preventive detention without right of access to any court is a standard part of the

[10] Edward Feit has put forward the provocative suggestion that the most successful form of government in sub-Saharan Africa was the colonial administrative regime. He contends that much of the military upheaval in Africa can be construed as an effort to recover this administrative system without the colonial power. "Pen, Sword, and People," *World Politics*, XXV (January 1973), 272-73.

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procedure.[11] In much of the Third World, and of other worlds as well, recourse to torture is so common as to attract little attention.

The basic tenets of Western democratic systems were promptly challenged and overturned in one country after another. The harsh reality for Africa was succinctly expressed by Frederick Hunter in the *Christian Science Monitor* of January 6, 1973, warning against lingering illusions about the viability of Western democracy: "This form of government simply has not worked on African soil. There is not a single African state where the actual practice of government remotely resembles Western democracy."

Amazingly enough, despite its vast size, diversity of peoples, and widespread poverty and illiteracy, India has been the leader in the small handful of Third-World countries that have stayed within their constitutional parliamentary framework, giving free play to opposition parties and holding genuine periodic elections. Elsewhere, instead of two or more parties competing on terms of at least formal equality, the swing was to single-party systems in which the ruling party outlawed all rivals, and was itself dominated by a single Nkrumah or Sukarno who basked in his fame as a charismatic leader, however suspect his claim to charisma or leadership may have been. The final overt plunge away from democratic constitutionalism came when the military took over, usually proclaiming its intention to lay the foundations for a better, cleaner, and more effective democracy; but the temptation proved great to hold on to power or to engage in a second coup after restoring civilian rule, as in Burma and Ghana. Where the military seized power, parties, already fading when no longer confronted by vigorous opposition, were promptly banned and politicians forbidden to practice their trade—often, it appears, to the cheers of the multitude who had lost what faith they may have had in their political leaders. (At present, Nigeria's large population and oil-based wealth make it the African country to be watched most carefully in terms of the success or failure of the promised restoration of constitutional government, now indefinitely postponed.)

This is not the occasion to recapitulate the earlier argument as to whether the single-party system could pass muster as democratic or whether a freely functioning opposition, with all its implications, was requisite. For African and Asian defenders of the single party, the key proposition is that if the will of the people was carried out, then

[11] For a discussion of preventive detention and related methods of dealing with the disfavored, see David H. Bayley (fn. 5), chap. II. Bayley also deals with freedom of the press, of association, and from discrimination.

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democracy was achieved, whatever the form of government. Furthermore, a number of Asian and African spokesmen contended that the authentic traditional democracy of their peoples recognized no mechanical process of a majority outvoting a minority, but only a process of continued discussion until all had come to agreement.

That "the will of the people should be the basis of the authority of government" was not a proposition likely to be publicly denied, but the vital question was who should determine what the will of the people was. However honorable the democratic intentions of those who created the single party through the banning or absorption of other parties, the fact that the single party, and the single leader as well, became unchallengeable save by coup or revolution led inevitably to its becoming authoritarian. The system rested on the assumption that the elite which had headed the nationalist movement and taken over the government at independence knew better than the people at large what the people really wanted and needed.

Sukarno's term, "guided democracy" (contrasted with what he derided as "free-fight democracy"), effectively expressed what was involved: democracy is admirable, but the illiterate and inexperienced masses are not competent to run their own affairs without guidance from above. Even though Julius Nyerere set a striking example in resigning as Prime Minister shortly after Tanganyika's independence in order to reshape his ruling party as an all-weather, two-way road linking government and people, the flow everywhere tended strongly to be only outward from the party-government center to indoctrinate or command the non-elite. Participation became a matter of being kept somewhat informed as to governmental programs, being told what to do, and for whom one could and should vote. The military carried the matter further along such lines as these: Democracy some day may be a good thing and the military are preparing the country for it, but government is not yet to be entrusted to the people at large or to the politicians who are corruptly betraying both the masses and the national interest.

It is easy to assert that the single party and leader represent the true will of the people, but precisely the basic assumptions and machinery of the single-party system make it impossible to determine whether the people are in fact represented by the party. It can carry no overwhelming conviction when Nkrumah proclaims that his Convention People's Party *is* Ghana, or Sékou Touré that his *Parti Démocratique de Guinée is* Guinea. Maybe they are and maybe they are not: When no alternative choices are available, there is no easy way of telling.

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Nor is one necessarily persuaded when one is informed in an Ivory Coast civics textbook that that country is a democracy which "is fortunate enough to have a single political party. This proves that all Ivoriens are grouped around their leader and that they approve of him wholeheartedly."[12]

In Africa and Asia no less than in the Soviet Union, the right to vote for a single slate of candidates, hand-picked by the party authorities, leaves open the question what the people's choice would be under different circumstances.[13] The late Tom Mboya of Kenya (assassinated in 1969), although defending the right of the people voluntarily to adopt a single-party system, added that "the people should be able, if they so desire, to restore the multi-party system by a further amendment of the constitution."[14] This no doubt represents an admirable democratic principle, but it stretches the imagination to see how it could be made to work, short of coup or revolution, in a system where the ruling party and leader tolerate no opposition. Plebiscitary democracy does not cheerfully lend itself to peaceful changes of regime.

Not expansion but curtailment of popular participation has been the general experience in the new states since independence, and generally this curtailment, dropping down toward zero-participation in the military regimes, has been accepted without marked grief or sense of loss. The abandonment of the substance of Western-style democracy, and often of the forms as well, has only rarely been challenged by a mass demand for a restoration or broadening of popular participation. In October 1973, an uprising, largely by students, overthrew Thailand's long-established military rule and brought about the installation of a civilian government. But, not long before, Presidents Park in South Korea and Marcos in the Philippines had moved toward the adoption of autocratic powers, and Thieu in South Vietnam had never presented more than a shabby pretense of democracy.

On both sides of the fence, among the ruling elites and among the masses, it has far more often than not been taken for granted that

[12] See Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago 1966), 30. In 1953 the UN General Assembly, laying out the factors involved in full self-government, looked to the existence of more than one political party as a criterion. Res. 742 (VIII).

[13] Tanzania inaugurated a significant experiment in 1965, when President Nyerere and the ruling Tanganyika African National Union allowed two TANU candidates to stand for each seat, with all phases of the election strictly controlled by the party.

[14] Cited by T. P. Melady, "Non-Alignment in Africa," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 362 (November 1965), 61. A note might be added in passing: "In Kenya, the only opposition party has been proscribed and its leaders detained as the country prepares for a somewhat overdue election." *The Review* (International Commission of Jurists), No. 4 (December 1969), 3.

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governing is the privilege and responsibility of the few. Throughout most of history, for almost all peoples, it is not democratic government from within which has characterized the larger communities of mankind, but autocratic government from above.[15]

There is neither space nor occasion to reexamine here the many explorations which have been made of the sharp turn away from the kind of democratic constitutionalism accepted as the model by the Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As far as the attitude of the ruling Third-World elements was concerned, a basic implicit or explicit proposition seems to have been that, if modernization and development were to be achieved, what the peoples of the new countries needed was not more rights and freedoms, but the discipline of hammering out national unity and of learning to live with the obligations and restraints of government. Ali Mazrui has summed the matter up well in his comment that the Congo could serve as an extreme case of incapacity for free institutions, needing not to be made capable of freedom but capable of authority[16]—which is just what it got under Mobutu.

Two more mundane motives for cutting down on popular participation may be mentioned. Once independence has been secured, wide popular participation is no longer needed to demonstrate to the colonial authorities that the people are democratically united both in their rejection of colonialism and in the acceptance of their nationalist leaders. Second, as a more positive incentive to cling to power, active popular participation brings with it not only the danger of aggravating the ethnic and elite-mass cleavages in the society, but also the threat that the people may turn against the present ruling elite and install a set of rivals in office. This is a particularly grievous threat in poor and underdeveloped countries where alternative sources of high income and prestige are rare, and where the upper political and governmental posts offer rich rewards in salary and in legal, dubious, and illegal perquisites.

Rita Hinden has remarked that, as African countries achieved independence, the honeymoon of high regard enjoyed by their leaders came to an end. "Instead of being noble freedom-fighters, supported by the sympathy of all liberal-minded people abroad, they had at once

[15] See Rupert Emerson, "The Prospects for Democracy in Africa" in Michael F. Lofchie, ed., *The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Africa* (Berkeley 1971), 245. This essay, which is as relevant to Asia as to Africa, deals with my doubts that democracy is likely to be the wave of the future in the Third-World countries.

[16] Ali A. Mazrui, "Consent, Colonialism, and Sovereignty," *Political Studies*, x (February 1963), 40-41.

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to become politicians and administrators, caught up in a new power struggle which is an inevitable part of politics. And once they became politicians and administrators, they were open to all the seductions of power—intrigue, corruption, bribery, even thuggery."[17]

This was hardly the setting in which popular participation would be seriously wooed, or a realistic effort made to link the authority of government to the will of the people.

Refugees and Massacres

The one-party state and other authoritarian systems have occasionally been justified on the ground that the new countries, facing hazardous times for which colonialism left them ill-prepared, could not afford the wasting of talents which the existence of an opposition involved. All skills and energies, it was contended, must be harnessed to an attack upon the great tasks ahead. If the increasingly authoritarian regimes of the Third World had in fact achieved such unity, more might have been accomplished; but in country after country talents which should have been drawn upon were removed from the scene by any one of a number of means, ranging from banning from public life to preventive detention, and from exile to execution. In some disastrous instances, thousands or hundreds of thousands have fled to neighboring countries in immediate fear of the loss of their freedom or their lives, not to mention their possessions. All too often the years of decolonization, dedicated to restoring human rights and the dignity of man, have become years in which for many the most basic rights and dignities have been elbowed or bulldozed aside.

In dealing with this grim topic it seems neither necessary nor feasible to attempt to compile a catalogue comprising a sketch of each of the many new Asian and African states, even though most of them have surely sinned against what were, or were regarded as, opposition leaders or forces. All that I have attempted to do is to pick out a few major and significantly illustrative cases.

Furthermore, it does not seem relevant or necessary to make any serious effort to penetrate beyond the range of figures which the conventional wisdom appears to have accepted as indicating the numbers of those who were slaughtered or died as a result of political actions or upheavals. The issue here is not to achieve greater accuracy in the estimates of the number of those who died or took refuge abroad, but to lay out the stark fact that far more blood was shed and misery in-

[17] Rita Hinden, "Africa Without Tears," *Encounter*, XXVI (May 1966), 56.

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flicted than is compatible with any scheme of human rights and dignity. In most instances, at all events, research as to numbers would be a relatively futile enterprise, because the circumstances were such as to render any accurate count wholly unobtainable. For the present purpose, once a massive "body count" of the dead and the refugees has been acknowledged, it is of little consequence whether a higher or lower estimate is accepted: either figure is appalling and establishes the tragic violation of basic rights beyond the need for further proof. No one is likely to protest that "the right to life, liberty, and security of person" has been safeguarded if only 20,000 have been slaughtered as against an alternative estimate of 100,000.

The one category of persons for whom a good approximation of an accurate figure is available are those refugees who come under the jurisdiction of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); in addition there are a substantial number of others who might in ordinary parlance be regarded as refugees, but who are not entitled to protection by the UNHCR. The largest number of these would presumably be the so-called "internal refugees" who have fled from harassment in one region of their country to another region in search of safety, as, for example, the Ibos in Nigeria or the forced migrations within Zaire in the years following independence. Others who do not appear in the UNHCR's tabulations are those who use exile to prepare for a renewal of battle as occasion offers, or those for whom the host country does not ask assistance.[18]

In magnitude of people involved, it is probable that the heavily populated Indian subcontinent heads the list both in refugees and in loss of life. Independence for India and the creation of Pakistan brought about—at a time when the new governments were not yet in full control in newly defined territories—what has been called the greatest movement of population in history. It was accompanied by a prolonged outburst of communal violence—the slaughter of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs by each other—which can have few rivals in the misery it inflicted. Moving in both directions across the new borders dividing the two wings of Pakistan from India, the refugees were estimated by mid-1948 to have numbered 12 million people, and the total loss of life through violence, disease, and privation of every sort is held to have reached 500,000, although some estimates run much higher. In succeeding years, movement across the frontiers continued spasmodically but still in large numbers, the most numerous group of

[18] See Robert O. Matthews, "Refugees and Stability in Africa," *International Organization*, XXVI (Winter 1972), 63.

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refugees being the Hindus moving from East Pakistan into West Bengal.

It was East Pakistan, about to be transformed into Bangladesh, which in 1971 was the starting point for some 10 million refugees who fled into India from the terror inflicted on them by the Pakistani forces sent to check the secessionist movement. The term "genocide" is always a dangerous and difficult one to invoke, but this appears to be a case when its use is well justified, since it seems clear on the record that there was both massive indiscriminate killing and a planned program of wiping out the actual and potential leadership of the country. It may be that the Bangladesh leader and Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, overestimated the death toll, but a brief statement of his in 1972 summarized the situation: "There was genocide in Bangladesh. You know that 3 million people were killed—intellectuals were killed in a planned way. They destroyed the economy. They broke the railways, burnt buses and trucks, and 10 million had to take shelter in India."[19]

In terms of the loss of life and the uprooting of people from their homes and countries, the partition of India and later of Pakistan brought with them the two great human catastrophes of the subcontinent. To round out the total inventory of the losses and upheavals in these two countries since 1947 would involve compiling the record of a very large number of diverse events and incidents. It would have to take into account such major matters as the deaths and disruptions in connection with the Kashmir dispute; the long drawn-out controversies concerning the Pathans, the Nagas, the Mizos, and the Biharis in Bangladesh; and for both countries, the long series of language disputes, frequently bursting into violence, which, particularly in India, involved the relation between the great historic language communities and the federal state structure.

Similar language problems in what is now Sri Lanka cost thousands of lives in the bitter controversies of 1956 and succeeding years between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. The island further suffered much violence and loss of life in 1971 through the terrorist attacks of a militant extreme leftist People's Liberation Front, known generally as the Che Guevarists.

If it is legitimate to leave aside—because of the distorting effect of heavy foreign involvement—the endless list of casualties in the Korean

[19] *India News* (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of India, April 22, 1972). It is dismaying to find in the *New York Times* of June 11, 1973, a headline: "Rising Bangladesh Unrest Marked by 2,000 Killings."

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War and the decades of warfare in Indochina, the most massive loss of life in the New Asian states is presumably to be found in Indonesia. In the postwar decades in which Sukarno was the leading figure, that country had a checkered history involving many casualties, including civil outbreaks of various kinds, Communist risings, clashes with the resident Chinese, the all-out Muslim challenge of Darul Islam, and the PRRI revolt of 1958. By far the greatest loss of life came in the aftermath of the attempted Communist coup of 1965, which hastened Sukarno's exclusion from power and left the government in military hands. The massacre of Communists which followed the failure of the coup, and of many others on more personal and local grounds, was a countrywide phenomenon, but it tended to be concentrated in East and Central Java and Bali. Since it was under no central control (although it was inspired and encouraged by the military), estimates as to the extent of the killing vary greatly, but a frequently cited figure of 300,000 seems as sound an estimate as any of the other figures, higher and lower, which have been put forward. In addition, *Amnesty International* reported, in a special Indonesia issue of March 1973, the detention of "more than 55,000 untried political prisoners in Indonesia . . . most of whom have been in prison, invariably in bad conditions, for more than seven years . . . suffering total loss of civil and legal rights."

Although the death toll usually listed as "more than 200" is triflingly small compared to the major outbreaks of violence elsewhere, the anti-Chinese riots in Kuala Lumpur in May 1969 deserve mention because of their clearly racial character. They were the immediate sequel of a general election in which the dominant Alliance Party was challenged both by Malay nationalists who demanded broader recognition and enforcement of Malay predominance, and by Chinese who repudiated their representatives in the Alliance as being overly complaisant and conservative. What was extraordinary was not that there should have been a falling out between Malays and Chinese, but that it was so long delayed.

Of the Southeast Asian countries the one which has been least able to cope with dissident movements defying the authority of the central government is Burma. In addition to splinter Communist parties which have plagued the government, several ethnic groups—notably the Karens, the Shans, and the Kachins—have from the outset of independence been in armed rebellion against the center, have made movement from one part of the country to another hazardous or impossible, and have gravely impaired the ability of the authorities in

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Rangoon, whether civilian or the subsequent military, to make their writ run throughout the country. The security of life, person, and property has obviously been gravely undermined.

To turn to Africa is to be confronted by so large a number of states as to make it impossible to do more than cite a few salient cases. For most questions of human rights it is evidently necessary to examine the record of each of the several African states, but one inescapable overall statistic is that Africa, in the years since most of its peoples achieved independence, has come to be the continent of refugees. The UNHCR estimated that at the end of 1972 (and substantially the same figures held for 1973), the African refugees with whom his office was concerned amounted to 1 million or more, of whom half or more had fled from white-dominated southern Africa, the great bulk of them from the Portuguese colonies: 420,000 from Angola (400,000 settling in Zaire and 20,000 in Zambia), 69,000 from Mozambique (59,000 settling in Tanzania and 10,000 in Zambia), 84,000 from Guinea-Bissau (settling in Senegal), 1,000 from Namibia, and 900 from South Africa.[20] The remaining half-million on the UNHCR's books are people who have found conditions so intolerable and hazardous in their own African-ruled countries that they moved on to take up life elsewhere. Much the same must be true for the large number of refugees outside the jurisdiction of the UNHCR, for whom no comparably authentic statistics are available. A possible indication of their number may be found if credence can be given to the hazardous estimate that 1 million people have deserted Guinea in the course of the long reign of Sékou Touré.

The vast scale of this migration of fellow countrymen and fellow Africans is a sad commentary on the limitations of African solidarity and brotherhood. In the light of the way Africans have been driven out of their own and other countries, it is dubious comfort to be told that "in one sense, there is no such thing as an African refugee in his own continent," because an African leaving one African society will find acceptance in another.[21] It is, however, true that the peculiar nature of African colonial-state boundaries, cutting across tribal lines,

[20] See the *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UN document E/5306, June 14, 1973), 13. For later figures, see the 1974 annual *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (preliminary mimeographed edition of May 15, 1974—E/5484), and *UNHCR*, the "house organ" published in Switzerland, Supplement to No. 6 (December 1973). For much valuable additional material, including key documents, see Hugh C. Brooks and Yassin El Ayouty, eds., *Refugees South of the Sahara* (Westport, Conn. 1970).

[21] John Hatch, "Historical Background of the Refugee Problem," *ibid.*, 16.

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has frequently eased the problem for both the refugees and the host countries in cases where the refugees cross a frontier which divides them from people of their own language and ethnic community, as in the case of many of those who crossed from Angola into Zaire.

Neither Nigeria nor the Congo contributed significantly to the external migration of refugees, although a substantial number of Nigerians, mostly from Biafra, sought temporary refuge in neighboring countries during the Nigerian civil war. But both were disrupted by very large numbers of internal refugees and by heavy loss of life.

In the Nigerian case, the two military coups of 1966 are central features, marked by charges and countercharges of tribal iniquities, but the immediately preceding years had already been notorious for growing violence, discord between peoples and regions, and gross political abuses. The coups themselves cost the lives of only a few distinguished figures. In the North, the slaughter of Ibos and others from the Eastern Region, costing at least several hundreds of lives, started in May of 1966, and was followed in September by a far greater massacre, which left perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 dead and brought about a mass exodus of an estimated 2 million Easterners from the North. The last round of death and destruction in Nigeria came with the civil war that followed the Biafran declaration of secession and independence in May 1967, and ended only with the defeat of Biafra in January 1970. It has been estimated that some 500,000 persons lost their lives from causes closely related to the war—many of them the very young and the old, who were unable to survive the war-imposed hardships and deprivations. Given the bitterness with which the war was fought and the accusations which each side addressed to the world against the other, it seemed to be evident that no peaceful reunion within a single Nigeria could be expected within the foreseeable future—the unexpected outcome being that Nigeria was in fact speedily restored and has been able to function with a wholly unexpected degree of tolerance and harmony.

For the Congo, the decisive events were the coming of independence in mid-1960 with an almost total lack of manpower trained to run the new state, and the mutiny a few days later of the Congolese National Army which was inherited intact, save for its name, from the Belgian colonial regime and at the outset had not a single African officer. The net result was the disintegration of the country, manifested not only by the wealthy and well-organized Katanga secession with Tshombe at its head, but also by a number of other areas and peoples, large and small, which either designedly sought separatism or drifted away for

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lack of any effective central Congolese authority. In these circumstances it is impossible to expect more than a most uncertain estimate of the number of those who died or were killed as victims of Zaire's time of troubles from 1960 to 1965, when Mobutu took over. Figures in the range of 100,000 to 150,000 have been suggested as plausible. An authority who at my request went over key items to be considered in such an estimate added the cautionary comment: "One may note that in these macabre calculations what is involved is not so much violation of human rights by governments, but rather the shrinkage of the zone of civil order in the polity."[22]

To a much greater extent than in the case of Nigeria's coups and war, the Congo's almost total collapse of governmental authority invited external intervention by various powers operating both on their own and through the UN.

No more gruesome series of events can be found than the massacres which were the prelude and the sequel to independence in the small but heavily populated countries, Rwanda and Burundi. The heart of the problem in both states was the long-standing domination of the majority Hutu people by the minority Tutsi. In 1959, three years before independence, the Hutu overthrew Tutsi rule in Rwanda in a bloody revolt which cost heavy Tutsi casualties and the flight of some 120,000 Tutsi to Burundi and other neighboring states. In 1963 an abortive Tutsi invasion from Burundi brought another Tutsi exodus and the killing of an estimated 12,000 Tutsi.

For Burundi (to skip over lesser times of trouble), the brutal climax came in 1972 in the Tutsi-dominated government's response to an attempted Hutu invasion. The outcome has been portrayed in the following graphic terms in a report issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "Through the spring and summer of 1972, in the obscure Central African state of Burundi, there took place the systematic killing of as many as a quarter million people. Even among the awesome calamities of the last decade, the tragedy in Burundi was extraordinary in impact and intensity. Though exact numbers can never be known, most eyewitnesses now agree that over a four-month period, men, women, and children were savagely murdered at the rate of more than a thousand a day."[23]

The Pakistani army has been accused of practicing both mass and selective genocide in East Pakistan in 1971; the Burundi authorities

[22] Personal letter from Crawford Young, dated Lubumbashi, October 27, 1973.

[23] Michael Bowen, Gary Freeman, Kay Miller, *Passing By: The United States and Genocide in Burundi* (New York, n.d.), 1.

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have been similarly accused. Charging an intent to exterminate the Hutu elite, an American Universities Field Staff report presented the following list of victims: "the four Hutu members of the cabinet, all the Hutu officers and virtually all the Hutu soldiers in the armed forces; half of Burundi's primary school teachers and thousands of civil servants, bank clerks, small businessmen, and domestic servants. At present (August) there is only one Hutu nurse left in the entire country, and only a thousand secondary school students survive."[24]

Tragically, the slaughter continued on into 1973, with many accounts of atrocities; in that year as in the year before, thousands of refugees poured over the borders into neighboring states. In July 1973, the UNHCR reported the total to have risen to 85,000.[25]

In sharp contrast to Burundi, the South Sudan presented a story with an at least provisionally happy ending as a result of the signing, in February 1972, of a peace agreement between the Sudanese Government and the South Sudan Liberation Movement, thanks in good part to the mediation of the Emperor of Ethiopia. This agreement put an end to seventeen years of warfare in which Khartoum attempted to enforce a single unitary rule on the entire country. The three southern provinces, different from the north in religion, culture, and language, demanded and fought for autonomy, which the 1972 agreement provided. The Sudanese Government estimated that, during the war, some 500,000 South Sudanese hid in the bush while 180,000 fled across the borders, primarily to Uganda and Zaire. With the coming of peace, a large-scale international effort embracing a number of governmental and voluntary agencies, with the UNHCR as the central coordinator, was undertaken to secure repatriation and resettlement.[26]

For a final African example of the overriding of human rights, one might turn to the erratic President Amin of Uganda, who has already left his cruel mark upon Africa as a spokesman for the African masses against alien intrusion. In May of 1973 Milton Obote, whom Amin had ousted from the presidency in 1971 and who became an exile in Tanzania, sent a letter to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at Addis Ababa, accusing Amin of mass murder and torture.[27] Detailing the killing of 3,500 Ugandans, Obote quoted a further calculation by a former minister of the Amin regime that "at a conservative estimate the death toll in Amin's first two years of terror was 80,000 to 90,000 people. Obote added that "the nature of the outrage

[24] *Ibid.*, 5-6.

[25] *UNHCR*, No. 4 (July 1973).

[26] See Louise W. Holborn, "The Repatriation and Resettlement of the Southern Sudanese," *Issue*, II (Winter 1972), 23-26.

[27] *New York Times*, May 27, 1973. I have also consulted a copy of the full text of the letter.

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on humanity in Uganda being practiced by Idi Amin and his agents is in fact genocide." Those who have "disappeared" or have been killed openly during the Amin regime include many members of the Western-educated elite and of the armed forces, suspected of tribal or personal hostility to his rule. His good name among the masses—Ugandan and other African—rests largely upon his attack on racial and cultural aliens in the Ugandan society and economy: first, despite Amin's earlier close ties with Israel, the small number of Israelis in the country, and second, about 50,000 Asians, some of them Ugandan citizens, driven out with no concern as to the depth of their roots in the country or where they would go.

It was the conclusion of a detailed study in 1974 by the International Commission of Jurists—*Violations of Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Uganda*—that the Amin regime "has either suspended or violated most of the fundamental human rights" and that "there has been a total breakdown in the rule of law," including the use of the powers given the military "to arrest, detain, torture and kill thousands of civilians from all walks of life. . . ." Many members of the armed forces have themselves met the same fate.

Nationalism and economic grievances have combined in a number of countries to expand the category of "displaced persons" to whom Uganda's Asians belong: people who have been arbitrarily and ruthlessly expelled from their often old-established country of residence, presumably to be returned to their country of origin. Amin is by no means the first nor is he likely to be the last to play this game. A few major examples may be cited:[28] Indonesia turned on its Chinese population; Cambodia, after the ouster of Sihanouk, expelled the resident Vietnamese amid unconfirmed reports of 200,000 killed; Burmese nationalism forced the return to India of hundreds of thousands of Indians, and Ceylon demanded the same for many of its Tamils. In the expulsion of alien Africans, Ghana and Zaire appear to head the list in numbers and ruthlessness.[29] In the formerly French African states many Dahomeyans were forced to return to their own country.

Concluding Reflections

The record which has been presented in the preceding pages, and which might easily be elaborated to cover many more, is clear enough evidence that the newly freed peoples of Asia and Africa share in

[28] See Fred R. von der Mehden, *Comparative Political Violence* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1973), 57.

[29] See "The Expulsion of West African Aliens," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, IX, No. 2 (1971), 205-30.

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original sin and are no more rid of the temptation to abuse their fellow men than is the remainder of the human race.[30] The proposition which is at once the most trite and the most significant is that they are no better and no worse than the rest of mankind, and that, like the rest of mankind, their propensity to engage in discrimination, oppression, and violence varies greatly according to time and circumstance. Any current appraisal must take into account not only that each society has its own system of social and ethical conceptions, but also that they are now caught up in a peculiarly difficult period of adjustment to independence in a tangled and disorderly world. Colonialism's random disruption of their old order brought them the start of transition from their traditional societies to a rapidly changing modernity, but not much more than that.

In a rash moment at the second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Conakry in April 1960, President Sékou Touré of Guinea made the extraordinary statement that "Asia and Africa, who have never colonised any people, nor hampered the process of development of any nation, any civilisation, have no bad conscience, no perfidious intentions, no unavowable schemes vis-à-vis the rest of the world. There is not a single one of our deeds which is not in keeping with the moral and material interests of social man, universal man."[31] Would that it were true! Regrettably, there is not even evidence that peoples who themselves have suffered oppression and exploitation have in any time or place learned a lasting lesson which forbids them to exploit and oppress other peoples within or outside their own society or polity.

After World War I, the Poles and other "liberated" peoples protested that their own experience made it inconceivable that they should maltreat minorities left over within their borders in the peace settlement; similarly, the nationalist heirs to the colonial regimes repudiated the notion that they might use their new-found power to attack the human rights and fundamental freedoms of their neighbors or fellow citizens. Particularly in black Africa, but with a great following throughout the world, they defined racism, the remnants of colonialism, and what was seen as rising neocolonialism as being the major

[30] In a Western-oriented "Comparative Study of Freedom" in *Freedom at Issue* (Freedom House, New York, January-February 1974), 151 countries are rated in terms of their political and civil rights and the status of freedom. Of the Asian and African countries dealt with in the present article, only nine are rated as *Free*, including Israel and Mauritius; only two, Gambia and Botswana, are in Africa. A rating of *Partly Free* is given to 26, some of which must have crossed the line from *Not Free* by the slimmest of margins.

[31] Sékou Touré, *The International Policy of the Democratic Party of Guinea* (Republic of Guinea, n.d.), VII, 121.

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threats to rights and freedom. The Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, where racist segregation, humiliation, and exploitation have been institutionalized as nowhere else in the contemporary world, were identified as the ultimate models of racist and colonial evil, and hence as the most notorious targets for attack. As the number of ex-colonial members of the UN increased, this position came to be identified as the official doctrine and increasingly activist program of the organization.

The result of that situation has been the emergence of a double standard which has worked to debase the moral coinage of the Third-World countries and to lessen the appeal of the causes they advocate by opening them to attack by their enemies and the skeptical. The wholly legitimate drive against colonialism and apartheid was in some measure called into question when the new countries habitually shrugged off any concern with massive violations of human rights and dignity in their own domain. It was inescapable that the international furor rightly raised over the Sharpeville shootings in 1960, in which some seventy Africans were killed and more wounded by the South African police, should be contrasted with the silence which generally greeted the Asian and African massacres in which tens and hundreds of thousands were killed, often with virtually no public voice of consequence raised in protest.

In the light of the record, it is impossible to evade the conclusion that the human rights and fundamental freedoms on which the Third-World countries based their demands for liberation and their attacks on white-dominated southern Africa have been flagrantly violated in their own domestic life, and from time to time in their international stance. Witness the defense of terrorism as a weapon to be used against colonialism and racism—and against Israel, which in turn retaliates by raids across its borders.

It is, I believe, impossible to dismiss as uncontrollable popular risings the bulk of the massacres, the driving of hundreds of thousands into exile, and the expulsions. In almost all major instances, save the massive and murderous exchange of populations between India and newly created Pakistan in 1947, the governments were involved—either full-scale or ill-concealed behind the scenes. The disintegration of public authority in the Congo after independence and the consequent collapse of law and order is a rare event. Nor does placing the blame on colonialism furnish much comfort, except to demonstrate that colonialism was a poor teacher of civility. The concrete situation is there, whatever may have created it. It is also evident, of course, that neigh-

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boring countries and remoter ones, as for instance in the case of the Congo, have often intervened, openly or covertly, whether in pursuit of their own interest or their conception of the public good or both.

It is understandable enough that peoples released from colonialism should insist on a strict doctrine of non-intervention in their affairs, asserting the inalienable right of every state to choose its political, economic, social, and cultural systems, and to conduct itself at home as it pleases.[32] As something of an aside, I might remark that this basic principle may—indeed, must, as its Third-World sponsors see it—be overridden by an even more basic one which condemns as totally illegitimate and open to intervention of any variety the colonial and apartheid regimes of southern Africa. The inevitable result is a double standard: The countries of the Third World are not subject to criticism or attack, even by each other, while any part of the rest of the world which can be labelled racist or imperialist must be held accountable.

One outstanding African spokesman who has publicly protested that double standard is President Nyerere. As head of the first African state to recognize Biafra, he held it to be intolerable that the Biafrans should be kept within Nigeria by force, and challenged an African summit meeting in 1969 to rethink its position. He warned that African leaders and the OAU would deserve the scorn of those who accuse them of double standards if they did not raise a voice against African regimes which oppress the peoples of Africa.

> If we do not learn to criticise injustice within our continent, we will soon be tolerating fascism in Africa as long as it is practised by African governments against African peoples. Consider what our reaction would have been if the 30,000 Ibos had been massacred by whites in Rhodesia or South Africa. One can imagine the outcry from Africa. Yet these people are still dead; the colour of those who killed them is irrelevant. We must ask Nigeria to stop more killing now, and to deal with the problem by argument, not death. Justice is indivisible. Africa, and the OAU, must act accordingly.[33]

Four years later, Nyerere called upon the OAU to offer its services to end the killings in Burundi, and not to allow the principle of non-intervention to block mediation while tens of thousands were dying.[34] "Both humanity and the cause of peace in Africa demand that we concern ourselves actively," he pleaded, but the OAU failed to respond, as it had failed in relation to Biafra.

[32] See, for example, General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), 1965.
[33] "The Nigeria-Biafra Crisis," mimeo (no date or place given; September 1969?).
[34] *New York Times*, July 18, 1973.

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Another African notable who has also protested, but with far more of a personal ax to grind, is former President Obote. In his previously cited letter to African heads of state and government, he asserted that under President Amin, who ousted him, genocide has been a fact "in the very heart and belly of Africa," with the result that Africa now stands to be "condemned forever on the conspiracy of silence over the trampling of human rights."[35] He voiced his fear that Africa might be charged with employing double standards in pronouncing upon the oppressive measures of the racist regimes in southern Africa while keeping silent about the same type of oppression in Uganda, and quoted from a memorandum written by a former minister under Amin: "Too many nations regard what is happening in Uganda as an internal matter. Is systematic genocide an internal matter or a matter for all mankind? The Sharpeville massacre was condemned by the entire civilized world, but nobody has yet condemned the wholesale killings and disappearances of innocent people in Uganda."

In his introduction in 1971 to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the UN, U Thant pointed out the contrast between the admirable job done in preparing the legal texts on human rights and the low standing of the UN in relation to the all-too-common violation of rights within the frontiers of a state.[36] "But practically where," he asked, "does an individual or a group of individuals find recourse against oppression within his own country?" For the Third World, and for most of the First and Second as well, the answer must still be: Nowhere. The Secretary-General added that "the time has surely come when the Governments in the United Nations must make a determined effort to give justice a world-wide dimension."

Independence alone provides no guarantee of human rights and dignity, nor of any other freedom than, by definition, that of the country as a whole. Indeed, it may serve to bar more tightly the sovereign gates which exclude intervention of any kind, including intervention aimed at the protection and promotion of rights of individuals.

[35] See fn. 27. For another condemnation of the double standard, see Hasu H. Patel, "General Amin and the Indian Exodus from Uganda," *Issue*, II (Winter 1972), 21.

[36] *UN Monthly Chronicle*, VIII (October 1971), 124. Writing of "Uganda's Reign of Terror," Hal Sheets, a Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, concludes that "Nearly thirty years after the founding of the United Nations, there is still no mechanism to protect citizens from the arbitrary madness of governments. Mass murder in Uganda and elsewhere remains, for the United Nations and the United States Government, a distant grief at best." "The Week in Review," *New York Times*, August 4, 1974. The enlargement in recent years of the jurisdiction and powers of the UN Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities holds out new hope, but an effective system of intervention on behalf of human rights seems still a remote goal.

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The principle of sovereignty still reigns. To cite only a single example, the problems of Biafra, including mass murders and a long civil war costly in human lives and misery, were regarded by the international authorities of Africa and of the world at large as a domestic concern of Nigeria in which they had no standing save to help to bring the war to an end, essentially on Nigeria's terms.

The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that "disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which outraged the conscience of mankind." Have not some of the "barbarous acts" which erupted in the Third World, a few of which have been recorded here, also outraged that conscience? And, if not, why not?

The standards for human rights and fundamental freedoms which have been set for the unfree countries should surely find no less observance in those which have already won freedom.

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POLITICAL DEMAND CHANNELS IN THE PROCESSES OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH IMPERIAL EXPANSION, 1870–1913

By STEPHEN COONEY*

BEFORE one can make conclusive statements about the causes of Western imperialism, of whatever type, one must comprehend the network of political processes and administrative relations by which expansionist demands were fed into the political systems of the imperialist powers. In such an analysis, one must integrate elements of both traditional and behavioral approaches to the study of politics. It is essential to know both the constitutional and administrative structures of political systems and the actual behavioral processes through which demands were transmitted to those national political authorities which ultimately sanctioned, supported, or ordered policies of expansion.

There is a growing body of historical studies which include accounts of such relations within the imperial powers. Since the turn of the century, when Hobson focused attention on the questions of who controlled and who profited from imperial expansion, there has been no lack of interest in the subject, but few broad surveys or analyses based on thorough documentation have been produced. I aspire to take a step in that direction. There now exists a large body of historical studies of imperial expansion, drawn from a wide variety of private and official primary sources. Utilizing some of these studies, I will attempt to establish models of how demands for imperial expansion in two countries—Britain and the United States—were related to the general decision-making processes in foreign policy and domestic politics. It is hoped that this study will make a contribution to several areas of current interest. It could serve as a case study of "linkages" between the internal and external spheres of politics, provide some insight and clarification for the debates on the causes of imperial expansion, and demonstrate the usefulness of applying contemporary concepts in international relations to the analysis of historical problems.

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I. Introduction

It is perhaps best to begin with an explanation of the term "demand channels." The specific concept of "political demands" has been developed by David Easton in his books on the systematic analysis of general political behavior. Demands are requests for certain material and ideological "outputs" from a political system. Demand "flow channels," as discussed in Easton's *Systems Analysis of Political Life*, denote the paths by which these demands are referred to a political system's official decision-makers.[1] I am here concerned with the national political systems of Britain and the United States, and the channels by which demands for imperial expansion flowed to their policy-makers.

However, one must always bear in mind that the study of imperial expansion involves demands at more than one level of political system. A national political system engaged in a policy of expansion, whether through direct territorial annexation or so-called "informal" extensions of economic and political influence, is operating in the greater sphere of the international political system, where the interests of other national political systems are also involved. Thus, the expanding imperial power must relate or "link" the demands imposed by conditions in the international sphere to those originating within its own domestic politics.

"Linkage" in this sense is a concept which has been developed especially in the articles of James N. Rosenau. He argues that the international political system and national domestic systems will tend to penetrate one another. That is, international systemic demands will tend to impose themselves on domestically formulated national policies, while domestic demands and needs will simultaneously encourage certain types of behavior within the international political system. The two types of system cannot therefore be studied in complete isolation from one another.[2] Another author, W. F. Hanrieder, has categorized three different types of "referents" for the formulation of political goals by a national political system:

[1] David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965), chaps. 3 and 5-9, esp. pp. 117-23.

[2] In particular, cf. James Rosenau, "Political Science in a Shrinking World," in Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York 1969), 1-17; also, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill. 1966), 52-71; and "Compatibility, Consensus, and an Emerging Political Science of Adaptation," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (December 1967), 983-88.

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(1) internal—goals which refer only to domestic circumstances and do not need to refer to factors beyond the boundaries of the state for their fulfillment;
(2) external—goals formulated with reference to the domestic system, which are, however, concerned with conditions in the international political system;
(3) systemic—"goals . . . formulated in response to what national decision-makers perceive to be existing patterns of power and purpose in the international system."[3]

One can accept these different goal referents as categorizing the sources and types of political demands. In terms of the modern pluralistic model, the political process involves a choice between competing and divergent goals, put forward by different groups of individuals. For the decision-makers of the political system as a whole, these different individual goals become, therefore, political demands. One can see from Hanrieder's classification that these demands move in two directions with regard to the boundaries of a national political system. "Internal" and "external" demands emanate from within the national system. The former are concerned solely with internal policy, but may have repercussions on the national system's ability to act in its "extra-societal" environment. "External" demands press for particular policies of action abroad. "Systemic" demands, which might be labeled more clearly as "international systemic demands," also press for external action but are derived from the situation outside the national boundary.[4]

The foregoing view of the process of linkage conceives of it simply as involving two interlocking spheres of policy, representing two different levels of political responsibility. Demands formulated wholly within the context of domestic politics may conflict with or reinforce the necessities or opportunities for action at the international level. National policy-makers must serve two constituencies—their domestic public and the international system. Their policies must be considered

[3] Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Actor Objectives and the International System," *Journal of Politics*, XXVII (February 1965), 117-21; and "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (December 1967), 978-80.

[4] "Boundary" is used here in the territorial sense. In Easton's terminology, one may refer to the systemic boundary between the national political system and its "extra-societal" environment, i.e. the environment beyond the territory which it serves. Easton maintains that there is also a boundary between the political system and the host society, which he defines as the "intra-societal" environment; cf. Easton (fn. 1), 21-22, 344-47 and Table 1. In the present study, the terms intra-societal and extra-societal environment are also employed.

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successful at the former level to secure their positions in the latter. Diplomatic and military services act to relay information on conditions in the international system, while party politics and representative institutions are especially important as channels of information concerning domestic demands.

In the light of historical information, I found that this simple, dualistic theoretical structure provides an adequate framework for the analysis of demand channels in the process of American imperial expansion. But in the British case, the structure of demand channels was far more complex. In studying British expansion, one must consider a separate level of demands—local imperial demands—which were not necessarily derived from either domestic or international pressures. The manner in which demands from this level interacted with those from the other two levels considerably complicated the making of British policy. These conclusions may well have some important implications for an understanding of the historical development of imperialism.

II. A Simple Linkage Model: American Imperial Expansion, 1889–1913

First, I will examine the structure of demand channels in American imperialism as an example of the simple linkage relationship derived from the theories of Rosenau and Hanrieder. Expansion was a dominant theme of American history, but it was traditionally considered a part of the domestic political process. European states evaluated American growth in the light of their own international interests. Seen from this perspective, the usual process of continental expansion, which drew heavily on European financial and demographic resources, was only of peripheral concern politically. Even Britain, with a vested interest in the security and development of Canada, was unwilling to commit itself too heavily against the growth of a new hegemonic giant in North America.[5] Meanwhile, the domestic population of the United States considered the growth of the country not in relation to expanded capabilities in international politics, but to a higher order of domestic well-being. Overseas expansionism, which risked greater involvement in international politics, was viewed by Americans as a species of political adventurism.[6]

[5] Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 6th ed. (New York 1958), chaps. 11, 15-17, 22-23, 26-27 and 33; Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908* (London 1967), *passim*.

[6] Marilyn Blatt Young, "American Expansionism, 1870–1900: The Far East," in Barton Bernstein, ed., *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History* (New York 1968), 176-201; Ernest R. May, *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay* (New York 1968), 83-94.

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Toward 1890, however, these perspectives were modified. Although overseas expansionist projects had been considered during almost every nineteenth-century American administration, it was only under President Benjamin Harrison (1889–1893) that specific projects were related to a coordinated reevaluation of the relationship between American economic, defense, and foreign policies.[7] From this date, one can speak of a true American policy of imperial expansion in the prewar era, whether by direct territorial annexation or by means of informal political-economic influence, which interacted increasingly with the processes of the European international system.[8]

In comparing the linkage process in American imperialism with that found in British imperialism, one is struck initially by the greater simplicity and straightforwardness of the American example. Lacking, for the most part, local imperial interests, the United States also lacked a complicating substructure of channels for local imperial demands. Before 1890 the United States had established only one unilateral overseas protectorate, in Hawaii. Here it is significant that demands for American annexation, emanating from entrenched local American interests, were channeled either through the State Department or through the domestic political process. The American minister maintained official contacts with the royal government and also, after 1889, clandestine contacts with the "Annexation Club."[9] Meanwhile missionaries, other settlers, and some of the economic interests in Hawaii developed propaganda in favor of expansion, which was later taken up by those elements of the domestic press and public opinion which had come to favor overseas expansion in general.[10]

Various other local overseas interests were developed or intensified during and after the 1890's. These included the involvement of American planters and shippers in the Cuban sugar trade, the extensive operations of the United Fruit Company (especially in Central America), and the activities of American missionaries in China. But the

[7] J. A. S. Grenville and George B. Young, *Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873–1917* (New Haven 1966), 83-95, 100-101.

[8] Robert W. Van Alstyne, in *The Rising American Empire* (Oxford 1960), chaps. 5-9, and Robert Zevin, in "An Economic Interpretation of American Imperialism," *Journal of Economic History*, LXII (March 1972), 316-33, emphasize the continuity between continental and overseas expansionism. However, it appears to me that they fail to account for different kinds of extra-societal environments in which expansion took place, as well as for the changed domestic attitude toward the new phase of expansion.

[9] Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands* (Baltimore 1936), chap. 2; Sylvester K. Stevens, *American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842–1898* (Harrisburg 1945), 186-212.

[10] The development of American interests in Hawaii, and their relationship to domestic American society, are discussed fully in *ibid.*, chaps. 1-8; the annexation debate is described in *ibid.*, 230-40, 245-61; Pratt (fn. 9), chaps. 4-5; May (fn. 6), chap. 8.

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important point about these interests, with reference to the present inquiry, is that their influence was felt again either through direct contact with the State Department or through sources of political pressure located completely within the domestic political system.[11]

The United States had no equivalent of European colonial ministries or colonial services, organizations which could provide a source for independent official demands and a special exclusive channel for the expansionist demands of private interests. Nor did the United States ever develop any kind of independent colonial affairs office with its own representative at the highest executive level.[12]

Within the executive as a whole, the only independent source outside of the State Department for the formulation of imperial projects was the Department of the Navy. The Navy contributed the greatest of all American imperialist theoreticians, Admiral Mahan, whose influence, aside from its impact on fellow naval officers, was primarily exerted outside the government, on public opinion. More influential in his official capacity was Admiral Royal B. Bradford, the energetic chief of the Bureau of Equipment. From 1898 to 1903, he exercised direct pressure on the State Department for the acquisition of bases which were essential for the American ability to coal its ships independently if it were to guard the Panama route, dominate the Caribbean, and play a major role in the Far East. Cuba was forced to grant the rights to two bases (only one of which was ever developed) as part of the price of its qualified independence. The Philippines were retained in large part to provide the United States with a major oriental *point d'appui*,

[11] On the influence of American interests in Cuba and the Spanish-American War, see Pratt (fn. 9), 248-51; Ernest R. May, *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power* (New York 1961), 112-20; Grenville and Young (fn. 7), chap. 7. On the United Fruit Company, see Dana G. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921* (Princeton 1964), 16-20. On American missionaries in China, see Paul A. Varg, *The Making of a Myth: The United States and China, 1897–1912* (East Lansing, Mich. 1968), chap. 1; Marilyn Blatt Young, *The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895–1901* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968), 76-87, 187-97; Thomas J. McCormick, *China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901* (Chicago 1967), chaps. 2 and 7.

There is also evidence that the direct impact of such influences on American imperial policy may be overrated. Cf., for example, Munro, 16-20, 24-37, and 225-35; M. B. Young, *Rhetoric of Empire*, 187-97; Howard C. Hill, *Roosevelt and the Caribbean* (Chicago 1927), 77-105; Ralph Eldin Minger, "William Howard Taft and the United States Intervention in Cuba, 1906," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XLI (February 1961), 75-89.

[12] Brief surveys of the development of the American colonial administrative apparatus during this period are to be found in Julius W. Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment* (New York 1950), chap. 5; Earl S. Pomeroy, "The American Colonial Office," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXX (March 1944), 521-26; and Richard W. Leopold, *The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History* (New York 1962), 197-99.

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but congressional penury and the failure of the armed services to agree on a suitable base site prevented their development. Secretary of State Hay even inquired diplomatically concerning the possibility of an American base on the China coast in 1899, though such a request quite possibly contradicted the spirit of his recently enunciated Open Door policy. The foregoing are only a few of the many American naval base projects that were being discussed around the turn of the century. Local resistance and diplomatic failure to agree on terms led to a prolongation of discussions until the Navy itself lost interest. Beginning in about 1903, the General Board of the Navy started to deprecate the value of a large number of scattered bases and to develop instead the principle of a single, concentrated fleet, with only a few strongly held bases. After that, the local American diplomatic representatives were often more interested than the Navy in the possibility of foreign bases. In the end, only Guantanamo Bay and Pearl Harbor were designated for development as major bases, though Guam, Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines had been acquired mainly for that purpose.[13]

As in other imperial countries, naval officers also served as local agents of American imperial power. Such local agents, supplied with outdated, irrelevant, or irksome instructions, located far from home authorities, and faced with immediate problems, could wield a certain amount of discretionary authority. Thus, Commander A. C. Dillingham of the cruiser *Detroit* virtually established himself as the dominant military authority during the Dominican troubles of 1903–1904, and stopped outbreaks of rebellion by forcing a peace agreement on contending parties. American naval officers played important roles in the Honduran and Nicaraguan crises of 1911–1912, often on their own initiative, and helped commit the United States to interventionist policies in those countries. Generally, these officers acted, or tried to act, within the spirit of State Department directives as transmitted in the orders of the Navy Department.[14]

[13] Richard D. Challener, *Admirals, Generals and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914* (Princeton 1973), 81-110, 178-98, 323-32; J. A. S. Grenville, "Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States, 1870–1917," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Ser. 5, XI (1961), 7-17; Grenville and Young (fn. 7), 307-19; William Reynolds Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909* (Austin, Texas 1958), *passim*; Seward W. Livermore, "American Naval Base Policy in the Far East, 1850–1914," *Pacific Historical Review*, XIII (June 1944), 113-35.

[14] Challener (fn. 13), 119-78, 198-218, 288-323; Walter LaFeber, "United States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution, 1893–1894," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XL (February 1960), 107-18; J. Fred Rippy, "Initiation of the Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XVII (August 1937), 419-57; Braisted (fn. 13), chaps. 2-3; Munro (fn. 11), 204-35.

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The role of the Army was more purely instrumental. The Army did provide important reports urging the retention of all the Philippines if a base were to be established there. It supported the demand that other islands be taken from Spain to provide steppingstones across the Pacific. Also, the so-called "Platt Amendment," which provided for an American protectorate over Cuba and the leasing of American bases there, was actually formulated by Elihu Root, then serving as Secretary of War, after consultation in Cuba with Governor Wood.[15]

But on the whole, the State Department bore the official responsibility for dealing with expansionist policies. There was no competing executive agency in formulating the expansionist decisions of either formal or informal empire. All questions of imperial expansion were dealt with by the diplomats and officials of the State Department, the Secretary, and the President. Relations within this policy-making system varied with different incumbents. In some cases serious questions remain concerning the actual balance of influence at the topmost level, between the President and the Secretary of State. Most American political leaders unfortunately were not prolific writers (Theodore Roosevelt was a notable exception). The lack of basic data has left much room for conjecture concerning the decision-making processes in the administrations of Harrison, Cleveland, and McKinley.[16] There even seems to be some doubt as to the degree to which Roosevelt acted as "his own Secretary of State." He gained a reputation for vigorous activity in foreign affairs by his personal conduct of crisis diplomacy, but the shaping of United States policies in Latin America and the Far East also owed much to the political management of John Hay and Elihu Root.[17] Taft delegated most of his authority in foreign

[15] McCormick (fn. 11), chap. 4; Lejeune Cummins, "The Formulation of the 'Platt' Amendment," *The Americas,* XXIII (1966–67), 370-89; Challener (fn. 13), 198-218, 344-63.

[16] A general survey of relations under these Presidents is to be found in Leopold (fn. 12), 106-10. An article by A. T. Volwiler, "Harrison, Blaine, and American Foreign Policy," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,* LXXIX (November 1938), 637-48, did much to alter earlier assumptions that the relatively obscure Harrison was strongly influenced in an aggressive direction by his prominent and energetic Secretary of State, "Jingo Jim" Blaine; cf. also Grenville and Young (fn. 7), chap. 3. On Cleveland's relations with his Secretaries, Walter Gresham and Richard Olney, cf. George Dulebohn, *Principles of Foreign Policy under the Cleveland Administrations* (Philadelphia 1941), esp. 16-30; Grenville and Young (fn. 7), chaps. 4, 6, and 7, esp. pp. 158-66; Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1963), chaps. 5-6. On McKinley's Secretaries of State before Hay took office in 1898, cf. Grenville and Young (fn. 7), 239-47, and Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900* (New York 1968), 197-203.

[17] Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and America's Rise to World Power* (Baltimore 1956), 192-99; Raymond A. Esthus, "The Changing Concept of the Open

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affairs to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, a former Attorney General and Senator, whose policies in turn were heavily influenced by his subordinates, particularly the First Assistant Secretary, Francis W. Huntington Wilson.[18]

Lower in the hierarchy, there seems to have been little scope for independent influence. The diplomatic service was notorious for a high proportion of political appointments and a low degree of efficiency in career positions.[19] The American experience did parallel Britain's in that great discretionary authority was sometimes wielded by nominally diplomatic representatives in distant or backward countries with weak governments.[20] Minister John Stevens committed the United States to recognition and protection of the new Hawaiian Republic on his own authority in 1893. Minister William Powell, accredited to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, frequently acted with excessive zeal and little supervision. The long-serving American minister to Korea, Rev. Horace N. Allen, held a great deal of independent influence and power at the Seoul court; for several years he battled the tendency in Washington to accept the growth of Japanese hegemony. But, in general, only the inconsequential nature of such posts enabled policies to be pursued independently, below the threshold of domestic political interest. It is significant that the policies of Stevens and Allen were subsequently disavowed by the government in Washington, and Powell was replaced in Santo Domingo when, in Roosevelt's eyes, the Dominican problem became really serious.[21]

In Washington itself, the various assistant secretaries also appeared to exert little independent influence, at least until the establishment, late in this period, of special divisions within the State Department for Latin America and the Far East. The chiefs of these divisions—Huntington Wilson, Willard Straight, William Phillips, and T. C. Dawson, among others—played important roles in formulating the Taft-Knox Dollar Diplomacy policies in Asia and Latin America. A. Whitney Griswold assigned to W. W. Rockhill, Hay's special adviser on Far Eastern affairs, a critical role in devising the Open Door policy, a view

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Door, 1899–1910," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLVI (December 1959), 437-51; Munro (fn. 11), 112-16.

[18] Leopold (fn. 12), 243; Munro (fn. 11), 160-64; Charles Vevier, *The United States and China, 1906–1913: A Study in Finance and Diplomacy* (New York, 1968 reprint of 1955 ed.), 88-92.

[19] Munro (fn. 11), 20-23, contains a good general description of the State Department in this period, from which several of the subsequent points are drawn.

[20] Grenville and Young (fn. 7), 125-26.

[21] On Stevens, Powell, and Allen, cf., among others, Pratt (fn. 9), 49-109; Munro (fn. 11), 78-94; Beale (fn. 17), 312-25; Rippy (fn. 14), 422-38.

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subsequently popularized by George F. Kennan. More recent scholarship has somewhat deemphasized the role Rockhill played.[22]

To summarize, control over official demands for imperial expansion, with reference to the situation in the extra-societal environment and the international political system, was usually the exclusive responsibility of the President and the Secretary of State. There were few American interests established abroad and there was no alternative executive agency through which they might have channeled their demands. Colonial administrative agencies performed only low-level functions. Only the Department of the Navy applied any systematic expansionist pressure, in the form of demands for bases. Within the State Department itself, there was, until the Taft Administration, relatively little scope for subordinate officials to generate independent expansionist policies.

This means that linkage in American imperial policy conformed to the pattern outlined earlier. There was a simple and direct interaction between executive policies, based on perceptions of the compatibility between international systemic demands and domestic needs, and those internal and external demands which were generated by the domestic system.

With regard to these latter demands, it is important to note that American policy-makers received less deference in the formulation of policy than was shown their British counterparts. In Britain questions of imperial expansion, if they were also related to questions of national foreign policy, were segregated somewhat from the normal processes of domestic politics. But in the United States greater legislative oversight of foreign policy matters meant that they were often submitted through normal domestic demand channels, without regard to their special extra-societal aspects.

There are probably two causes of this difference. First, the American President during this period possessed considerably less general executive authority than the British Prime Minister. The decline of executive authority in the post-Civil War period is a well-known phenomenon in the evolution of the American constitutional system. The President in this period did not even submit the executive budget, though he could request authority from Congress for special appropriations. The position of general executive weakness was aggravated by the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority in the Senate for the

[22] A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New Haven 1938), 62-76; George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago 1951), chap. 2; M. B. Young (fn. 11), chap. 6; McCormick (fn. 11), chap. 5.

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ratification of treaties. With congressional seats often under local control and with a majority-aggregation system of two closely competing political parties, no President ever had a comfortable, permanent majority to support his foreign policy. He usually had to accept a certain quota of party defectors on any given vote while hoping to gain some support from the other party on grounds of local advantages or disinterested solidarity behind national policies.[23] On two issues of the 1890's, the American reaction to the Cuban revolution and the building of a Central American canal, Congress even seriously threatened to act without presidential direction.

Although Roosevelt was supposed to have expanded the role of presidential political leadership, even he had difficulties in securing congressional approval for his imperial and foreign policies. The Dominican Receivership Treaty of 1905 never came to a vote because of congressional opposition; a formal treaty was not approved until 1907. An important reciprocity agreement with Newfoundland, which might have contributed to an eventual absorption of Canada, was lost because it was delayed and unacceptably amended by the Senate. Roosevelt also chronically failed to secure adequate appropriations for the construction of overseas bases, and had to compromise on the construction of dreadnoughts for the Navy.[24]

This lack of deference to executive leadership rubbed off on the Secretary of State. The appointment was still considered prestigious, but it had lost its identification with domestic political status and power. Though the constitutional conditions of service were different, the antebellum American Secretary of State had often held a position of personal domestic political power comparable to that of the nineteenth-century British Foreign Secretary. Presidents Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Van Buren had all served in the office, as had each of the senatorial triumvirate of Clay, Calhoun, and Webster. Since the retirement of William H. Seward in 1869, no powerful domestic political figure save James G. Blaine had held the office (though William Jennings Bryan would accept the position in 1913).

[23] The best general study of the administrative relations between the executive and legislative branches from the Civil War to 1901 is Leonard D. White, *The Republican Era: A Study in Administrative History, 1869–1901* (New York 1958), chaps. 1-5. A summary of the constitutional traditions concerning control of foreign policy and their development in this era is in Leopold (fn. 12), 66-102, 112-18, 246-52.

[24] On these issues, cf. Hill (fn. 11), 157-69; Munro (fn. 11), 94-106, 116-25; Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine*, Vol. III, *1867–1907* (Gloucester, Mass., 1966 reprint of 1937 ed.), 436-44; John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography* (New York 1953), 235-41; Charles S. Campbell, *The Anglo-American Understanding, 1898–1903* (Baltimore 1957), 255-69; Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1783–1918* (Princeton 1939), 261-85.

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No presidential nominee, again with the exception of Blaine, had ever been Secretary of State or held any other diplomatic position. (Bryan is again a later exception, and Walter Gresham was considered as a possible Republican candidate for the Presidency in 1888; he bolted the party in 1892 and was appointed Secretary by the Democrat Cleveland.) There was no particular sense of longevity or expertise in the office. Hay (1898–1905) held the office longer than any man between the retirement of Hamilton Fish in 1877 and the accession of Cordell Hull in 1933.

A reason for this decline of the political power and prestige of the Secretary of State is easy to find: the declining relative importance of foreign policy matters after the Civil War. This contributed to a second cause of the lack of deference shown by the public and Congress to the executive in general. The mid-century period marked an intensification of the preoccupation with the country's phenomenal domestic growth. Concomitantly, there was little sense of any kind of involvement of American interests in overseas political affairs. This tendency was increased by the Western Hemisphere's relative freedom from the threat of European political penetration. The main issues in foreign affairs related to the process of domestic growth: relations with Canada, the possibility of building a Central American canal and, above all, tariffs. While the general independent power and prestige of the Presidency and the executive branch declined due to domestic political developments, foreign policy became more linked with purely domestic political questions.[25] With no critical issues relevant to national survival or advancement at the level of the international system, the country could dispense with solidarity behind the foreign policy leadership; foreign policy became, in the words of Professor Bailey, a football of politics.[26]

An important result was that in the linking of domestic American society with international affairs, domestic and local interests could have a greater impact than they did in Britain. There were techniques by which a President could manipulate the political system to avert these domestic constraints. But even a "strong" President, such as Roosevelt, had to avoid the appearance of committing the nation to an alliance, and to exercise caution in undertaking any overseas responsibilities.

A general model of American demand channels would indicate two

[25] Good examples of this are in Garraty (fn. 24), 235-41; C. S. Campbell (fn. 24), 255-69; LaFeber (fn. 16), 370-79; Stevens (fn. 9), 281-97.
[26] Cf. Bailey (fn. 5), chaps. 26-27.

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directions of "demand flow." This is shown in Diagram 1, a schematic representation loosely adapted from Easton. Most demands from the extra-societal environment and the international system entered the American political system via the State Department, with some others being channeled through the service departments. Some private-interest demands may also have been channeled into the intra-societal environment, where they were routed through the normal processes of domestic political demands, which are here only sketched in. These demands may have entered the governmental level through Congress. Because of its great political strength, the latter negotiated on an equal level with the executive in foreign and imperial policy. Direct access



DIAGRAM 1. DEMAND CHANNELS IN AMERICAN IMPERIAL EXPANSION

to the executive is not shown, though it may occasionally have occurred. Domestic demands relative to imperial expansion were almost always expressed through congressional pressure or advice. As for electoral pressure on the President, imperial expansion was probably never a decisive issue in presidential contests.[27]

[27] The only presidential election in which imperial expansion was declared a major issue was that of 1900, but it does not appear to have played a decisive role on the outcome. See Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?" *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXIV (June 1937), 43-52; D. Jerome Tweton, "Imperialism versus Prosperity in the Election of 1900," *North Dakota*

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III. A Complex Linkage Model: British Imperial Expansion, 1870–1907

Whereas we have studied American imperial expansion only from 1889 to 1913, we will examine the development of demand channels in British imperial expansion over a somewhat longer period, from 1870 to 1907. The period between the Franco-Prussian War and the Anglo-Russian Entente comprised not only an important new stage in the development of British imperial expansion, but also many significant developments in the relationship between imperial and foreign policies.

However, the year 1870 marks no watershed in the development of the process of making imperial policy within the domestic society of Britain. Disraeli, at least, was aware that events on the Continent had ended the political primacy of Britain in Europe, and that it was necessary to rely upon development of the empire to ensure the continuation of Britain's status as a great political power. But neither he nor anyone else yet managed to impart to British society a new sense of imperial direction or of a need to reorganize the management of imperial affairs.[28] There was no great change in the imperial policy-making process and the evaluation of colonial demands until about 1895. By then, most expansion had been completed.

There were two important consequences. First, foreign policy remained largely in the hands of the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary. Foreign policy included those aspects of imperial policy

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Quarterly, xxx (Spring 1962), 50-55; E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920* (Philadelphia 1970), chap. 14; Harold Baron, "Anti-Imperialism and the Democrats," *Science & Society*, xxi (1957), 227-36; Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898–1900," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, xxii (September 1935), 220-30; Richard E. Welch, Jr., "Senator George Frisbie Hoar and the Defeat of Anti-Imperialism, 1898–1900," *Historian*, xxvi (May 1964), 370-80.

The Republicans, under Lodge's influence, adopted an aggressively expansionist platform plank in 1896, in contrast to the anti-expansionism of President Cleveland, but the McKinley-Bryan election of that year was dominated by the issue of "free silver"; Pratt (fn. 9), 206-15.

[28] William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890*, 2d ed. (New York 1950), 12-14; Stanley R. Stembridge, "Disraeli and the Millstones," *Journal of British Studies*, v (November 1965), 133-39; Robert Blake, *The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill* (London 1970), 123-30; J. H. Rose and others, eds., *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. III: *The Empire-Commonwealth, 1870–1919* (Cambridge 1959) [hereafter abbreviated as *CHBE*], 102-7; J. E. Tyler, *The Struggle for Imperial Unity, 1868–1895* (London 1938), 23-26; W. N. Medlicott, "Bismarck and Beaconsfield," in A. O. Sarkissian, ed., *Studies in Diplomatic Historiography in Honour of G. P. Gooch* (London 1961), 226-28; A. P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies* (London 1959), 25-33.

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which impinged on relations with other states of the European international system. The Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office usually maintained full control over all aspects of foreign policy and thereby over relevant matters of imperial expansion as well. The second result applies to the gap left by the first: those aspects of imperial policy not immediately connected with foreign policy considerations. I found that pressures of imperial expansion were not explicable solely by the application of a simple linkage model dichotomizing between domestic and international demands, but only by addition of a third level of demands, interacting with both of the others.

These have been labeled local imperial demands, i.e., demands on British policy made by officials and interests in territories ruled or controlled politically by Britain. One can argue that these demands were ultimately derived from Britain itself, but to regard them as domestic or internal factors would be inappropriate. The British political system developed separate mechanisms for local imperial demands, which one may consider as external to that society while also separate from international systemic demands. Cecil Rhodes, British subjects in Gambia, and Anglo-Indian military strategists (three different examples that have been studied), all had ways of making their demands felt in British domestic politics, to be sure, but this involved a conversion process. When presenting their case to the domestic British public, they often used different images and arguments from those they used when making local imperial demands directly to the British Government. Converting a local imperial demand into a domestic demand was only one possible approach in pressuring Whitehall. The crux of the matter is that colonial political systems were separate from the British political system but subordinate to it.

The consequences were not merely semantic. A different process of decision making in colonial expansion, circumventing Foreign Office control and operating through other mediating agencies (especially the Colonial and India Offices), had developed precisely because the Foreign Office was not greatly concerned with colonial problems during the mid-century years. This process continued to function as the Foreign Office became more interested in imperial policy, largely because no effort was made to establish a unified command of imperial policy until Balfour's ministry. From about 1870 to 1885, foreign and imperial policies were allowed to operate separately, but with increasing incidences of interconnection. From 1885 to 1895, decisions on colonial expansion were usually subordinated to careful consideration of international systemic demands by the Foreign Office. After 1895, with the

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accession of Joseph Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary, followed by that of Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India, local imperial demands challenged international systemic demands for priority in the formulation of policy, a challenge which finally ended with the reassertion of the supremacy of international systemic demands.

Three different kinds of demand channels in the British model have now been introduced: the Foreign Office channel which primarily carried international systemic demands; alternative official channels for local imperial demands (some of which, it should be noted, were also routed through the Foreign Office because of the protectorate system); and the channels of the domestic political process.

Aside from its greater complexity, there is a further way in which the network of British demand channels differed from that of the United States. The British executive had a firmer control over foreign policy than its American counterpart, and used this control to seclude foreign policy more fully from domestic political influences. We are thus left with an interesting paradox. While it had much less exclusive control over official demand channels connected with imperial expansion than the State Department, the Foreign Office most of the time actually had greater freedom from domestic constraints in linking policies of imperial expansion to general foreign policy.

The basis for the Foreign Office's control, both within and outside the government, lay in the high status of the Foreign Secretary and in the exclusiveness of its policy making. With regard to the general question of political leadership, the key factor in creating a large amount of deference toward the government was the high social and political status of the Foreign Secretary himself. The strength of the Foreign Secretary's position in this respect has been amply demonstrated by Gosses. First, the occupants of the position were always of high social standing. All were from leading Whig or Tory families during these years, and only Sir Edward Grey was not a peer. Even more significantly, the Foreign Office was somewhat excluded from the tradition of "government by amateurs." The Foreign Secretary was almost never reshuffled into other positions in the Cabinet: he was considered a professional. The exceptions during this period were Derby, who accepted the Colonial Office only after he had changed parties, and Granville, whom the Queen and political opinion in general forced Gladstone to demote to the Colonial Office in 1886. (Salisbury held the Foreign Office portfolio for a total of about twelve years, Granville for a further nine and Grey for nine also, beginning near the end of this period.) The Foreign Secretary's high status and presumed ex-

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pertise reinforced the notion that foreign affairs were too sensitive and difficult to be conducted by the normal domestic processes of government. Salisbury maintained, with a possible touch of egotism, that only the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary need be men with greater than "good average ability."[29] In 1868, parliamentary radicals succeeded, by four votes, in finally forcing the itemization of foreign and consular accounts, but in 1886 they failed by the same margin to make all territorial acquisitions and "great national engagements" subject to parliamentary approval. In general, the excuse of delicacy of negotiations served to deflect awkward parliamentary questions on current matters in foreign affairs.[30]

But the deference which entrusted foreign affairs so fully to the Cabinet and the Foreign Secretary was balanced by some degree of accountability. The political leadership of the government in the area of foreign policy was challenged indirectly, through the total accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, rather than directly, through the Foreign Secretary. The latter and his Parliamentary Under-Secretary did encounter some difficult questions, and sundry demands were presented directly to the Foreign Office through petitions, memorials, and visiting delegations. But the Prime Minister was ultimately responsible for the management of the Cabinet and for holding together the diverse coalitions composing the political parties. Major foreign policy questions could break up the internal cohesion of the ministry or undermine the general credit placed in it by the public. Although the direction of foreign policy was by tradition an aristocratic prerogative, both parties faced the problem of integrating traditions of aristocratic leadership with the rising forces of democracy. This problem was present both within the internal party organization and in the party's relation to the general public. Within the two major parties, the tension had different effects on the relationship of the Foreign Secretary to the Cabinet and party leadership.

The Conservative country squires and magnates were driven reluctantly, by Disraeli and Lord Randolph Churchill, toward a modern conception of party politics. Even by the turn of the century, the Conservative Central Office was not secure in its ascendancy over either the county notables or the rambunctious new local associations, and the problem was made worse by the accession of the Liberal

[29] F. Gosses, *The Management of British Foreign Policy Before the First World War* (Leiden 1948), chap. 4; C. J. Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists*, Vol. I: *British Foreign Policy, 1878–1902* (London 1967), 13-18; Zara Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914* (Cambridge 1969), 192-200.

[30] Thornton (fn. 28), 83-88; Gosses (fn. 29), chap. 4; Lowe (fn. 29), 11-13.

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Unionists.[31] All sides, however, were united in a nationalistic determination to maintain England's imperial strength and world position, although they disagreed on the specific means of doing so.[32] The Conservative Cabinet recognized the necessity of heeding the international systemic referent more completely than did Liberal cabinets; and the Conservative or Unionist Foreign Secretary usually felt that he could bring delicate decisions before the Cabinet for a realistic discussion.

This was not the case with the Liberals, who were never more than a congeries of diverse interests united under the "Gladstonian umbrella." Gladstone tried to provide the party with a sense of cohesiveness and purpose by emphasizing overriding single issues.[33] The old Whig leadership, with whom Gladstone identified temperamentally if not in policy, became increasingly incongruous within the party, so that a break was probably inevitable, whether over the Irish question or some other issue. Still, a Whig rump including Rosebery, Kimberley, and Spencer stayed and tried to steer the party toward a moderate reform policy at home and an imperialist policy abroad. The Radicals were loosely united in opposition to this approach to foreign and imperial policies, at least after Chamberlain left the Liberal Party, but seldom applied great pressure because of their prior commitments to domestic affairs and the Irish question. The Whigs were thus able to demand a free hand in controlling foreign policy as the price of their support. Beginning with Rosebery, Liberal foreign policy was conducted in virtual independence of Cabinet influence. Gladstone and Harcourt tried to fight this in 1892–1894, but only provoked threats of Rosebery's resignation. After the formation of the Liberal League, an imperialist party within the party, a compromise restored a semblance of party unity, and a Liberal Leaguer, Grey, was given the Foreign Office in the 1905 Cabinet. As Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman helped Grey keep the Cabinet out of foreign affairs as much as possible.[34]

Complementing the deference granted to the Foreign Secretary within society, Parliament, and the Cabinet was the dominance of the

[31] Blake (fn. 28), 137-59; H. J. Hanham, *Elections and Party Management: Politics in the Time of Disraeli and Gladstone* (London 1959), chaps. 16-17; Peter Fraser, *Joseph Chamberlain: Radicalism and Empire, 1868–1914* (London 1966), chaps. 10-11; R. B. McDowell, *British Conservatism, 1832–1914* (London 1959), 170-76.

[32] *Ibid.*, 102-6; *CHBE* (fn. 28), 156-62.

[33] D. A. Hamer, *Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy* (Oxford 1972), *passim*.

[34] Lowe (fn. 29), 166-68; Robert Rhodes James, *Rosebery* (London 1963), chaps. 8-12; Hamer (fn. 33), chap. 12; George Monger, *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900–1907* (London 1963), 257-61.

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Foreign Office in interpreting the situation within the international political system. No other department could match its information service in comprehensiveness or authority, at least until late in the period. The service ministries contributed some important specific information, but lacked centralized intelligence organizations until the late eighties. In fact, not until the Balfour ministry (1902–1905) was the Committee on Imperial Defence seriously used to coordinate defense planning with foreign and imperial policy.[35] Except during Chamberlain's tenure as Secretary, the Colonial Office held a low status within the government, and its views on questions of importance in general foreign policy were relegated to a secondary role. By contrast, the great importance of India sometimes gave information from that quarter a special urgency in determining policy. However, Lord Curzon, as Viceroy in 1899–1905, was ultimately unsuccessful in redefining the goals of foreign policy from the Indian point of view.

Imperial decision making, as it was related to general foreign policy, was carried on chiefly at the highest levels. The permanent staff of the Foreign Office was remarkably small; its work was usually restricted to the transmission of information from diplomats and consuls in the field, or advice on protocol and procedure. As Permanent Under-Secretary, the self-effacing and judicious Sir Thomas Sanderson may have strongly influenced the policy decisions of Salisbury during the latter's later years, but it was not until the early 1900's that a revolution in style and procedure gave permanent officials more explicit influence.[36] Also, one earlier change in the old tradition came about in the African Department after 1883, when Sir Percy Anderson and Sir Clement Hill successively played major roles in shaping imperial policy. It is possible that this exception was due mainly to a general ignorance of African matters.[37]

A final assessment of decisional roles at Cabinet level is harder to make. On the one hand, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, often working in collaboration, were considered responsible for a joint formulation of policy. Gladstone complained in 1892, when he and Rosebery differed over Uganda, that it was the first time in his long Cabinet experience that he had known the Prime Minister and Foreign

[35] *Ibid.*, 93-99; *CHBE* (fn. 28), 230-54, 563-77; Arthur J. Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880–1905* (London 1964 reprint), 77-78, 244-45.

[36] Ray Jones, *The Nineteenth Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History* (London 1971), *passim*; Monger (fn. 34), 94-103; Steiner (fn. 29), 1-121.

[37] *Ibid.*, 44-45; William Roger Louis, "Sir Percy Anderson's Grand African Strategy, 1883–1896," *English Historical Review*, LXXXI (April 1966), 292-314; Lowe (fn. 29), 182-83.

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Secretary to disagree in front of the Cabinet.[38] The only other example of such a major dispute in this era was the quarrel between Disraeli and Derby over the Eastern Question in 1877–78.[39] Salisbury for long periods eliminated the problem of collaboration by holding both portfolios. Furthermore, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had access to material not generally available to the Cabinet and could carry on private correspondence with British diplomats; the Cabinet was sometimes misled through the use of highly selective information. Nevertheless, it cannot be considered as a rubber stamp for the imperial policies of the Foreign Secretary. There were major Cabinet debates and divisions over the foreign and imperial policies of the Disraeli and Gladstone governments of the seventies and eighties which seriously affected those policies.[40] The gaffe of the Anglo-Congolese Treaty of 1894 reduced Rosebery's ability to conduct an independent foreign policy during his year as Prime Minister, and Salisbury's policies were plagued by Cabinet criticism and opposition in 1895–1900.[41]

Generally, one may conclude however that the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office had firm control over both the information received from the international political system and the development of national policy to meet international demands. The forms and tactics of policy had to be adapted to various domestic considerations, such as concepts of national status, national material needs, and national standards of morality, as applied to the international environment. But in Britain these demands had a smaller chance to affect policy than they had in the United States. This applied to imperial policy inasmuch as it formed a part of foreign policy.

Whether or not it constituted a part of foreign policy, imperial policy, including questions of expansion, could sometimes still be subject to important domestic influences. These influences usually originated among private British interests in the extra-societal or colonial environments. If such interests failed to obtain satisfaction from their direct demands on the government, they could approach the government indirectly, through the processes of domestic politics. They could

[38] James (fn. 34), 264-65.

[39] R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics* (London 1938), chaps. 7-8.

[40] *Ibid.*; Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London 1961), chaps. 3-6; *CHBE* (fn. 28), 127-56.

[41] James (fn. 34), 347-52; Lowe (fn. 29), 183-86, 196-241; J. A. S. Grenville, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century* (London 1962), *passim*; G. N. Sanderson, *England, Europe and the Upper Nile: A Study in the Partition of Africa* (Edinburgh 1965), 363-69, 392-403; John D. Hargreaves, "Lord Salisbury, British Isolation and the Yangtze Valley, June–September, 1900," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, xxx (May 1957), 62-75.

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either agitate public opinion to gain support for their causes, or work more discreetly through private-interest pressure groups. It appears that there were ordinarily three ways of converting such questions of foreign and imperial policy into domestic policy issues: by seeking to make them questions of national prestige or status, by making them questions of humanitarian concern, and by making them questions of general or local economic benefit. All of these methods involved creating an "external" demand on the government—that is, trying to force the government to behave in the extra-societal environment according to the needs and principles of domestic society.

I do not have the space here to explore the use of such techniques in channeling demands for imperial expansion. Some preliminary research has indicated that pressure based on humanitarian appeals was more influential in motivating British imperial expansion than use of the other techniques. However, this conclusion is attended by several important qualifications. For the purposes of my model, I will merely note that private interests overseas could also seek to influence the government in London through the ordinary channels of domestic politics.

Thus far, I have considered only the view from London, emphasizing how demands for imperial expansion were related to the making of British foreign policy. By contrast, the study of imperial policy from the colonial perspective reveals a policy of expansion determined largely by local needs, in which responsible Whitehall Offices often played a mediating rather than a directing role. Such local developments were interrupted by London decisions—sometimes based on foreign policy considerations—more often than they were motivated by them.

Local imperial demands can be divided into two categories, which were related to one another. One might name them "private interest demands" and "official administrative demands." The former would include all demands made upon the domestic British Government or overseas colonial authorities by individuals or groups in colonies and other areas of imperial concern acting in a private capacity. Private-interest demands arose out of dealings with local overseas populations, both inside and outside of the formal empire. Although it undertook no special responsibility for the economic and social relations of these interests with local populations, the British Government did feel obliged to provide an administrative framework within which commercial and other interests could function, if none existed within the host society. This is the basis for Robinson's and Gallagher's concept of the "imperialism of free trade." It was a form of the inexorable

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systematic cultural penetration by European statist modes of organization into other areas of the world.[42]

"Official administrative demands" included the demands made within the British Government by administrators and other officials overseas, including diplomatic representatives with quasi-administrative functions. These demands were based on local administrative needs. They arose partly out of the governing of private interests. Local administrators often served as the first step in mediating between such interests and the London government. Although the absolute scale of private interests in the various regions of the world was generally small, they were important factors in the considerations of local administrative agents. This was not due only to the interests' own need for protection, but also to the fact that, given the constant tendency of the British Government to economize on its expenditures, private interests might serve as cat's paws for local British strategic or political operations.

Private-interest demands originated with three sources. Two of them were local humanitarian and economic interests, such as religious missions and trading factories. These usually had connections within British domestic society through mission boards, antislavery societies, shipping lines, boards of directors, and domestic exporters. Their demands were joined by those of a third source, the colonial settlers. Although the settlers did not want increased British authority over themselves, they did expect and demand expanded imperial British commitments to ward off the presence of other European powers, to provide military support against the natives, and to assist in providing the basis for general economic development. Given the large variety of local situations, an infinite number of combinations among these interests was possible. In China, outside the empire, mercantile and religious communities united in demanding an expansion of British authority, whereas in South Africa private interests often worked at cross-purposes.[43] Despite some local discrepancies, the trend of private-interest demands was toward some form of expanded British commitment.

[42] Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, Ser. 2, VI (August 1953), 1-15. Even Gladstone admitted, "Let the government adopt, with mathematical rigour if you like, an opposition to annexation, and what does it affect? It does nothing to check that tendency—that, perhaps, inevitable tendency—of British enterprise to carry our commerce and the range and area of our Settlements beyond the limits of our Sovereignty in those countries where civilisation does not exist." Quoted in Paul Knaplund, *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy* (London 1937), chap. 5.

[43] On South Africa, cf. J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Wodehouse, *Rhodes* (London 1963), chaps. 5-6; *CHBE* (fn. 28), 137-41; C. W. de Kiewet, *The Imperial Factor in South Africa* (Cambridge 1937), 22-24, 60-65; and Robinson and Gallagher (fn. 40), 202-9.

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British officials in overseas posts cannot be regarded, as were those of the United States, as mere subordinates within an administrative hierarchy. Because of the long imperial tradition, there was a proconsular mystique associated with positions of local imperial authority. The "man on the spot," familiar with local political factors and entrusted with discretionary authority to protect British interests in fluid situations, possessed a prestige unknown to his American counterparts, who performed a function alien to the whole American political tradition and were therefore something of an embarrassment to their society.[44] Sometimes local British officials had greater prestige and authority than their nominal chiefs in London. The Viceroy of India in particular had more status accruing to his position than to that of either the India Secretary or the Colonial Secretary. Nor could roles be defined by departmental titles. Nominal diplomatic representatives, such as Lord Cromer in Egypt or Sir John Kirk in Zanzibar, functioned like colonial governors; governors and commissioners in the self-governing colonies often served as diplomatic representatives of a large power in allied client states. The distinguishing characteristic of an official position in a colony or diplomatic post in a backward area was not determined by its departmental status or title, but by the local conditions and the position of Britain and of British interests.

However, the official did often bring to his post a certain kind of "Office view." Army officers, for instance, who served as imperial administrators in various capacities, were affected by the stress on personal achievement that was a feature of the Army after the abolition of the purchase of commissions. They were constantly pushing for an active policy to extend British authority or preserve imperial prestige.[45] Naval officers, especially important in Africa, were eager to pursue slave traders, but reluctant to engage in messy inshore operations on behalf of traders of dubious repute who demanded the chastisement of natives.[46] Early in the period, many Colonial Office representatives tried to apply the guidelines of retrenchment and frugality which then dominated their Office's thinking, though that sometimes rebounded peculiarly in the form of demands for further territorial expansion to help improve a colony's fiscal solvency.[47] The "Indian" view was differ-

[44] May (fn. 6), chap. 8. Theodore Roosevelt, incidentally, was a special admirer of the proconsular British administrator and would have liked, above all, to have held such a position himself. He remained intensely interested in the problems of foreign colonial administrations and aspired to have the United States share in what he considered an uplifting and ennobling endeavor. David H. Burton, "Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist," *Review of Politics*, XXIII (July 1961), 356-77.

[45] Thornton (fn. 28), 96-99.

[46] John D. Hargreaves, *Prelude to the Partition of West Africa* (London 1963), 38-41.

[47] *Ibid., passim*; C. W. Newbury, "Victorians, Republicans and the Partition of West

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ent and affected not only India: many officials began their careers in India, but later administered imperial interests elsewhere.[48] India, especially before 1858, was a major exception to the axiom formulated by Robinson and Gallagher, "trade without rule wherever possible," because of the many projects of political, cultural, social, and economic interventionism and development. In a sense, India was a model for later activist programs of colonial rule and development of which Chamberlain was the sponsor. Though after the Mutiny there was some retrenchment in the area of sociocultural change, the events of 1857–58 placed British officials even more directly in charge of the country politically.

Local imperial demands were conveyed to London either through domestic British connections (which have already been discussed), or through official channels, principally those of the Foreign, Colonial, and India Offices. But the attitudes of these offices toward such demands differed widely. All three respected the administrative necessities affecting the views of their local officials. However, the Foreign Office automatically considered local advice in the light of international systemic conditions before formulating a policy to be passed on to the Cabinet. For example, the opposition of Kirk, based on local considerations, to the colonial agreement of 1886, giving Germany control of mainland territories claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, was overriden by Salisbury and the Foreign Office, and Kirk's opinion was not placed before the Cabinet.[49] The general attitude of British representatives in China, who were unsympathetic to the demands of local British merchants because of London's decision to support the domestic authority of the central Chinese Government, showed the effects of the same process operating from the center outward.[50]

The Colonial Office adopted a more mediatory, rather than arbitrative, role. First of all, its chief concern, unlike that of the Foreign Office, was with local imperial administration. Second, its status in the Cabinet was much lower and it possessed much less of a right to make inde-

Africa," *Journal of African History*, III (1962), 471-77; John S. Galbraith, "The 'Turbulent Frontier' as a Factor in British Expansion," *Contemporary Studies in Society and History*, II (January 1960), 156-63.

[48] Cf., for example, de Kiewet (fn. 43), 125-32.

[49] Sir Reginald Coupland, *The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856–1890* (London 1939), chaps. 17-18, esp. p. 433.

[50] Nathan Pelcovits, *Old China Hands and the Foreign Office* (New York 1948), 19-27, 84-97; E. V. G. Kiernan, *British Diplomacy in China, 1880 to 1885* (Cambridge 1939), *passim*. However, "super-diplomats," Foreign Office representatives who had built great reputations in sensitive overseas quasi-administrative positions, always found at least a special hearing for their views and shared the proconsular mystique; cf. Steiner (fn. 29), 233-38.

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pendent policy decisions. Colonial Office policy was hemmed in between the need to follow Cabinet guidelines as to the relative weight of prestige and economy in imperial policy, and Foreign Office guidelines with regard to systemic considerations. It could influence these guidelines through the information which it provided, but it could not formulate them itself. The scope for independent Colonial Office policy lay in the *unimportance* of imperial issues. If they did not require immediate large resource outlays and did not involve major questions of British international prestige or international systemic considerations, imperial questions might be dealt with freely by the Colonial Office. Otherwise it had to intercede on behalf of local imperial demands with other departments and the Cabinet. This did not mean that its role was insignificant. The local policy which the Colonial Office had adopted or accepted before a major crisis point was reached could limit the options of future imperial policy. The retrenchment policy of 1865 in West Africa, for example, had already been undermined by local and Colonial Office decisions before the series of major Cabinet decisions which led to Wolseley's campaign against the Ashanti.[51] A few years later, Lord Carnarvon's independent policy of forcible federation in South Africa led to two local wars of imperial expansion, neither of which were approved by the British Cabinet.[52]

The status of local imperial demands was greatly, though only temporarily, altered by the arrival of Chamberlain at the Colonial Office. However, this did not involve a sudden volte-face in the Office's own attitude to imperial expansion. The Office's attitude had already changed of its own accord. Prior to 1871, the position of Permanent Under-Secretary, which was one of great influence because of the lack of detailed knowledge on the part of changing Colonial Secretaries, was held by Sir Frederick Rogers. He thought that self-governing colonies should stand on their own feet, financially and politically, as soon as possible, and that Crown colonies should endeavor to pay their own way. He opposed expanding imperial responsibilities and believed that the whole domestic burden of colonial and imperial management should be minimized. He was succeeded by Sir Robert Herbert, a former governor of New Zealand, under whose tutelage the Office's attitudes were completely revised. Herbert believed in stronger ties

[51] W. D. McIntyre, "British Policy in West Africa: The Ashanti Expedition of 1873–4," *Historical Journal*, v (1962), 19-26; Hargreaves (fn. 46), 78-90.

[52] The unsympathetic Disraeli, using his pet name for the Colonial Secretary, complained about the costs of "Twitters' blunders." De Kiewet (fn. 43), *passim*; *CHBE* (fn. 28), 55-60; Reginald Lovell, *The Struggle for South Africa, 1875–1899* (New York 1934), 19-25.

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between the mother country and the colonies, especially in the areas of development and protection, and was much more sympathetic to local demands for expanding British commitments. But it took a Secretary of Chamberlain's stature and commitment to the imperial cause to carry such views in the Cabinet against traditionalists like the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks Beach.[53]

The role of the India Office was also mediatory, situated as it was between two almost independent authorities, the British Government and the Government of India. Whereas the Colonial Office linked the concerns of the domestic British Government with the demands of scattered, small, colonial administrations, the India Office linked the former with an administration almost as complex and powerful as it was itself.[54] The importance of the role of India was above instrumental definition. It was of great economic significance to Britain as well as an important source of troops whose use was beyond parliamentary control. Liberals like Sir John Seeley and John Morley also viewed India as a great moral obligation to be discharged. But India was more than all this: as Disraeli understood, its possession greatly affected the self-conception of the British people and the status of Britain in the eyes of the world.[55] British interests in India not only possessed a great importance in themselves, but also produced repercussions in other areas of imperial concern. Some of these areas, such as Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and Persia, perhaps were serious imperial concerns only because of their relationship to India.

The sole task of the Indian Secretary was to achieve some coordination between the demands and policies of the giant colony and those of the British Government. To the Viceroy, the Secretary and the Council of India represented the ultimate political authority of London; to London, he represented the proconsular status of the Viceroy. Since the British Government did hold the ultimate authority, viceroys had to resign occasionally as their policies conflicted with the ideas of Whitehall. Yet the Viceroy held one important trump: the great concern with British prestige in India after the Mutiny. He also had the further advantage of immediate local control. An aggressively ex-

[53] On the role of the Colonial Office, cf. the study by R. B. Pugh in *CHBE* (fn. 28), chap. 19, esp. pp. 729-37. Cf. also *CHBE*, pp. 18-32, 181-91; Thornton (fn. 28), 99-101, 112-13; Robinson and Gallagher (fn. 40), 395-402.

[54] Cf. the role played by Lord George Hamilton as Indian Secretary in the Muscat crisis, as discussed in Briton Cooper Busch, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894–1914* (Berkeley 1967), 68-93.

[55] Robinson and Gallagher (fn. 40), 1-17, 462-69; D. R. Gillard, "Salisbury and the Indian Defence Problem, 1885–1902," in K. Bourne and D. C. Watt, eds., *Studies in International History* (London 1967), 236-48.

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pansionist incumbent like Curzon or Lytton might encourage or create an incident resulting in a local *fait accompli*, which could not then be repudiated by London because of fear of the impact on British prestige. Curzon finally made the definitive attempt to reorient British foreign and imperial policies according to the perspective of the Indian Government, but failed. Morley, who became Indian Secretary in 1905, sought to divorce general imperial and foreign policy concerns from local British policy in India.[56]

The different possible sources of British demands for imperial expansion and the possible channels open to such demands are shown in Diagram 2. Compared to Diagram 1, this diagram presents both



DIAGRAM 2. DEMAND CHANNELS IN BRITISH IMPERIAL EXPANSION

[56] On the influence of Curzon and Indian interests on British policy at the turn of the century, cf. Busch (fn. 54), chaps. 2-8; Firuz Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914* (New Haven 1968), 241-352, 386-475; Rose Louise Greaves, "British Policy in Persia, 1892–1903," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXVIII (1965), 34-60, 284-88; Grenville (fn. 41), 291-303; Steiner (fn. 29), 233-38; Monger (fn. 34), 1-14, 50-62, 84-92, 136-46, 164-75. On Morley, see Busch (fn. 54), 352-69; and Monger (fn. 34), 283-95.

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the greater complexity of the network of British demand channels and the higher level of authority of the British executive, especially as related to questions of foreign policy.

IV. Conclusion

The general purpose of this exercise has been to create a conceptual map of demand channels in American and British imperialism as a basis for further discussion and analysis. Admittedly, the diagrams and analysis presented in fulfillment of this goal may beg more questions than they answer. The role of domestic demand channels in particular is underdeveloped. I have concentrated on the study of formal executive agencies and the roles they played in linking different levels of policy. I believe that it is desirable first to understand the roles of various official agencies and how they related to each other and the political systems at all levels. From this, one can proceed to an extensive analysis of demands for imperial expansion.

As for the two countries under study, it is evident that the imperial expansion of the United States can be studied through the application of current foreign-policy linkage models. However, such models, which seek to explain national behavior by a dualistic relationship between the international political system and national domestic politics, are inadequate to cope with the British case. There one must comprehend the special processes of colonial policy in order to understand the phenomenon of imperial expansion.

This conclusion may have broader implications as well. The standard general histories of international politics in the pre-World War I era tend to assume the existence of simple dualistic linkage systems. For example, W. L. Langer is greatly concerned with the diplomatic response to domestic pressures for imperial expansion.[57] By contrast, A. J. P. Taylor seems to make a point of demonstrating that such domestic pressures did not greatly affect foreign policy behavior.[58] Richard Rosecrance's models of international systemic behavior during this era rely upon the dualistic view such historians have had of the foreign-domestic linkage process as it affected policies of imperial expansion.[59] The same can be said of the theories of imperial expansion developed by Hobson, Schumpeter, and the Marxian theorists. Each is

[57] William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902*, 2d ed. (New York 1951), esp. chap. 3.

[58] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (Oxford 1954), 245-50, 268-69, 357-66, 372-79, 404-17.

[59] Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective* (Boston 1963), chap. 12.

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concerned chiefly with those groups in domestic society which stimulated and profited from policies of imperial expansion, rather than with the interplay between distinctly different domestic and colonial interests. Even in the volume of the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* that deals with this period, at least one reviewer found the same tendency to concentrate on the relation of domestic pressures to European political considerations, at the expense of neglecting local imperial factors which often played decisive roles in the processes of expansion and partition.[60]

This type of view is adequate when we are studying powers without local imperial interests, but not in other cases. The United States and Britain could represent polar extremes in this respect: the former almost without colonies and overseas interests, the latter endowed with large colonies and independent imperial interests dating from earlier eras of expansion. Between them would lie all the other major and minor imperial powers. In each of them there was, and is, a different balance between domestic interests in external policy, interpretations of international systemic conditions by policy makers, and local imperial interests.

[60] Cf. review by Ronald Oliver in *Journal of African History*, I (1960), 155-56; also Hargreaves (fn. 46), 338-49.

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THE MISSILE CRISIS:
His Finest Hour Now

By JAMES A. NATHAN*

INTRODUCTION

HISTORIANS know there is a rhythm to their craft. Events are examined and orthodoxies are established. Then comes a chipping away of previously held convictions. New understandings emerge and stand, at least for a while; and then comes another tide of re-evaluation. The Kennedy Administration's shimmering hour—the Cuban missile crisis—has just begun to have its luster tarnished by critics. Yet few have subjected the event to a complex review of its meaning in terms of the assumptions, policy processes, and relationships of the cold war.[1]

My contention is that the crisis became something of a misleading "model" of the foreign policy process. There are seven central tenets of this model, each of which was "confirmed" by the "lessons" of the Cuban crisis:

(1) Crises are typical of international relations. The international environment is a constant collision of wills that is a surrogate of war and, at the same time, takes place at the doorstep of war. Crises are objective elements of the international system—but they also have a profoundly psychological element of "will" and "resolve."

(2) Crises are assumed to be manageable. The skills of personality, training, and organizational expertise that have been developed in the national security machinery during the past twenty-five

* Most of the arguments contained in this article appeared in a paper delivered at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 29–September 2, 1974.

[1] "Revisionist" critiques of the Cuban crisis are becoming more frequent. But most are rather polemical and thin. For a sample of some of the better ones, see Richard J. Walton, "The Cuban Missile Crisis" in *Cold War and Counter Revolution* (Baltimore 1972), 103-43; Leslie Dewart, "The Cuban Crisis Revisited," *Studies on the Left*, v (Spring 1965), 15-40; John Kenneth Galbraith, "Storm Over Havana: Who Were The Real Heroes?" (review of *Thirteen Days* by Robert F. Kennedy), *Book World*, January 19, 1969, 16; I. F. Stone, "The Brink" (review of *The Missile Crisis* by Elie Abel), *New York Review of Books*, April 1966, 13; Ronald Steel, "End Game," *New York Review of Books*, March 13, 1969, reprinted in Steel, *Imperialists and Other Heroes* (New York 1971), 115; Louise FitzSimmons, *The Kennedy Doctrine* (New York 1972), 126-73.

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years can be orchestrated by a vast bureaucracy in controlled and responsive movements.

(3) Although crises are a characteristic of the international system, the domestic system is one of order and consensus, and is insulated from the necessities of international politics. Public opinion can be controlled to lend support for a particular foreign policy; but rarely do appurtenances of the domestic sector have their own imperatives.

(4) Diplomacy is a mixture of the instrumentation of force and bargaining. An essential element of crisis management is the ability to reconcile the inherent forward dynamic of violence, threats of violence, and the instruments of violence with negotiation.

(5) The United States can control the process of crisis negotiation to "win." "Winning" results in the conclusion of the events themselves. Political crises therefore terminate by definition, almost like medical crises.

(6) The Soviets seldom negotiate serious matters except under extreme duress.

(7) Military questions are too critical to be left in the hands of strictly military men and organizations that are not in step with the needs of crisis management. Crisis management can and must be a civilian enterprise.

After the Cuban missile crisis, there were the beginnings of détente with the Soviet Union. The test-ban treaty, the hot line, and a more civil exchange between the two powers are widely believed to stem from the favorable resolution of the missile crisis. Yet the model and the usual inherent assumptions on the meaning of Cuba can be challenged. Nevertheless, the Cuban missile crisis stands as a watershed of the cold war and in the history of the contemporary international system.

I. Mastery or Luck?

By far the most intense experience in East-West relations occurred in October 1962, when the Russians were discovered to have placed forty-two medium-range missiles in Cuba. In Khrushchev's apt description, it was a time when "a smell of burning hung heavy" in the air.[2] Kennedy's apparently controlled and masterful way of forcing Khrushchev

[2] Roger Hilsman, *To Move A Nation* (New York 1967), 48, 157; also cited in Steel, *Imperialists and Other Heroes*, 115.

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to withdraw the missiles in the thirteen-day crisis has become a paradigmatic example of the way force can be harnessed to a policy by an elaborate manipulation of threats and gambits, negotiation and intimidation. Academic and government analysts have viewed Kennedy's response as a highly calibrated dissection of alternatives instead of seeing his actions as largely an intuitive response to a threat to his administration's electoral future, pride, and strategic posture. As Hans J. Morgenthau, the eminent scholar and a critic of the Kennedy Administration, concluded: "The Cuban Crisis of 1962 . . . was the distillation of a collective intellectual effort of a high order, the like of which must be rare in history."[3] Much of this analysis—so drenched in the cool light of hindsight—bears a suspicious resemblance to the logical and psychological fallacy of reasoning, *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*.[4] Nevertheless, the dominant lesson Americans have drawn from the Cuban experience has been a joyous sense of the United States regaining mastery over history.

For many years Americans had felt threatened by the Soviet challenge to world order—especially since that challenge had been reinforced by growing Russian strategic capability. But after Cuba, the fears of precipitate expansion of a Soviet-American dispute into a final paroxysm of nuclear dust were dissipated. After Cuba, "escalation" became the *idée fixe* of academics and policy-makers—a vision of a ladder of force with rungs separated by equivalent spaces of destruction, each with its own "value," running out toward darkness. Escalation became the dominant metaphor of American officialdom. Each rung could be ascended or descended with the proper increment of will and control. Events and military machines could be mastered for diplomatic ends. As Robert McNamara exalted after the exciting and frightening Cuban climax: "There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management."[5] Dennis Healy, the British Labor Party "shadow" Defense Minister called the Kennedy Administration's performance a "model in any textbook on diplomacy."[6] Journalist Henry Pachter described Kennedy's execution of crisis management as "a feat whose technical elegance compelled the professionals'

[3] Morgenthau, *Truth and Power, Essays of a Decade, 1960–1970* (New York 1970), 158.

[4] A current review of this enormous literature is contained in Charles F. Hermann, ed., *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research* (New York 1972).

[5] Cited by Coral Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management* (London 1971), 2.

[6] Alexander George and others, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston 1971), 132.

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admiration."[7] Similarly, the Wohlstetters made Cuba into a general historical principle about the use of force in times of great stress: "where the alternative is to be ruled by events with such enormous consequences, the head of a great state is likely to examine his acts of choice in crisis and during it to subdivide these possible acts in ways that make it feasible to continue exercising choice."[8]

The decisions as to what steps should be taken to deal with the implantation of the missiles were hammered out in the ExCom meetings. Although court chroniclers of the Kennedy Administration have pored over each detail, the impression now is not one of all choices having been carefully weighed and considered. Rather, in retrospect, there appears to have been a gripping feeling of uncertainty and pressure. Robert Kennedy, for instance, at the height of the crisis, looked across at his brother and almost fainted at the horror of what they were contemplating: "Inexplicably, I thought of when he was ill and almost died; when he lost his child, when we learned that our oldest brother had been killed; of personal times of strain and hurt. The voices droned on, but I didn't seem to hear anything. . . ."[9]

There were reports that one Assistant Secretary was so disconcerted and fatigued that he drove into a tree at 4 a.m. Robert Kennedy recalled, "The strain and the hours without sleep were beginning to take their toll. . . . That kind of pressure does strange things to a human being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced men."[10] And President Kennedy, although deliberately pacing himself, wondered if some of his principal advisors had not suffered mental collapse from the long hours and pressure. Tense, fearful, and exhausted men planned and held together the American policy response to the Russian missiles.

The consensus of most behavioral research is that men operating under such acute stress are scarcely capable of considered judgment. Strain and fatigue commonly produce actions which are "caricatures of day-to-day behavior."[11] Although the stress of crisis decision-making

[7] Pachter, "J.F.K. as an Equestrian Statue: On Myths and Myth Makers," *Salmajundi* (Spring 1966), cited in George, *ibid.*

[8] Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, "Controlling the Risks in Cuba," *Adelphi Paper No. 17* (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1965), 19.

[9] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (with "Afterword" by Richard Neustadt and Graham T. Allison) (New York 1971), 48.

[10] Kennedy (fn. 9), 22; Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York 1969), 705; Hermann (fn. 4), 33.

[11] See Thomas W. Milburn, "The Management of Crisis," in Hermann (fn. 4), esp. pp. 263-66.

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concentrates and focuses the collective mind, it does not allow for the kind of elegant dissection of events that is now read into the Cuban affair. Events can take charge of decision-makers; on October 25, 1962, Robert Kennedy reported that he felt, as Soviet ships drew near the edge of the American quarantine, that "[W]e were on the edge of a precipice with no way off. . . . President Kennedy had initiated the course of events, but he no longer had control over them."[12] John F. Kennedy's calm public face, discipline, and cool control gave a sense of intellectual engagement in the crisis which yielded no hint of the mute wasteland he was contemplating. But his private anxiety is well recorded, and a case can be made that dispassionate analysis or problem-solving was all but precluded by the psychology of the situation.

It was very close. The military and the "hawks"—a term coined by journalistic descriptions of the ExCom deliberations—were pushing for actions ranging from a "surgical strike" to an all-out invasion of Cuba. Such options would have demanded the stark choice of an even greater Soviet humiliation or a Soviet response in kind. Ironically, a "surgical strike" was not really practical, for there was no guarantee that more than 90 percent of the missiles could be extirpated. Even after an American air attack, some of the missiles could have survived and been launched. And "surgical" always was a misnomer to describe an estimated 25,000 Cuban fatalities, not to speak of the 500 sorties which American planes would have had to run in order to "take out" the Soviet missiles and bombers. Nevertheless, if six out of fourteen members of the ExCom group had had their way, the blockade of Cuba would have been an attack, which Bobby Kennedy called a "Pearl Harbor in reverse." It is no wonder that President Kennedy estimated the world's chance of avoiding war at between one out of three and even.[13]

The illusion of control derived from the crisis was perniciously misleading. Although many Americans shared the belief of historian Schlesinger that the Cuban crisis displayed to the "whole world . . . the ripening of an American leadership unsurpassed in the responsible management of power . . . [a] combination of toughness . . . nerve and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so matchlessly calibrated that [it] dazzled the world,"[14] President Kennedy's control was in fact far from complete. For example, the main instrument of pressure was the blockade run by the Navy. Following the suggestion of British Ambassador Ormsby-Gore, Kennedy decided to move the blockade closer to Cuba, from 800 miles to 500 miles, in order to give the Russian

[12] Kennedy (fn. 9), 48-49. [13] Sorensen (fn. 10), 705.
[14] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston 1965), 840-41.

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ships heading toward Cuba more time. The order was given but never carried out. The blockade remained at 800 miles.

McNamara had sensed the Navy's lack of responsiveness to civilian commands and had gone to the "Flag Plot," or Naval Operations Center, where he could talk to ship commanders directly by voice-scrambled radio. McNamara pointed to a map symbol indicating that a ship was in a spot where he had not wanted it. "What's that ship doing there?" he asked. Anderson confessed, "I don't know, but I have faith in my officers."[15] McNamara's unease with the apparent lack of responsiveness of the Navy to civilian command prompted him to inquire what would happen if a Soviet captain refused to divulge his cargo to a boarding American officer. Chief of Naval Operations Anderson picked up a Manual of Naval Regulations and rose to defend the Navy against any implied slight about Navy procedure. "It's all in there," Anderson asserted. McNamara retorted, "I don't give a damn what John Paul Jones would have done. I want to know what you are going to do, now!" The last word—again, however—was the Navy's: Admiral Anderson patronizingly soothed the fuming Defense Secretary, "Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your deputy will go to your offices, the Navy will run the blockade."[16] As McNamara and his entourage turned to leave, Anderson called to him, "Don't worry, Mr. Secretary, we know what we are doing here."[17]

Just when the first Soviet-American encounter at sea seemed imminent, William Knox, the president of Westinghouse International, who happened to be in Moscow, was surprised by an abrupt summons from Premier Khrushchev. The voluble Soviet leader, perhaps half-convinced that Wall Street really manipulated American policy, gave a frightening summary of the strategic situation in the Caribbean. He warned that if the U.S. Navy began stopping Soviet ships, the Soviet subs would start sinking American ships. That, Khrushchev explained, would lead to World War III.[18]

Only a little later, the Navy began to force Soviet subs to the surface in order to defend its blockade—well before Kennedy had authorized contact with surface vessels. Kennedy was appalled when he learned that military imperatives are distinct from diplomatic necessities and

[15] Jack Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon* (New York 1964), 285-86.

[16] Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia 1969), 155-56. Abel interviewed the witnesses to this episode, some of whom did not agree as to Anderson's exact words. Anderson, Abel reports, could not recall ever having said this.

[17] William A. Hamilton, III, "The Decline and Fall of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," *The Naval War College Review*, XXIV (April 1972), 47.

[18] Abel (fn. 16), 151-52; Hilsman (fn. 2), 214; W. E. Knox, "Close-up of Khrushchev During a Crisis," *New York Times Magazine*, November 18, 1962, p. 128.

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can, all too often, conflict. When he found out that the Navy was intent on surfacing ships, he was horrified: "Isn't there some way we can avoid having our first exchange with a Russian submarine—almost anything but that?" McNamara replied, "No, there's too much danger to our ships. There is no alternative." The President's brother wrote that "all six Russian submarines then in the area or moving toward Cuba from the Atlantic were followed and harassed and, at one time or another, forced to surface in the presence of U.S. military ships."[19] One can only wonder what would have happened if one of the Russian subs had refused to surface and had instead turned on its pursuers.

Events were only barely under control when at the height of the crisis, on October 26, an American U-2 plane fixed on the wrong star and headed back from the North Pole to Alaska via Siberia. To compound matters the Alaskan Air Command sent fighter-bombers to escort the plane home, and the U.S. fighters and the spy plane met over Soviet territory before proceeding back.[20] To survive a Strangelove series of incidents like these, even given the assumptions of the day, can hardly be characterized as more than luck. It would not seem to be the mastery that Schlesinger and other court scribes delight in recalling and extolling.

II. The Domestic Factor

Why was there a crisis in the first place? The answer is found, in part, in one of the unacknowledged necessities in the conduct of American international affairs—domestic political considerations.[21] The Kennedy Administration's sense of its own precarious electoral position, the coming of the November mid-term elections, and the place Cuba had occupied in public debate, all augured for an immediate and forceful response, no matter what the strategic reality was of having Russian missiles near American borders. The imperatives of American domestic politics during an election year had been building for some time. On August 27, 1962, for example, Republican Senator Homer E. Capehart of Indiana declared, "It is high time that the American people demand that President Kennedy quit 'examining the situation' and start protect-

[19] Kennedy (fn. 9), 55.

[20] Irving Janis, *Victims of Group Think* (Boston 1972), 163; Henry Pachter, *Collision Course* (New York 1963), 58.

[21] Leslie Gelb and Morton Halperin, "The Ten Commandments of the Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy," *Harpers,* Vol. 244 (June 1972), 28-37; Leslie Gelb, "The Essential Domino: American Politics and Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs,* L (April 1972), 459-76.

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ing the interests of the United States."[22] Former Vice President Nixon, on the gubernatorial campaign stump in California, proposed that Cuban communism be "quarantined" by a naval blockade.[23] Republicans in both Houses had warned the administration that Cuba would be "the dominant issue of the 1962 campaign."[24] The chairman of the Republican National Committee jabbed at Kennedy's most sensitive spot—his concern for foreign policy "resolve": "If we are asked to state the issue in one word, that word would be Cuba—symbol of the tragic irresolution of the administration."[25]

The pressure mounted. As the political campaign began, one observer spotted a sign at a Kennedy rally in Chicago which read, "Less Profile —More Courage."[26] The widely respected and conservative *London Economist* reported that America had become "obsessed" by the "problem" of Cuba;[27] and I. F. Stone despaired in his *Weekly* that Cuba was a bogey which shook Americans, in the autumn of 1962, even more than the thought of war.[28] The domestic pressure on the American President was so intense that one member of Camelot, former Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith, wrote: "once they [the missiles] were there, the political needs of the Kennedy administration urged it to take almost any risk to get them out."[29] This skeptical view was shared by none other than former President Eisenhower, who suspected "that Kennedy might be playing politics with Cuba on the eve of Congressional elections."[30]

Nor, as Ronald Steel pointed out, were the "principals"—the ExCom —insulated from domestic considerations in their deliberations.[31] One Republican member of the crisis planners sent Theodore Sorensen—Kennedy's alter ego—a note that read: "Ted—have you considered the very real possibility that if we allow Cuba to complete installation and operational readiness of missile bases, the next House of Representatives is likely to have a Republican majority?"[32] Similarly, McGeorge Bundy,

[22] "Capehart: U.S. Should Act, Stop 'Examining Cuba,'" *U.S. News and World Report*, September 10, 1962, p. 45.

[23] *New York Times*, September 19, 1962.

[24] "Cuban Crisis," *Data Digest* (New York 1963), 35, cited by Thomas Halper, *Foreign Policy Crisis: Appearance and Reality in Decision Making* (Columbus, Ohio 1971), 132.

[25] "Notes of the Month: Cuba: A U.S. Election Issue," *World Today*, XVIII (November 1962), 543; Halper (fn. 24), 132.

[26] Quincy Wright, "The Cuban Quarantine of 1962," in John G. Stoessinger and Alan Westin, ed., *Power and Order* (New York 1964), 186.

[27] *Economist*, October 6, 1962, p. 15.

[28] "Afraid of Everything but War," *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, September 17, 1962, p. 1.

[29] Quoted in Steel (fn. 1), 119.

[30] Abel (fn. 16), 78.

[31] Steel (fn. 1), 121.

[32] Sorensen (fn. 10), 688.

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chief advisor to two presidents, wondered, when the missiles were first reported, whether action could be deferred until after the election.[33] If the missile installations were completed earlier, there would be, arguably, both a strategic and an electoral problem facing the administration.

What was the worrisome substance of change in the strategic balance represented by the placement of forty-two missiles? To Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, it seemed that "A missile is a missile. It makes no great difference whether you are killed by a missile from the Soviet Union or from Cuba."[34] About two weeks later, on television, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick confirmed the debatable meaning of the missiles: "I don't believe that we were under any greater threat from the Soviet Union's power, taken in totality, after this than before."[35] Indeed, Theodore Sorensen wrote in a memorandum to the President on October 17, 1962—five days before the blockade was ordered—that the presence of missiles in Cuba did not "significantly alter the balance of power." Sorensen explained, "They do not significantly increase the potential megatonnage capable of being unleashed on American soil, even after a surprise American nuclear strike." Sorensen confessed, in conclusion, that "Soviet motives were not understood."[36]

III. Just a Dirty Trick?

To Khrushchev, the missiles offered the appearance of what former State Department analyst Roger Hilsman called a "quick fix" to the Soviet problem of strategic inferiority. Khrushchev was under enormous pressure from the Russian military who rejected his "goulash communism" and were pushing for a vast increase in the Soviet arms budget.[37] The Cuban missile ploy was probably Khrushchev's response to the prospect of Russian strategic inferiority which was reported by the Kennedy Administration as it admitted that the Democratic preelection charge of a "missile gap" had not been based on fact. The American announcement that the "gap" had been closed was accompanied by a Defense Department plan, dated October 19, 1961, for production of over one thousand missiles by 1964.

One purpose of the Soviet moves in Cuba was, therefore, to gain

[33] George (fn. 6), 89.
[34] Hilsman (fn. 2), 195.
[35] *New York Times*, November 12, 1962.
[36] *Wilmington Morning News*, January 25, 1974.
[37] Walter W. Layson, "The Political and Strategic Aspects of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (University of Virginia 1969), 18-87; Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945–1970* (Baltimore 1970), 73-99, 100-194.

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the *appearance* of parity with the Americans. The employment of twenty-four MRBM's and eighteen IRBM's *seemed* to be a dramatic movement in that direction. But such an increase posed no real threat to American retaliatory strength, or to increasing American superiority. As Henry Kissinger noted at the time, "The bases were of only marginal use in a defensive war. In an offensive war their effectiveness was reduced by the enormous difficulty—if not impossibility—of coordinating a first strike from the Soviet Union and Cuba."[38]

The U.S. Administration knew that the Soviets were not striving for more than an appearance of strategic equality. As Kennedy later reflected, they were not "intending to fire them, because if they were going to get into a nuclear struggle, they have their own missiles in the Soviet Union. But it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality."[39] In the 1970's, by contrast, "appearances" were less important while the Americans were arranging a complex international order which verged on duopoly. Indeed, beginning in 1970, Soviet submarines and tenders began to visit Cuban ports.[40] And by 1973, Soviet submarines with Polaris-type missiles were regularly stopping in Cuba. What protest there was by the Nixon Administration seemed so muted as to be almost inaudible.[41]

Why was Kennedy so concerned about "appearances"? Perhaps he felt that the American people demanded an energetic response, given their purported frustration over Cuba. The administration's evaluation of the public mood supported the notion that firmness was a requisite of policy. Although repeated Gallup polls before the crisis showed 90 per cent of Americans opposing actual armed intervention in Cuba,[42] Kennedy's own sense was, as his brother pointed out, that if he did not act, he would have been impeached.[43]

[38] Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on Cuba," *The Reporter*, XXVII, November 22, 1962, p. 22.

[39] Interview, December 17, 1962, *Public Papers of the Presidents*, John F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C. 1963), 898.

[40] *New York Times*, December 6, 1970. According to the authoritative *Aviation Week*, the Russians also began to schedule regular stops of long-range aircraft at about the same time. December 21, 1970, pp. 16-17.

[41] For a description of the forceful but private insistence that the building of a Soviet base at Cienfuegos be halted, see Marvin and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston 1974), 209-12. Nevertheless, sporadic press reports indicate that Soviet nuclear submarines are putting into Cuba up to this day. See Barry Blechman and Stephanie Levinson, "U.S. Policy and Soviet Subs," *New York Times*, October 22, 1974; *Washington Post*, October 26, 1974.

[42] "How U.S. Voters Feel About Cuba," *Newsweek*, October 13, 1962, p. 138, Halper (fn. 24), 133.

[43] Kennedy (fn. 9), 45, and "Afterword," 114.

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Another explanation for Kennedy's concern that he would not "appear credible" to Khrushchev dates from the time, less than two years earlier, when he decided not to use air support for the Bay of Pigs invasion. According to James Reston's impression upon seeing Kennedy ten minutes after the two leaders had met in Vienna, "Khrushchev had studied the events of the Bay of Pigs; he would have understood if Kennedy had left Castro alone or destroyed him; but when Kennedy was rash enough to strike at Cuba but not bold enough to finish the job, Khrushchev decided he was dealing with an inexperienced young leader who could be intimidated and blackmailed."[44] Similarly, George F. Kennan, then the United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, met the President after the Vienna summit session and reported that he found Kennedy "strangely tongue-tied" during these talks. Later, he recalled for a Harvard oral history interviewer:

> I felt that he had not acquitted himself well on this occasion and that he had permitted Khrushchev to say many things which should have been challenged right there on the spot.
>
> I think this was definitely a mistake. I think it definitely misled Khrushchev; I think Khrushchev failed to realize on that occasion what a man he was up against and also that he'd gotten away with many of these talking points; that he had placed President Kennedy in a state of confusion where he had nothing to say in return.[45]

Kennedy expressed concern to Reston and others that Khrushchev considered him but a callow, inexperienced youth and that he soon expected a "test." "It will be a cold winter," he was heard to mutter as he left the Vienna meeting. Khrushchev may indeed have been surprised at the forceful reaction of Kennedy, particularly after the young President had accepted the Berlin Wall in August 1961 with no military response and had temporized in Laos in 1961 and 1962.

Perhaps, as Hilsman has argued, the Soviets assumed that the fine American distinctions between "offensive and defensive" missiles were really a *de facto* acknowledgment of the Soviet effort in Cuba. One could conjecture that this was what led Khrushchev to promise, and to believe that Kennedy understood, that no initiatives would be taken before the elections. In any case, Kennedy's concern about his "appearance" and the national appearance of strength kept him from searching very far for Soviet motivation. His interpretation was that it was a personal injury to him and his credibility, as well as to Amer-

[44] Reston, "What Was Killed Was Not Only the President But the Promise," *New York Times Magazine*, November 15, 1964, p. 126.
[45] *New York Times*, September 1, 1970; *New York Daily News*, August 31, 1970.

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ican power. He explained this sentiment to *New York Post* reporter James Wechsler:

> What worried him was that Khrushchev might interpret his reluctance to wage nuclear war as a symptom of an American loss of nerve. Some day, he said, the time might come when he would have to run the supreme risk to convince Khrushchev that conciliation did not mean humiliation. "If Khrushchev wants to rub my nose in the dirt," he told Wechsler, "it's all over." But how to convince Khrushchev short of a showdown? "That son of a bitch won't pay any attention to words," the President said bitterly on another occasion. "He has to see you move."[46]

IV. True Grit and Crisis Diplomacy

The missile crisis illuminates a feature of the American character that came to be considered a requisite personality trait of the cold war: being "tough." Gritty American determination had become the respected and expected stance of American statesmen under stress in confrontations with the Soviets from the earliest days of the cold war. When Truman, for example, dispatched an aircraft carrier, four cruisers, a destroyer flotilla, and the battleship Missouri to counter Soviet pressure on the Turkish Straits, he told Acheson, "We might as well find out whether the Russians [are] bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years."[47] Clark Clifford gave more formal expression to this sentiment when he advised Harry Truman, in a memo, in late 1946: "The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand. The United States must use that language in order that Soviet leaders will realize that our government is determined to uphold the interest of its citizens and the rights of small nations. Compromise and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidence of weakness and they are encouraged by our 'retreats' to make new and greater demands."[48]

The American concern with its appearance of strength was a mark of the Kennedy Administration. One White House aide recalled that, especially after the failure of the Bay of Pigs, "Nobody in the White House wanted to be soft. . . . Everybody wanted to show they were just as daring and bold as everybody else."[49]

In the Cuban crisis, the cold-war ethic of being "tough" exacerbated the discrepancies between the necessities of force and the necessities of

[46] Schlesinger (fn. 14), 391.
[47] Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York 1951), 192.
[48] Arthur Krock, *Memoirs* (London 1968), 228-29.
[49] Hugh Sidey, *John F. Kennedy, President* (New York 1964), 127.

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diplomacy and negotiation. As a result, diplomacy was almost entirely eclipsed. In fact, it was hardly tried. According to Adam Yarmolinsky, an inside observer of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, "90 per cent of its time" was spent "studying alternative uses of troops, bombers and warships. Although the possibility of seeking withdrawal of the missiles by straightforward diplomatic negotiation received some attention within the State Department, it seems hardly to have been aired in the Ex-Com." Yarmolinsky confesses that it is curious that no negotiations were considered. Nor were economic pressures ever suggested by the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Only a series of military plans emerged, and they varied from a blockade to a preemptive strike.[50]

Kennedy knew the Russians had deployed missiles on October 16. But, instead of facing Soviet Foreign Secretary Gromyko with the evidence while the Russian was giving the President false assurances that missiles were not being installed, the President blandly listened without comment. Whether or not the Russians believed that Kennedy must have known, the effect of the charade was an absence of serious negotiations. Instead of using private channels to warn the Russians that he knew and intended to act, Kennedy chose to give notice to the Russians in a nationwide TV address. After that, a Soviet withdrawal had to be in public and it almost had to be a humiliation. When the Soviets attempted nonetheless to bargain for a graceful retreat, their path was blocked. Kennedy refused Khrushchev's offer of a summit meeting "until Khrushchev first accepted, as a result *of our deeds* as well as our statements, the U.S. determination in the matter."[51] A summit meeting, Kennedy concluded, had to be rejected; for he was intent on offering the Russians "nothing that would tie our hands." We would only negotiate with that which would "strengthen our stand."[52] If there were to be any deals, Kennedy wanted them to seem a part of American munificence. He did not want a compromise to be tied to the central issue of what he conceived to be a test of American will and resolve. "[W]e must stand absolutely firm now. Concessions must come at the end of negotiation, not at the beginning," Robert Kennedy cautioned.[53]

In other words, the Soviets had to submit to American strength before any real concessions could take place. When Khrushchev offered to exchange the Cuban missiles for the Jupiter missiles stationed in

[50] Yarmolinsky, *The Military Establishment* (New York 1971), 127.
[51] Kennedy (fn. 9), 44-45; (emphasis added).
[52] Sorensen (fn. 10), 699.
[53] Schlesinger (fn. 14), 811.

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Turkey, Kennedy refused, even though he had ordered the missiles out months earlier; in fact, he had thought they were out when Khrushchev brought them to his attention. (The Jupiters were all but worthless. A marksman with a high-powered rifle could knock them out.[54] They took a day to ready for firing and the Turks did not want them.) Kennedy, however, did not want to appear to yield to Soviet pressure even when he might give little and receive a great deal. An agreement would have confounded the issue of "will." As Kennedy's Boswell put it, the President wanted to "concentrate on a single issue—the enormity of the introduction of the missiles and the absolute necessity of their removal."[55]

In the final act of the crisis, Kennedy accepted one of two letters sent almost simultaneously by Khrushchev. One contained the demand for removal of the Turkish missiles; the other did not. Kennedy accepted the latter. Khrushchev's second letter began with a long, heartfelt, personal communication and made no mention of a *quid pro quo*. Kennedy's response was a public letter to Khrushchev, temperate in tone, in which he accepted the more favorable terms he preferred and further detailed American conditions. It is said that Kennedy published his response "in the interests of both speed and psychology."[56] But this procedure of publishing the private terms of an interchange with another head of state was a considerable departure from diplomacy. It was not negotiation; it was, in this context, a public demand. Public statements during a crisis lack flexibility. Compromise is almost foreclosed by such a device, because any bargaining after the terms have been stated seems to be a retreat which would diminish a statesman's reputation. Since reputation was the stake in Cuba as much as anything else, Kennedy's response was hardly more than a polite ultimatum. In private, Kennedy was even more forceful. Robert Kennedy told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, "We had to have a commitment by tomorrow that those bases would be removed. . . . If they did not remove those bases, we would remove them. . . . Time was running out. We had only a few more hours—we needed an answer immediately from the Soviet Union. . . . We must have it the next day."[57]

As a result of the crisis, force and toughness became enshrined as instruments of policy. George Kennan observed, as he left forty years of diplomatic service: "There is no presumption more terrifying than that of those who would blow up the world on the basis of their per-

[54] Hilsman (fn. 2), 202.
[55] Schlesinger (fn. 14), 810.
[56] Sorensen (fn. 10), 714.
[57] Kennedy (fn. 9), 87.

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sonal judgment of a transient situation. I do not propose to let the future of mankind be settled, or ended, by a group of men operating on the basis of limited perspectives and short-run calculations."[58]

In spite of occasional epistles from the older diplomatists, the new managers who proliferated after Cuba routed those who most favored negotiations. In an article in the *Saturday Evening Post*, one of the last "moderates" of the Kennedy Administration, Adlai Stevenson, was attacked for advocating "a Munich." The source of the story, it was widely rumored, was President Kennedy himself.[59]

The policy of toughness became dogma to such an extent that non-military solutions to political problems were excluded. A "moderate" in this circumstance was restricted to suggesting limited violence. Former Under Secretary of State Ball explained his "devil advocacy" in Vietnam, in which he suggested that there be a troop ceiling of 70,000 men and bombing be restricted to the South: "What I was proposing was something which I thought had a fair chance of being persuasive . . . if I had said let's pull out overnight or do something of this kind, I obviously wouldn't have been persuasive at all. They'd have said 'the man's mad.' "[60]

This peculiar search for the middle ground of a policy defined in terms of force was abetted by the sudden sense on the part of Kennedy's national security managers that the military was filled with Dr. Strangeloves. There was some warrant for this fear. Time and time again, during the crisis, the military seemed obsessed by the opportunity to demonstrate its potential. When asked what the Soviet reaction would be to a surgical raid on their missiles and men, General Lemay snapped, "There will be no reaction." When the crisis ended on Sunday, October 25th, one of the Joint Chiefs suggested that they go ahead with a massive bombing the following Monday in any case. "[T]he military are mad," concluded President Kennedy.[61] Robert Kennedy recalled acidly that "many times . . . I heard the military take positions which, if wrong, had the advantage that no one would be around at the end to know."[62]

In part, it was as a result of the Cuban crisis that the civilians of the American defense and foreign policy bureaucracy grew to despise

[58] Schlesinger (fn. 14), 397; also cited by I. F. Stone, *In a Time of Torment* (New York 1968), 23.

[59] Walton (fn. 1), 119. The article was by Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, "In Time of Crisis," *Saturday Evening Post*, December 8, 1962.

[60] Gelb and Halperin (fn. 21), 36.

[61] Schlesinger (fn. 14), 831; Neustadt and Allison, in "Afterword," in Kennedy (fn. 9), 126.

[62] *Ibid.*, 26.

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the military. Hilsman reports that later in the Kennedy Administration, an official prepared a mock account of a high-level meeting on Vietnam in which Averell Harriman "stated that he had disagreed for twenty years with General [Brute] Krulak [Commandant of the Marines] and disagreed today, reluctantly, more than ever; he was sorry to say that he felt General Krulak was a fool and had always thought so." It is reported that President Kennedy roared with laughter upon reading this fictitious account.[63] Hilsman also delighted in telling a story about General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who once briefed President Kennedy on Vietnam: "This is the Mekong Valley. Pointer tip hit the map. Hilsman, watching, noticed something, the point tip was not on the Mekong Valley, it was on the Yangtze Valley."[64] Hilsman's recollection of the general's error became a common office story.

Ironically, while the military was increasingly thought to be rather loutish and ill-prepared, civilians were starting to rely more and more on military instrumentalities in the application of which, with few exceptions, they were not trained, and whose command structure they despised as being second-rate at best. Civilian "crisis managers" felt, after Cuba, that they should have control and that the military could not be trusted and had to be made more responsive to the political and civilian considerations of policy. To many observers, as well as to these managers, the "failures" of the Cuban missile crisis were not failures of civilian judgment but of organizational responsiveness. The intelligence establishment, for instance, had not discovered the missiles until the last minute. McNamara never really secured control over the Navy. U-2 flights were sent near the Soviet Union to "excite" Soviet radar at the height of the crisis; until Kennedy ordered their dispersal, American fighters and bombers were wing to wing on the ground, almost inviting a preemptive Soviet blow. Moreover, American tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-tipped IRBM's in Turkey and Italy were discovered to be unlocked and lightly guarded.[65] All this led observers and policy-makers to believe that crisis management demanded the President's organizational dominance and control, because the military and intelligence organizations were inept and their judgment was not reliable or at times even sane.

[63] Hilsman (fn. 2), 512-13; John McDermott, "Crisis Manager," *New York Review of Books*, IX, September 14, 1967, 4-10. The fictitious paper, written by James Thompson, also took on the whole Vietnam decision-making team.

[64] David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York 1972), 255.

[65] *Washington Post*, May 26, 1974.

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V. Cuba and the American Century

After Cuba, confidence in the ability of U.S. armed superiority to command solutions to "crises" in a way that would favor American interests expanded in such a way that Americans again began to speak of the American century. For a period before the crisis there had been a national reexamination. There were fears of national decline in the face of startling Soviet economic growth. Advances in Russian rocketry had led Americans to believe that not only were they in a mortal competition with the Soviets, but that the outcome was uncertain. Now, however, most of these doubts seemed to have dissipated.

The Cuban missile crisis revived the sense of the American mission. Henry R. Luce once rhapsodized in a widely circulated *Life* editorial that Americans must "accept wholeheartedly our duty and opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence for such purposes as we see fit, and by such means as we see fit."[66] After the crisis, Arthur Schlesinger could lyrically resurrect this tradition: "But the ultimate impact of the missile crisis was wider than Cuba, wider than even the western hemisphere. . . . Before the missile crisis people might have feared that we would use our power extravagantly or not use it at all. But the thirteen days gave the world—even the Soviet Union—a sense of American determination and responsibility in the use of power which, if sustained, might indeed become a turning point in the history of the relations between east and west."[67]

Similarly, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, then a member of the Planning Council of the Department of State, proclaimed that American paramountcy was the lesson of Cuba. Brzezinski explained, "The U.S. is today the only effective global military power in the world."[68]

In contrast to the United States, Brzezinski declared, the Soviets were not a global power. Although Khrushchev may at one time have believed otherwise, the Cuban crisis demonstrated the limits of Soviet capabilities. "The Soviet leaders were forced, because of the energetic response by the United States, to the conclusion that their apocalyptic power [nuclear deterrent power] was insufficient to make the Soviet

[66] Luce, *The American Century* (New York 1941), 23, and *Life*, February 17, 1941, p. 63. Actually, Luce had been on record with this message from the age of twenty. See W. A. Swanberg, *Luce and his Empire* (New York 1972).

[67] Schlesinger (fn. 14), 840, 841.

[68] "Background" remarks to a conference for editors and broadcasters May 22, 1967, cited in Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York 1969), 19. For Brzezinski's edited remarks, see "The Implications of Change for United States Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, LVII, July 3, 1967, pp. 19-23.

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Union a global power. Faced with a showdown, the Soviet Union didn't dare to respond even in an area of its regional predominance—in Berlin. . . . It had no military capacity to fight in Cuba, or in Vietnam, or to protect its interests in the Congo." No doubt the historic American sense of divine purpose and the almost Jungian need to be the guarantor of global order received a strong fillip from the Cuban crisis. Brzezinski concluded: "What should be the role of the United States in this period? To use our power responsibly and constructively so that when the American paramountcy ends, the world will have been launched on a constructive pattern of development towards international stability. . . . The ultimate objective ought to be the shaping of a world of cooperative communities."[69]

The overwhelming belief of policy-makers in American superiority seriously eroded deterrence. The Soviet Union reached the same conclusion as the United States—that a preponderance of military power, ranging across the spectrum of force from PT craft to advanced nuclear delivery systems, was the *sine qua non* of the successful exercise of political will. Before fall of 1962, Khrushchev's strategic policy, in the words of a Rand Kremlinologist, "amounted to settling for a second-best strategic posture."[70] The missile crisis, however, manifestly demonstrated Soviet strategic weakness and exposed every Soviet debility that Khrushchev's verbal proclamation of superiority had previously covered.

VI. Cuba and Deterrence

After Cuba, the Soviet military, responding to the humiliating American stimulus, demanded a higher priority to strategic arms and a cutback on the agricultural and consumer sectors of the Soviet economy. Although Khrushchev and Kennedy were by then moving toward a détente—best symbolized by the signing of the test-ban accords of mid-1963—many in the Kremlin saw this as but a breathing spell in which the Chinese might be isolated and Soviet arms could catch up. Naval preparations, especially the building of Polaris-type submarines, were intensified.[71] Soviet amphibian landing capability—something in which the Soviets had shown little interest before—was revitalized and expanded. As Wolfe noted, "From the time of the first test-launching . . . of 1957 to mid-1961 only a handful of ICBM's had been deployed. . . . After Cuba, the pace of deployment picked up, bringing the total

[69] *Ibid.* [70] Wolfe (fn. 37), 134.

[71] David Woodward, *The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy* (New York 1964), 229-30.

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number of operational ICBM launchers to around 200 by the time of Khrushchev's ouster."[72] Although the West still outnumbered the Russians by four to one in numbers of launchers at the time, the Russians worked furiously, and by September 1968, they commanded a larger force than the United States.[73] Worldwide "blue water" Soviet submarine patrols were initiated; and a decision was taken under Brezhnev and Kosygin to extend the Soviet navy to "remote areas of the world's oceans previously considered a zone of supremacy of the fleets of the imperialist powers."[74]

After the missile crisis, the cold-war establishmentarian John McCloy, representing President Kennedy, was host to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetzov. McCloy secured an affirmation from Kuznetzov that the Soviets would indeed observe their part of the agreement to remove the missiles and bombers from Cuba. But the Soviet leader warned, "Never will we be caught like this again."[75]

The Soviets were to yield again to U.S. strength in Vietnam and the Middle-East. But each time, the usable strategic leverage of the United States grew weaker. Thus, the structure of the international system and international stability was shaken in three ways.

First, the United States became confident that its power would prevail because global politics had become "unifocal."[76] But American military primacy began to erode as soon as it was proclaimed, when the Soviets fought to gain at least a rough strategic parity.

Second, nations, once cowed, are likely to be less timid in the next confrontation. As Kennedy admitted some time later, referring to the Cuban missile crisis, "You can't have too many of those."[77] Just as Kennedy feared he had appeared callow and faint-hearted in successive Berlin crises, and thus had to be tough over Cuba, the Soviets were likely to calculate that they must appear as the more rigid party in future confrontations or risk a reputation of "capitulationism." For weeks after the missile crisis, the Chinese broadcast their charges of Russian stupidity and weakness to the four corners of the globe. The Chinese labeled Khrushchev an "adventurist" as well as a "capitulationist," and therefore not fit for world Communist leadership. The

[72] Wolfe (fn. 37), 182-83.

[73] Statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, *The Fiscal Year 1970–1974 Defense Program and Defense Budget*, Department of Defense, January 15, 1969, p. 35.

[74] Fleet Admiral V. Kasatonov, "On Battle Watch," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 30, 1967; cited in Wolfe (fn. 37), 446.

[75] John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York 1973), 68.

[76] George Liska, *Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy* (Baltimore 1967), 36 ff.

[77] K. J. Holsti, *International Politics* (2d ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1972), 325.

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Russian answer was to accuse the Chinese of being even "softer" than they for tolerating the Western enclaves of Macao and Hong Kong.[78] The charge of who was the most capitulationist, the Chinese or the Russians, grew almost silly; but these puerile exchanges had their own dangers in terms of deterrence.

Third, once a threat is not carried out—even after an appearance of a willingness to carry it out has been demonstrated—the ante is upped just a bit more. Morgenthau described a two-step process in nuclear gamesmanship, "diminishing credibility of the threat and ever bolder challenges to make good on it. . . . [T]he psychological capital of deterrence has been nearly expended and the policy of deterrence will be close to bankruptcy. When they reach that point, the nations concerned can choose one of three alternatives: resort to nuclear war, retreat, or resort to conventional war."[79]

Morgenthau's observation captured the dilemma of American policymakers after Cuba. The problem was that nuclear superiority had been useful, but each succeeding threat (since no nuclear threat has ever been carried out) would necessarily be weaker than the last. Yet, how could security managers translate military power into political objectives without such threats? Daniel Ellsberg recalled the quandary of U.S. security managers:

> McNamara's tireless and shrewd efforts in the early sixties, largely hidden from the public to this day, [were to] gradually control the forces within the military bureaucracy that pressed for the threat and use of nuclear weapons. [He had] a creditable motive for proposing alternatives to nuclear threats. . . . [I]n this hidden debate, there was strong incentive—indeed it seemed necessary—for the civilian leaders to demonstrate that success was possible in Indochina without the need either to compromise Cold War objectives or to threaten or use nuclear weapons.
>
> Such concerns remained semi-covert: (for it was seen as dangerous to lend substance to the active suspicions of military staffs and their Congressional allies that there were high Administration officials who didn't love the Bomb). . . ."[80]

But after the Cuban crisis, the option of "low-level violence" became more and more attractive. Conventional and limited deployments of force became increasingly necessary as conventional force was considered less forbidding than the nuclear abyss. After all, the

[78] Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin* (New York 1968), 319-20.
[79] Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York 1969), 212-13.
[80] Daniel Ellsberg, *Papers on the War* (New York 1972), 292-93.

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symbolic or "psychological capital" of deterrence rested on the notion of resolve. And one way to demonstrate political will was through the resurrection of conventional force as an instrument of demonstrating "commitment"—a commitment whose alternative form was a threat of nuclear holocaust. The latter was bound to deteriorate with the advent of a viable Soviet retaliatory capability and the knowledge that the Soviets had collapsed once under a nuclear threat and might not be willing to be quite so passive again. Many national security managers found they could navigate between the Scylla of nuclear war and the Charybdis of surrender with the serendipitous discovery of the "lifeboat" of the 1960's—limited war. It would not prove to be a sturdy craft.

Of course, the assumptions of the planners of limited war—as they emerged victorious from the Cuban crisis—were as old as the cold war. They dated from the Truman Doctrine's Manichean presentation of a bipolar global confrontation where a gain to one party necessarily would be a loss to the other. A world order of diverse centers of power, with elements of superpower cooperation, where gains and losses would be less easily demonstrable, was not so demanding of military remedy. A multipolar world would be less congenial to the belief that the only options available to policy-makers were either military force or retreat. Maneuver and negotiation, in such a world, would again become part of diplomacy. But such a development was to come about only after the tragic failure of the military remedy had been demonstrated in Vietnam.

VII. The By-products of Success

There were other effects related to the exuberant reaction to the Cuban crisis. As the United States began to feel that power and force were successful solvents to the more sticky problems of the cold war, the role of international law declined precipitously.[81]

[81] Dean Rusk reflected earlier, obligatory American statements about international legal order and American foreign policy when he declared:

> Our foreign policy has been reflected in our willingness to submit atomic weapons to international law, in feeding and clothing those stricken by war, in supporting free elections and government by consent, in building factories and dams, power plants and railways, schools and hospitals, in improving seed and stock and fertilizer, in stimulating markets and improving the skills and techniques of others in a hundred different ways. Let these things stand in contrast to a foreign policy directed towards the extension of tyranny and using the big lie, sabotage, suspicion, riot and assassination as its tools. The great strength of the United States is devoted to the peaceful pursuits of our people and to the decent opinions of mankind. But it is not healthy for any regime or group of regimes to incur, by

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Moral pontifications appeared increasingly hypocritical after Cuba. But after all, hypocrisy, in the words of H. L. Mencken, "runs, like a hair in a hot dog, through the otherwise beautiful fabric of American life."[82] The participants in the crisis knew the blockade was an act of war that had little basis in international law. After the crisis was over, even lawyers began to see law as but another instrumentality of American policy. The conclusion reached by American academics was that "International law is . . . a tool, not a guide to action. . . . It does not have a valid life of its own; it is a mere instrument, available to political leaders for their own ends, be they good or evil, peaceful or aggressive. . . . [The Cuban missile crisis] merely reconfirms the irrelevance of international law in major political disputes."[83]

Dean Acheson summarized the code of the cold war as it was confirmed by the Cuban experience: "The power, prestige and position of the United States had been challenged. . . . Law simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power. . . . The survival of states is not a matter of law."[84]

George Ball, former Under Secretary of State, wrote: "No one can seriously contend that we now live under a universal system or, in any realistic sense, under the 'rule of law.' We maintain the peace by preserving a precarious balance of power between ourselves and the Soviet Union—a process we used to call 'containment' before the word went out of style. It is the preservation of that balance which, regardless of how we express it, is the central guiding principle of American foreign policy."[85]

The UN was used in the Cuban Crisis, not as Kennedy had told the General Assembly the year before, as "the only true alternative to war,"[86] but as a platform where Adlai Stevenson, the eloquent Amer-

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their lawless and aggressive conduct, the implacable opposition of the American people. The lawbreaker, unfortunately in the nature of things, always has the initiative, but the peacemaking peoples of the world can and will make themselves strong enough to insist upon peace.

Cited in Halberstam (fn. 66), 327.

[82] H. L. Mencken, "Editorial," *American Mercury*, IX, November 1926, 287. Cited in Halper (fn. 24), 157.

[83] William P. Gerberding, "International Law and the Cuban Crisis," in Lawrence Scheinman and David Wilkinson, eds., *International Law and Political Crisis: An Analytic Casebook* (Boston 1968), 209-10.

[84] Richard J. Barnet and Marcus Raskin, *After Twenty Years* (New York 1965), 229n.

[85] George Ball, "Slogans and Realities," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVII (July 1969), 624.

[86] John F. Kennedy, "Let Us Call a Truce to Terror," address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 23, 1961, *Department of State Bulletin*, October 16, 1961, p. 619.

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ican representative, could deal "a final blow to the Soviet case before world opinion."[87]

Epitomized by Cuba, crisis after crisis pointed out the stark irony: Americans, who had so long stroked the talisman of international law, now seemed to do so only when their interests were not jeopardized. Otherwise, law became merely a rhetorical flourish of United States policy. International law was still a part of the admonition that "armed aggression" and "breaches of the peace" cease and desist. But, in back of these legalistic and moralistic injunctions, the armed cop became more and more apparent. As General de Gaulle had observed earlier, the conclusion that American idealism was but a reflection of the American will to power became almost inescapable after the Cuban crisis.[88] Few obeisances about the need for law in international society disguised the sense that America had abandoned her ancient, liberal inheritance in the zesty pursuit of world order.

Another effect of the crisis was to differentiate the "great powers"—the United States and the Soviet Union—from other states which were literally frozen out of a major role in structuring global politics. After all, the major "chips" of big-power poker were simply not accessible to other governments—even those with modest and nominally independent nuclear forces. For no other nations had the capability of making even plausible calculations of either preemptive or second-strike blows against a great power, much less basing national strategies on such possibilities. As a result, Europeans were offered the appearance of some control in their nuclear lot with the ill-fated MLF. But the nuclear trigger was still in the hands of the United States, and so was the final squeeze. Not only were the weapons of great-power diplomacy increasingly inaccessible to other states, but the other tools of statecraft also receded from the grasp of those with modest resources. The spy, for instance, was largely replaced by satellite reconnaissance. Intellectual musings on great-power conflict became differentiated from other strategic thinking. Gradually, the Soviets and the Americans created a shared private idiom of force; and a curious dialogue began between the congressional budget messages of the Secretary of Defense and the periodic revisions of *Strategy* by Marshal Sokolovsky.[89] Allies became mere appurtenances of power whose purpose, in the

[87] Schlesinger (fn. 14), 824.

[88] For General de Gaulle's analysis, see his *Mémoires de Guerre*, Vol. II, *L'Unité* (Paris 1956), 97-98.

[89] Marshal Z. D. Sokolovsky (introduction by Raymond Garthoff), *Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts* (New York 1963). (Subsequent editions were translated by RAND for internal use by government officials.)

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duopolistic structure of international society, was increasingly symbolic. Thus, for example, the OAS was asked to validate the U.S. blockade at the same time the American quarantine was announced.

Similarly, Dean Acheson flew to Paris and other European capitals to confer with American allies about the coming confrontation over Cuba.

> "Your President does me great honor," de Gaulle said, "to send me so distinguished an emissary. I assume the occasion to be of appropriate importance." Acheson delivered President Kennedy's letter, with the text of the speech to be delivered at P-hour, 7 P.M. Washington time. He offered to summarize it. De Gaulle raised his hand in a delaying gesture that the long-departed Kings of France might have envied. "May we be clear before you start," he said. "Are you consulting or informing me?" Acheson confessed that he was there to inform, not to consult. "I am in favor of independent decisions," de Gaulle acknowledged."[90]

For the Europeans, Gaullists and Leftists alike, it appeared that there was a high likelihood of nuclear annihilation without representation.[91] In spite of European gestures of support, the alliance received a shock from which it did not recover. The British, in the midst of a vicious internal debate about whether or not to abandon nuclear weapons, decided they were necessary to buy even minimum consideration from their American allies. The French did not debate; they accelerated their nuclear programs while withdrawing from a military role in the alliance.

On the Soviet side, it was equally apparent that Russian interests would not be sacrificed to sister socialist states. Castro was plainly sold out. The weak promise tendered by the Kennedy Administration not to invade the island was probably cold comfort as Castro saw his military benefactors beat a hasty retreat from American power. Embarrassingly, Castro began to echo the "capitulationist" theme of Chinese broadcasts. Privately Castro said that if he could, he would have beaten Khrushchev to within an inch of his life for what he did. Soviet Foreign Minister Mikoyan was dispatched to Cuba and stayed there for weeks, not even returning to the bedside of his dying wife, but Castro's fury was unabated. Whatever the motive for Khrushchev's moves in Cuba, the Chinese were also enraged.[92] Any attempts

[90] Abel (fn. 16), 112.

[91] Amitai Etzioni, *Winning Without War* (Garden City, N.Y. 1965), 46.

[92] Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (New York 1968), 675. Ulam (pp. 668-70), suggested that Krushchev aimed at precluding both Chinese and German acquisition of nuclear weapons.

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the Soviets had made prior to October 1962 to dissuade the Chinese from assuming a nuclear role lost their validity when it became obvious that the Russians would not risk their own destruction for an associate.

By 1963, a new era of East-West relations was unfolding. The United States still cultivated the asymmetrical assumptions of the cold war, but the Soviet Union was at least admitted as a junior partner in a duopolistic international system which began to be characterized as détente. The relaxation was favorable to Kennedy, who wanted to begin to deal with the Soviets without the ideological rancor that had poisoned previous relations, and who had a vision of Soviet "responsibility" which was to be enlarged upon by succeeding administrations. The Soviets, too, sought a détente. Given their acknowledged strategic inferiority, they could hardly expect to be successful in another series of confrontations. Moreover, the Chinese began to present formidable ideological and political difficulties for the Russians, whose new interest in improved relations with the United States caused intense fears in China of American-Soviet collusion. At the same time, the Soviets began to fear a Sino-American agreement that would be detrimental to their interests. As Michael Suslov, chief ideologue of the Soviet Union, explained in early 1964, "With a stubbornness worthy of a better cause the Chinese leaders attempt to prevent the improvement of Soviet-American relations, representing this as 'plotting with the imperialists.' At the same time the Chinese government makes feverish attempts to improve relations with Britain, France, Japan, West Germany, and Italy. It is quite clear that they would not refuse to improve relations with the United States but as yet do not see favorable circumstances for such an endeavor."[93]

Conclusion

Thus, by 1964, the crisis had precipitated a change in the global structure of power. American paramountcy had been self-proclaimed; the seeds of détente had been sown by a shared vision of nuclear oblivion; and the ingredients for a great-power condominium were becoming clear. If it had not been for the war in Vietnam, the present framework of international affairs might have been with us ten years earlier. Tragically and ironically, the "lessons" of the Cuban missile crisis—that success in international crisis was largely a matter of national guts; that the opponent would yield to superior force; that presidential control of force can be "suitable," "selective," "swift," "effective," and

[93] *Ibid.*, 691.

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"responsive" to civilian authority; and that crisis management and execution are too dangerous and events move too rapidly for anything but the tightest secrecy—all these inferences contributed to President Johnson's decision to use American air power against Hanoi in 1965. The Cuban crisis changed the international environment but riveted American expectations to the necessities of the diplomacy of violence. Even the language of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was almost identical to that which Kennedy's legal advisors had drawn up for the OAS in October of 1962.[94] Although the Cuban crisis created substantial changes in distinguishing superpowers from other states, the realization of the equality of the superpowers and of the indications that they could join in a relationship which had some elements of condominium and some elements of the classic balance of power was suppressed until the American agony in Vietnam drew to a close.

[94] Remarks by William P. Bundy, University of Delaware, October 16, 1973.

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Review Articles

COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS

By DONALD P. KOMMERS

Richard D. Baker, *Judicial Review in Mexico: A Study of the Amparo Suit.* Austin and London, University of Texas Press, 1971, 304 pp., $8.50.

B. L. Strayer, *Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada.* Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1968, 275 pp., $15.00.

Heinz Laufer, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und politischer Prozess.* Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1968, 623 pp., DM 70.

Mauro Cappelletti, *Judicial Review in the Contemporary World.* Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971, 117 pp., $8.50.

Edward McWhinney, *Judicial Review* (4th ed.). Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1969, 270 pp., $10.00.

Richard E. Johnston, *The Effect of Judicial Review on Federal-State Relations in Australia, Canada, and the United States.* Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1969, 320 pp., $12.00.

Thomas M. Franck, *Comparative Constitutional Processes: Cases and Materials.* New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, 595 pp., $16.00.

John M. Maki, *Court and Constitution in Japan: Selected Supreme Court Decisions, 1948–60.* Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1964, 445 pp., $9.50.

Glendon Schubert and David J. Danelski, eds., *Comparative Judicial Behavior.* New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1969, 412 pp., $7.95.

Theodore L. Becker, *Comparative Judicial Politics: The Political Functionings of Courts.* Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1970, 407 pp., $6.95.

I

THE widespread adoption of judicial review in the world today would seem to rank as a major political development of our time. It marks an important shift, at least in constitutional doctrine, from an emphasis upon the supremacy of political forces—and the principle of majority rule—at the beginning of this century, to the supremacy of written constitutions—and the principle of limited rule—at mid-century. Provisions for judicial review now appear in the constitutions of well over fifty nations, including countries of Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the Far East. In most of these nations, judicial review emerged as an articulate principle of post-1945 constitutions.

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Judicial review is not a twentieth-century creation, however. That political rulers are and should be subject to an order of higher law is a very old notion with deep roots in Roman and medieval political philosophy, as McIlwain has shown.[1] Associated almost exclusively with American constitutionalism in the nineteenth century, judicial review implies the obligation of courts to refuse to enforce any legislation that violates the Constitution. The authority of courts in the United States to declare laws unconstitutional was essentially a judicial invention which Americans regarded as a logical consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers. What is new about judicial review today is not merely the broad scale on which it has been adopted, but the conscious decision of constitution-makers around the globe to place the guardianship of fundamental law in judicial hands.

The books discussed below reflect the wonder of judicial scholars curious about the operation of constitutional courts and the effect of judicial review in countries other than the United States. As is to be expected at the beginning of exploratory work, these studies are enormously varied in purpose and scope. They mirror the differing perspectives of their authors, who are an interesting mix of American and foreign academicians, political scientists, legal scholars, and researchers, some committed to traditional modes of inquiry and some oriented toward quantitative studies. We might have expected, incidentally, that political scientists would be more sensitive than legal scholars to the political implications of judicial review and to the policy-making roles of constitutional courts, but such is not universally the case in the studies under review. Still, what legal scholars would want to know about judicial review would not always satisfy the curiosity of a political scientist. Undoubtedly, there is a penumbral area between law and politics where scholars in both disciplines may communicate meaningfully with one another, and I shall speak of this sphere of collaboration later on.

Six of the books discussed below are comparative (loosely defined) studies of judicial structures, decisions, or processes (Cappelletti, McWhinney, Johnston, Franck, Becker, and Schubert-Danelski); the remaining four are single-nation studies (Baker, Strayer, Maki, and Laufer). Beyond this very simple classification, the books may be divided roughly into three groups: (1) historical-analytic studies of the origin, scope, and impact of judicial review (Baker, Strayer, Cappelletti, McWhinney, and Laufer); (2) doctrinal studies—and casebooks

[1] Charles Howard McIlwain, *Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1947).

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—in constitutional law (Franck, Johnston, and Maki); and (3) quantitative studies of judicial decision making and the judicial process (Schubert-Danelski and Becker). The time has come to take stock of these studies, to reflect on what we have learned from them, and to suggest where comparative judicial research might go from here.

II

(1) HISTORICAL-ANALYTIC STUDIES

Examinations of judicial review frequently start off with the typical lawyers' questions. Who may bring a case to a court authorized to hear constitutional complaints? What jurisdictional problems must be hurdled to gain access to the court? What cases in particular may the court hear? What principles of interpretation does the court use in deciding constitutional cases? What is the legal impact of a constitutional ruling? Exhaustive treatments of these and related questions are to be found in the studies by Strayer and by Baker, of Canada and Mexico, respectively.

In both countries, judicial review is the product of a unique set of historical circumstances. To understand the operation and functions of judicial review in Mexico and Canada today is, therefore, equivalent to knowing how the technical rules governing judicial review evolved through time. Baker maps the development and present scope of the *amparo* suit, which in Mexico is the principal legal tool and a highly specialized procedure used to protect individuals against the unconstitutional acts of public officials. Strayer traces the historical antecedents of judicial review in Canada, although his main concern is to describe and assess the character of constitutional litigation as applied to the review of legislation. In the best tradition of legal analysis, these studies also show how judges in both countries have used their powers of constitutional review to expand their authority beyond what appears to have been the original intent of the framers of the Constitution.

Although these books are meticulous in their attention to judicial techniques, they hardly touch in any systematic way the political dimension of judicial review. Baker and Strayer do show historically how judicial review came to be adopted in Mexico and Canada, but formal legal documents—their main source of data—say little about judicial review's social, political, and ideological determinants. Although Laufer —a German political scientist—seeks explicitly to consider the political significance of judicial review, his study of West Germany's Federal

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Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) is largely a narrative account of the immediate political conflicts accompanying the establishment of a constitutional tribunal in Germany and of subsequent legislative efforts to modify its structure. Laufer also considers—more than Baker or Strayer—the process of selecting justices and the political roles of the tribunal under study. However, in spite of the increasing use of interviewing and survey techniques in German political studies, Laufer tells us very little about the justices themselves, their perceptions of their judicial roles, or their attitudes towards judicial review. Although he contends that judicial review is a major influence in West Germany, the author fails to tell us exactly how that influence is to be measured.

Actually, nearly one-half of Laufer's study is a detailed analytical commentary on judicial decisions in the limited field of political parties and election law. But whether these decisions have helped to root judicial review more firmly in Germany's political soil and legal culture is a question that is hardly touched. Despite formidable trappings of scholarship—2034 footnotes and fastidiously numbered paragraphs from the beginning to the end of the 623-page volume—this is a tendentious book: it is special pleading in favor of judicial review. Moreover, the author's conclusion, that the Federal Constitutional Court is "one of the most important guarantors of the democratic order" (p. 585) in West Germany, is unsupported by empirical evidence. Judicial review and democracy, in his view, are two sides of the same coin; he seems not to allow for the possibility that judicial review might be used, as it was during the last stage of the Weimar Republic, as an illiberal and antidemocratic weapon.[2]

The comparative judicial scholar looking closely at these three studies will be struck more by the differences than by the similarities in the character of judicial review from nation to nation. In Mexico, the writ of *amparo* is designed to help a particular person with a special grievance against some public official; it is not, as Becker notes in *Comparative Judicial Politics*, "a strong popular check on the executive and legislative branches" (p. 210); an *amparo* proceeding may not even be used to protest governmental infringements on the right to property (Baker, 132). In Canada, although judicial review follows the American model, it is confined operationally to the settlement of constitutional disputes between the states (provinces) and the national government. In West

[2] Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (Villingen-Schwarzwald 1964), 193.

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Germany, judicial review extends to all legislation, and decisions of the Constitutional Court are absolutely binding on all other branches of government.

The roles of the constitutional courts in these countries also seem to vary. In Mexico, the court has served mainly to protect the citizen against arbitrary governmental action (Baker, 272); in Canada, to guard (although not always to the author's liking) the federal system (Strayer, 203-4); in West Germany, to further political democracy (Laufer, 585). Even if we discount the lack of an evidentiary base for such conclusions, these books remind us that there is likely to be a problem of equivalence in any transnational study of judicial review. Not only are the formative influences upon the development of judicial review different in each country, but so too is the formal authority conferred upon constitutional courts. Consider, for example, the field of election law. In Mexico, the courts are barred absolutely from any review of the electoral process; in West Germany, review of elections and even of the legitimacy of political parties is expressly conferred by the Basic Law; in Canada, the courts themselves have followed a policy of abstention, choosing not to adopt the American Supreme Court's policy of active intervention in electoral politics. Despite all these variations, the comparativist hungers for generalizations which will explain the appeal and uses of judicial review as a general principle, apart from its particular manifestations in various settings.

Even if Cappelletti's study of judicial review does not satisfy this hunger, it is a promising beginning. His book is a short, incisive transnational survey of the origin, scope, and agencies of judicial review, although it is confined mainly to judicial review in Europe. By treating the subject topically rather than on a country-by-country basis, Cappelletti manages to demonstrate variations in judicial review rather sharply. In his attempt to classify systems of judicial review, Cappelletti distinguishes mainly between centralized and decentralized systems of review, describes the variations within them, and, in a very general way, seeks to relate the two systems to certain features, attributes, or properties of legal (and political) systems.

At the same time, the author points to what he regards as converging trends in both centralized and decentralized systems of review. One of these trends, in his opinion, is the blurring of "long-standing distinctions between the natural law and the positive law, between precedent-oriented and statute-oriented courts, and between varying separation-of-powers theories" (p. 67). Another is the growing tendency of courts in all systems of judicial review "to stimulate a 'con-

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stitutional consciousness' and increasingly to play non-judicial or political roles" (pp. 67-68). Cappelletti ventures to suggest that judicial review represents a kind of modern-day universal quest for higher law principles to guide men in their search for political order. What judicial review does in fact symbolize for political elites and the general public is itself a subject worthy of cross-cultural research.

McWhinney shifts the scene to the English-speaking world, where he examines judicial review in several former British colonies, including the Republic of Ireland, Canada, Australia, India, and Pakistan. Concerned with judicial review as an agent of constitutional and political change, he is interested mainly in how judges use their authority to achieve certain policy goals. McWhinney is cognizant of the relationship between methods of judicial recruitment, judges' perceptions of their roles, judicial policy, and of both the legal and sociopolitical factors which orient judges toward judicial activism or restraint. On the whole, although acutely aware of the judiciary's limited capacity to influence the direction of a political system, McWhinney, like Cappelletti, is clearly impressed with the wide acceptance and relative success of judicial review "as a prime instrument of democratic constitutionalism" in the countries under investigation (p. 233). The author has a sharp eye for discerning new trends in the uses of judicial power, and his insights cannot easily be ignored. Still, the book's rich fund of propositions about the nature, purpose, and impact of judicial review resembles a large stew; a comparative judicial scholar ought to try his hand at boiling it down into a few workable hypotheses for cross-cultural research.

(2) DOCTRINAL STUDIES

The books by Johnston, Maki, and Franck are studies of constitutional law. Maki and Franck's works are collections of judicial decisions. Johnston's book is an analytical study of judicial decisions handed down by the high courts of the United States, Canada, and Australia. Tracing in broad strokes the historical development of federal-state relations in these countries, the author analyzes judicial opinions on intergovernmental immunity, taxation, interstate commerce, spending, and treaty making, and shows how the three tribunals have used constitutional law as a tool in limiting or expanding national or state power. Although a political scientist, Johnston is at his best when comparing legal doctrines; he is not so convincing when ranging beyond constitutional law to tell us about the actual impact of judicial decisions on federalism. For example, the author concludes that the Canadian

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Supreme Court has virtually managed to transform a federal into a confederal system of government, a result of which he disapproves. He also concludes that the Australian High Court has impeded the development of a healthy federalism, whereas the United States Supreme Court, in his view, has struck the proper balance between state and federal authority, mainly because American justices are pragmatic jurists and conscious of socioeconomic realities. Like Strayer and McWhinney, Johnston attributes Canadian and Australian constitutional doctrines on federalism to the formalistic legal training (and attitudes) of the judges and to their use of strict constructionist methods of constitutional interpretation. In any case, Johnston's final assessment of the impact of judicial review in Canada, Australia, and the United States is that it has been "significant" (p. 279).

Johnston's study begs complex questions about the linkage among judicial attitudes, judicial techniques, and judicial doctrines. Are variations in judicial reasoning, for example, sufficient to explain differences in the policies of constitutional courts? Problems arise, too, in the author's discussion of judicial impact. Would the historical pattern of federal-state relations have been substantially different in these countries without the constitutional jurisprudence surveyed by Johnston? Are judicial decisions dependent or independent variables? What accounts for general public acceptance of judicial settlements of federal-state conflicts? Is popular acceptance of judicial decisions denying much-needed authority to the Australian Parliament—owing, as Johnston suggests, to the public's "temperamental need to believe in the extense [*sic*] of a body of benevolent elders set above . . . the political struggle" or to the fact that the judges "have succeeded in 'de-politicizing' their actions" (p. 286)? Johnston is correct in pointing out that judicial decisions alone "may very well present a seriously distorted view of the actual federal relationship in Canada and Australia" (p. 287); he goes on to mention, all too briefly, various informal cooperative arrangements between levels of government designed to circumvent constitutional limitations imposed by the courts.

It is appropriate to interject here that Mexico and West Germany are also federal political systems. Yet in Mexico, as Baker points out, the courts are powerless to settle federal-state conflicts; in West Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court, although originally established to play a major role as umpire of the federal system, has actually decided a very small number of federalism cases. Under what political circumstances, then, are federal-state conflicts litigated in courts? When are such conflicts negotiated outside of courts? Greater attention to the

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interplay between the judiciary and the legislative branches would probably shed light on these and other questions relevant to any examination of judicial influences on the development of federalism.

The Franck casebook deserves notice for both the scope of its coverage and the attention it gives to the judicial process in widely differing cultural settings. It is composed of a careful selection of judicial decisions from the high courts of Australia, Canada, India, England, the United States, and seventeen Asian and African countries where an inheritance of common law has been grafted onto local customary law or tribal systems of law. Concerned mainly with the scope of judicial power and fundamental rights—especially procedural rights—in newly independent states, these decisions are from appellate courts exercising authority under constitutions in large measure infused with British, American, and French constitutional principles. Whoever approaches the materials in this book with a sure footing in the constitutional law of advanced Western states will be struck by the extent to which Western concepts of constitutional law have been purposely incorporated into, or consciously rejected by, non-Western cultures. But there is an equivalence problem here too, since judicial structures vary so much from country to country, and since constitutional litigation is a relatively new activity in Africa and Asia. The recent history of the emerging nations also shows how delicate judicial review is as an instrument of limited rule, if indeed judicial review was intended to limit governmental power in these countries; it may be a lingering remnant of Anglo-Saxon influence, headed eventually for extinction.

Besides an informative introduction on judicial review in Japan, Maki's book includes twenty-six major cases in Japanese constitutional law. These cases, which I believe have not been published in English before, fall into the areas of freedom of conscience, expression, travel, and assembly, as well as defendants' rights. The inclusion of dissenting and concurring opinions provides some basis for speculating about the kind of value cleavages which appear on the Japanese Supreme Court. More important for the student of comparative politics, however, is what these decisions—and those contained in the Franck volume as well—suggest about the relationship between cultural values and constitutional law. One cannot, for example, read the obscenity case without becoming deeply conscious of moral concerns which seem rooted in Japanese culture. Yet, interestingly, the Court labored to articulate a *universal* moral value by which to determine obscenity. Still, one would expect any such value to be related to the dominant culture of the men holding it. Predictably, as the dissenting opinions in the obscenity case

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show, the minority was unable to accept any such universal value. But this raises the question of the relationship between basic cultural values and personal values in the making of constitutional policy—a major point of inquiry, it would seem, in any study of comparative constitutional law.

(3) JUDICIAL PROCESS AND DECISION-MAKING STUDIES

We might have expected that the remaining two books under consideration would attempt empirically to show the relationship between the judicial policies of constitutional courts and cultural values. The volume of essays edited by Schubert and Danelski, however, focuses almost exclusively on the relationship between judges' personal values and their official decisions. The articles are studies of decision making by constitutional (supreme) courts in several Asian countries (mainly Japan, India, and the Philippines), and in Canada and Australia. The search for a cross-cultural theory of judicial decision making is indeed a legitimate and immensely valuable enterprise. But some of the fascinating questions about the relationship between culture and judicial policy in certain nations (especially in Japan, Canada, and Australia), which the more conventional legal studies by Maki, Strayer, Johnston, and McWhinney raise, are barely addressed in this volume. It might be suggested that the quantitative techniques used in these studies limit the authors' perspective on constitutional courts. It is easy to neglect the impact of cultural values and other environmental characteristics impinging on courts in studies which employ the judicial vote as the main unit of analysis and cumulative scaling—one of several statistical methods used to relate personal values to judicial decisions—as the principal research tool.

Becker's book, the testament of a scholar in a high state of indignation with the existing literature on courts and the judicial process generally, is relevant here because of the space devoted by the author to judicial review and the study of constitutional courts. In his main line of argument, he hurls three general charges at the literature of judicial research in political science: (1) it is ethnocentric in its focus on the American judiciary; (2) it is narrow (i.e., narrowly legalistic or narrowly behavioral); and (3) it is unscientific (i.e., not cumulative). He counsels us to correct these deficiencies, in reverse order, by (1) using a structural-functional framework of analysis to (2) examine the functions performed by judicial structures *in political systems* on (3) a transnational basis. To achieve comparability or equivalence across national boundaries, Becker stresses the impor-

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tance of studying the judicial role, defined in terms of those judicial procedures and techniques by which impartial (i.e., judicial) decisions are reached. Judicial review enters the analysis at this point, and is defined as an aspect of judicial independence. But is the significance of judicial review to be found in the extent to which a constitutional court hands down decisions in opposition to the political branches of government? Is it to be found in the pattern of compliance with judicial mandates? Is it to be related to the frequency with which judicial review is exercised? If so, what of Ireland, where judicial review as such is seldom exercised, but where it seems nevertheless to be fully accepted as a principle of constitutional government? In short, do we exhaust the meaning or reality of judicial review for a political community by describing the empirical effects of court decisions?

Becker does not reach these questions, owing in part to his readiness to exchange the hat of a scholar for the cap of a judicial reformer. He attacks judicial review. The caustic cutting edge of Becker's critique slashes particularly hard into the pro-judicial review bias (which is largely assumed, not illustrated) of most research on foreign constitutional courts. No doubt we need to be reminded that judicial review is not always what it is cracked up to be and that it will not make the world safe for democracy. But the author is reckless in some of his assertions about the causes of judicial review. For example, it is simply not true, as Becker asserts, that "the influence of the United States is probably the single most important factor in bringing about the currently widespread existence of judicial review" (p. 224). The Baker, Cappelletti, Laufer, and Franck studies do not sustain this proposition. In the end, Becker proposes the abolition of judicial review in the United States and elsewhere because of its undemocratic character (pp. 383-84). Clearly, in his opinion, judicial review possesses no symbolic value for political democracies; as the author notes, judicial review is merely a "gadget" (p. 385), and gadgets, after all, are disposable.

III

What generally can be said of these studies of judicial review and constitutional courts? Let us take the historical and doctrinal studies first. The random observations, contradictory statements, and disparate conclusions of the works discussed here are one indication of their theoretical deficiency. The books discussed do not conceptually relate to each other; they fail to build on each other; and they are not systematically comparative in design. Although they impart much inter-

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esting information about particular judicial decisions and the operation of certain courts, they do not add measurably to our knowledge of comparative constitutional law or of the political roles of constitutional courts. Constitutional doctrine, political culture and setting, judicial recruitment, judicial procedure and techniques, judicial decision making, conditions for judicial review, political impact of judicial review, and structural variations in the organization of constitutional courts are all covered in these volumes. But the relationship between two or more of these variables is rarely the object of systematic study, and there is an almost total failure of the literature to consider their relationship in a cross-national context.

Most of the studies considered here lack analytic structures capable of dealing reliably with these relationships even within a single national setting. Propositions about judicial review are for the most part the products of personal impressions drawn from traditional case analysis. No one has developed a framework for the systematic study of judicial policy. Although illustrations of judicial policy abound in these studies, they are mainly narrative accounts, interspersed with normative judgments, of largely episodic events.

The studies reported in the Schubert and Danelski volume, on the other hand, are exceptional for their theoretical significance and methodological sophistication, largely because the authors have tried to apply to constitutional courts in Asia statistical techniques and mathematical models successfully applied to the United States Supreme Court. The cumulative character of such studies is, of course, sufficient reason to continue experimenting with tested research methods in foreign environments. There are limits, however, to the application of behavioral methods on a comparative basis. For one thing, techniques used to study individual judicial behavior clearly cannot be applied to constitutional courts which hand down anonymous institutional opinions. Their use seems limited, too, when applied to courts—such as European constitutional courts—with an institutional bias against split decisions, even though dissenting opinions may be permitted.

A more serious limitation of behavioral techniques generally is that they restrict the scope of comparative inquiry. If it is our purpose to bring the comparative study of courts and judges into the mainstream of a developing science of comparative politics, we shall have to restore the *polis* to its proper place of significance in our cross-cultural research designs. We need to develop research models which will provide some means for determining the influence of unique system characteristics, such as features of the legal culture, upon judicial values and policies. Becker's

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structural-functional paradigm is at least a start, for it seeks to link courts with what they actually *do for* (their functions?) the political communities in which they exist. The Becker framework, however, ignores the impact or role of a judicial institution as a totality. Courts, especially constitutional courts, are more than the sum of their procedures and techniques. Courts and judges are responsible for political inputs which are not immediately derived from the *judicial role* as such. These inputs, including the role of courts as political symbols, need to be taken into account in studies of comparative judicial politics.

IV

Where, then, do we proceed from here? The research directions proposed below are intended to give some unity of purpose to our labors. My suggestions follow logically from the concerns of the books discussed in this article. They are not calculated to produce much in the way of general theory, if only because our first need seems to be for more exploratory work in the area of judicial review and more accurate descriptions of what constitutional courts are actually doing. Given the state of our knowledge and availability of resources, the comparative studies I suggest seem feasible of being undertaken *now*. They leave room also for a judicious eclecticism in the choice of research methodology. We should realize, as Arend Lijphart has recently pointed out, that the comparative method does not imply the use of any given research technique.[3] Certainly, current techniques for analyzing quantified data should not alone dictate what we ought to know about constitutional courts; the tendency to place ourselves in servitude to method is always present. Let us shape our questions first—questions which are politically relevant and intellectually interesting—and *then* proceed to find the best means to address these questions. By directing our attention to the following, we can get on immediately with the business of comparative judicial research and begin inquiries which are most worthy of our attention.

1. *We need to classify judicial review on a worldwide basis and chart its relationship to legal and political characteristics of the system.* Cappelletti remarks that "in spite of its nearly universal appeal, judicial review remains an enigmatic institution" (p. 98). To unravel the enigma, we shall have to ask some researchable questions about judicial review. For a start it would be worthwhile, even at the level of formal constitutional organization and theory, to find out whether judicial

[3] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review*, LXV (September 1971), 682-83.

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review is commonly associated with certain legal forms, political structures, modes of judicial organization, or constitutional values. We frequently speak of judicial review in tandem with federalism, separation of powers, common-law legal systems, bills of rights, and judicial independence. But these relationships need to be clarified, for judicial review appears also in the constitutions of well over forty non-federal regimes, in several countries with civil-law legal systems, and in parliamentary as well as presidential systems of government. We also tend to equate judicial review with liberal democracy. Yet Yugoslavia, a Communist political system, has an operating constitutional court, not to mention liberal democracies which do *not* have judicial review. We need to go beyond Cappelletti's typology and develop a classification of variations both in the structure of constitutional courts and in the scope of judicial review in all parts of the world, and then examine the legal, political, and environmental factors which produce one type of judicial review rather than another.

A related research task is to examine the actual political conditions affecting the exercise of judicial review. One of the difficulties of the books considered in this article is that nearly all deal with countries in which judicial review is a salient characteristic of the political system and regarded as having been at least moderately successful. Our need now is for case studies of countries in which judicial review is not functioning effectively or, once adopted, has been rejected. In many parts of the world, judicial review is still little more than a formal prescription. As Franck makes clear, it has not worked in some developing nations of Africa and Asia where it is difficult enough to establish an independent judiciary, let alone tolerate judicial control of constitutionality. Experience seems to show that even in countries ruled by law within a system of partitioned power, judicial review, when newly adopted, is exercised with extreme caution if at all. We need to know more about the genealogy of judicial review in these countries so as to be able to specify the conditions under which judicial review was adopted in the first place and the conditions of its maintenance or atrophy.

2. *We need intensive studies of the operation and roles of constitutional courts in individual countries.* The United States Supreme Court is the only major constitutional tribunal in the world on whose internal workings and external impacts we have reasonably detailed and accurate knowledge. We are in need of similarly comprehensive studies of foreign constitutional tribunals whose organization, power, and activities can profitably be compared with the United States Supreme Court. To enhance comparability, these studies might at first be limited

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to other advanced political democracies, or even restricted to modern federal systems of government in which constitutional courts operate. A research design for the study of a particular constitutional court might focus on the input-conversion-output aspects of judicial activity. On the input side we would systematically explore the kinds of cases, petitions, or demands which come to the court; we would also want to know who goes to the court for redress, why, and under what conditions. With respect to conversion we would want to have systematic studies of the process of judicial recruitment and socialization, the activities and roles of judges, the values or "folkways" of the institution, the methods used for disposing of official business, individual and group stratagems of decision making, and norms of constitutional interpretation. On the output side we would want to know how the tribunal in question uses its power to influence public policy and to mobilize support for itself, both specific and diffuse.

We need studies of the political impact of constitutional courts most of all, for they are most relevant to a developing science of *comparative politics*. Surface impressions about impact need to be replaced with hard data. Systematic inquiries are required to test hypotheses about the roles and functions frequently ascribed to a court in the popular literature. We should find out how the mass public and the political elites perceive a court. How aware of the court and its decisions are these groups? How does awareness and knowledge of judicial decisions affect attitudes toward a constitutional tribunal or compliance with its rulings? Is the court really perceived as a legitimizing institution, as has often been alleged? What specific roles and functions—latent and manifest—does the court perform within the totality of the governing process? What is the court's impact in given policy areas? What are its linkages to other institutions of government, including the judicial bureaucracy? These are just some of the questions which a research design on the impact of a particular constitutional court would include. The next step in comparative research is to begin specifying how the functions, roles, and influence of constitutional courts vary from country to country, and what legal, political, cultural, or other environmental factors produce these variations. Finally, we should avoid clogging this enterprise with abstract—and, by now, tired—debates on whether judicial review is consistent with democratic theory; that track leads nowhere.

3. *We need studies of comparative constitutional law.* The need for systematic studies of constitutional courts and their linkages to political systems should not obviate the equally pressing need for cross-cultural

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studies of constitutional doctrine. That is an area of study which should not be the monopoly of legal scholars; it is a domain ready for collaborative work on the part of legal scholars and political theorists interested in both the idea and the phenomenon of judicial review. Of the books reviewed here, only the Johnston volume qualifies as a study in comparative constitutional law, and it is only a beginning. Actually, we have hardly begun to think comparatively about constitutional law and, until a few years ago, it was not really possible to do so. If we can overcome linguistic barriers, comparative constitutional law is an exploitable field of study, and, what is more, it promises to enrich the study and teaching of American constitutional law as well. Since 1945, West Germany, India, Japan, and Italy, to name just a few, have each created a corpus of constitutional jurisprudence which begs for comparison with American constitutional law. Comparable bodies of constitutional (or political) jurisprudence are to be found, among a few other countries (especially in Latin America), in Mexico, Canada, and Australia, recipients all, as we have seen, of still older traditions of judicial review.

It may sound a little old-fashioned or else heretical to beckon political scientists to renew their traditional concern for substantive constitutional law and policy. Personal judicial values and motivations are of course important ingredients of any assessment of constitutional policy, but for political science, moving into what is increasingly being called the post-behavioral era, comparative constitutional law can itself be a search for value (and policy) in the community of men. A large measure of intellectual excitement is to be expected from observing how the constitutional courts of different nations, with different social systems, legal cultures, and political institutions, face up to common problems of governance.

One objective of the study of comparative constitutional law is to specify those constitutional values and ideas that are commonly accepted in differing political cultures and legal systems. What shared values are reflected in the constitutional law of differing nations? Is there a set of jural postulates common to the constitutional law of culturally distinct nations? One observes, for example, a tendency on the part of courts of judicial review almost everywhere to find principles of ordered liberty, civilized conduct, simple equity, or natural justice which are not immediately derivable from the literal language of the constitutions they interpret—a phenomenon Cappelletti probably had in mind when noting the increasing convergence of positive and natural law in the constitutional law of nations. In short, what does

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judicial review symbolize in the minds of public men? Is it to be associated with declining faith in popular democracy? Does it signify political man's need for a public philosophy? Does it represent a striving after natural justice or a higher law of political obligation? What I am suggesting is that these are important questions and that they are approachable through the study of comparative constitutional law.

Another objective of the study of comparative constitutional law is to examine systematically the influence of constitutional courts upon one another. Constitutional courts are among the few places in the public life of nations today where there is serious reflection about problems of governance in the modern world. These problems are met, of course, within the limits of particular constitutional frameworks and particular political systems. Increasingly, however, constitutional courts across the world are beginning to cite each other in their opinions and to take into account each other's experiences with constitutional government. These cross-fertilizing tendencies are in need of study.

Still another objective of comparative constitutional case analysis is to investigate the role of outside influences—to the extent that these influences are specified in judicial opinions—in the shaping of constitutional doctrine. The constitutional cases of several countries (especially the United States, India, West Germany, Italy, and Canada) can now be studied from the point of view of the varying weights which constitutional courts attach to the opinions of legal scholars, historical experience, oral arguments and briefs, social and economic theories, decisions of foreign courts, as well as inside factors like the courts' own precedents. In short, we have the means to develop comparative constitutional law—and politics—into a meaningful scholarly discipline. All we need now are the scholars.

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INSIGHTS INTO INTERNATIONAL SERVICE

By JEAN SIOTIS

Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*. Knopf, New York, 1972, 655 pp., $12.50.
Shirley Hazzard, *Defeat of an Ideal: A Study of the Self-Destruction of the United Nations*. Atlantic Monthly Press—Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1973, 286 pp., $8.50.
Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Storm Has Many Eyes: A Personal Narrative*. W. W. Norton, New York, 1973, 272 pp., $7.50.
Richard Symonds and Michael Carder, *The United Nations and the Population Question*. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1973, 326 pp., $8.95.
Alexander Szalai, with Margaret Croke and Associates, *The United Nations and the News Media*. UNITAR, United Nations, New York, 1973, 323 pp., $6.50 (paper).

VARIED experiences and associations with international bureaucracies provide a common element in five recent books related to the United Nations. Two of the books deal principally with crucial issues for the United Nations Secretariat, while the other three emphasize more general aspects of international organization. Taken together, they demonstrate the wide range of contacts and effects deriving from the work of international institutions. The books include excellent biographical and autobiographical material, a treatment of organized approaches to population problems, and a study of news media and the UN.

Brian Urquhart's monumental study of Dag Hammarskjöld probably offers more insights into the structure and functioning of the United Nations than any other work published during the past ten years. Shirley Hazzard has written a passionate and moving account of life in the UN Secretariat during some of its darkest hours. Henry Cabot Lodge's autobiography covers his ambassadorship to the UN, one of the longest held by a representative of the United States. Richard Symonds and Michael Carder record the long battle in the UN family to cancel the taboo on population-control programs. Finally, Alexander Szalai reports the findings of a major research project undertaken by the UN Institute for Training and Research. In some respects the experiences reflected here extend well beyond the UN framework inasmuch as they represent several "typical" categories of international actors. There are those based on technical activities (Symonds and

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Szalai), those of the political arm of international secretariats (Urquhart), those of obscure, enthusiastic service without guiding effect on the organizations being served (Hazzard), and those of the government representatives in daily contact with international secretariats (Lodge).

Brian Urquhart, who has spent the better part of his adult life in the UN, had the exceptional privilege of access to Dag Hammarskjöld's private papers as well as to a great number of other unpublished sources. One wonders, however, whether access to these written sources alone would have enabled him to write such a masterful study of a single man and the politics of his era. For some decades, the catastrophic effect of the telephone on the record available to historians has been beyond doubt. Much of the information and analyses in Urquhart's book were possible only because the author assumed the role of observer-participant and collected information while specific actions were taking place, or was able to interview participants shortly after important events. Obviously, such an opportunity is not given to just any scholar working on the UN. There is reason, therefore, to be particularly grateful to Urquhart for having written so brilliantly and honestly about a man and the institution to which he has always been profoundly attached. Implementing Voltaire's dictum, "On doit des égards aux vivants, on ne doit aux morts que la vérité," is not an easy task, and rare are those writers of friendly biographies who have not fallen victims to hagiography.

The book on Hammarskjöld is a rich source of new information on the United Nations and its most prestigious Secretary General. Although it covers all aspects of Hammarskjöld's action at the head of the organization, some events are stressed more than others, for reasons which are not always clear. I would have been happier had Urquhart devoted more attention to the situation Hammarskjöld found inside the Secretariat and to his actions to remedy that situation. References are made to his conception of his role and of his own responsibility in assuring that the Secretariat did not harbor United States citizens of "subversive" political persuasions, but little is said of the institutionalization of "security clearance" procedures under Hammarskjöld.

As for the descriptions and analyses of the major political initiatives undertaken by Hammarskjöld, they are remarkably well written and documented. Although Urquhart was personally involved in most of them, his narrative is dispassionate and comes close to excellence as an example of political biographical writing. At no point is the reader

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given the impression that Urquhart deliberately chose to highlight those aspects which would enhance the Secretary General's posture as a man of wise political judgment, or to conceal his shortcomings as an administrator whose judgment was not always considered very sound, even by those who admired him. The conclusion one draws from this study is that Hammarskjöld's political acumen in the face of particularly complex situations was generally sharp, but also that he never used his administrative powers to correct major political errors for which some of his senior associates were responsible. His friendship for those in whom he placed his confidence was unfaltering, whatever their mistakes, but this sort of personal loyalty did not always benefit the organization. Urquhart's discussion of the Congo operation provides a case in point: the major blunders committed by some of his subordinates in Leopoldville caused, to a large extent, the failure of Hammarskjöld's attempts early in August 1960 to establish a working relationship with Patrice Lumumba, following the initial skirmishes. The Secretary General's attempts to maintain some form of balance between Congolese parties were seriously and adversely affected by action undertaken in the field late in August and early September. Although "he was taken aback" (p. 445) when he heard of his personal representative's decision to close down all radio stations and airports in Leopoldville, he did not relieve the responsible officer or restrict his operations, as many observers expected. But could he have done so, after having given Andrew Cordier such wide powers a few days earlier?

Urquhart's discussion of Hammarskjöld's institutional leadership confirms, at least implicitly, the point that has often been made by many who worked closely with him or who studied his actions as Secretary General: as one of his subordinates put it privately in the early sixties, Hammarskjöld could be compared to Loyola or Lenin to the extent that, while in office, he developed an institutional ideology which was accepted within the Secretariat and which served as an inspiration to those carrying out his instructions. He failed, however, to establish a structure comparable to the Jesuit Order or the Bolshevik Party, which could have carried on in the same missionary spirit after his death. Hammarskjöld was a man of exceptional intelligence and integrity, but he never really came to grips with crucial organizational problems. A solution for these difficulties could have led to the establishment of a genuine international Secretariat based on the principles which he had espoused so often and so brilliantly. This failure may

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lead us to the conclusion that it is an illusion to expect in one man all the qualities necessary to the attainment of so many and at times contradictory objectives. It is nevertheless the illusion on which the concept of a truly international civil service rests.

Shirley Hazzard's book on the UN Secretariat is not an academic work. Rather, it is an angry and moving testimonial of ideals lost during the course of ten years' service in the UN. It is a well written polemical piece of a kind that is seriously lacking in the literature on the UN. At times, it becomes almost a pamphlet in the original meaning of the term, denouncing those who betrayed the ideals in which Hazzard and thousands of others believed for many years. The author entered UN service when the "big purge" of the McCarthy period was starting. She must have shared many of the frustrations and much of the anguish of thousands of international officials who either faced the inquisition or were powerless witnesses to the degradation of the institutions to which they belonged.

I have believed for a long time that the credibility of the principles on which the UN Secretariat was founded could not be taken seriously as long as those who had a responsibility in acquiescing in the actions of the United States authorities in the early 1950's were still holding key positions in the UN and in associated agencies. As Shirley Hazzard stresses on several occasions, the shock of the purges was all the greater because it was the United States which took the initiative in undermining the very foundations of the Secretariat. It had been accepted as a fact of life in the UN that totalitarian or authoritarian regimes might act in such a fashion, but the two Anglo-Saxon powers had always insisted on the importance of protecting the international Secretariat from undue influences exerted by governments and other sources. Yet it was the United States which demanded and obtained from the Secretary General the right to investigate the political opinions of American staff members and, worst of all, the right to obtain their immediate dismissal. More than twenty years have gone by since the early days of McCarthyism, but the "security clearance" is still in the rule book of the UN, and much of the spirit of the time has survived to this day. Although many of the officials who held responsible positions in the early 1950's are either dead or have retired, some of their basic assumptions about the relationship between the Secretariat and the national authorities of the host country still prevail. Until this situation changes, if it ever does, it is very difficult if not impossible to

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ask officials who come from countries which do not share the democratic traditions of the United States to be more loyal to the organization and free from national influences than are their American colleagues.

Notwithstanding the fact that I basically share most of Hazzard's views about what went on in New York, it should be stressed that most of the Secretariat units that were geographically outside the United States, and most of the agencies, were not similarly affected by McCarthyism. The experiences of American officials working under Gunnar Myrdal at the Economic Commission for Europe, as well as many others, were indeed quite different and much more enviable than those of their colleagues in New York. This variation simply demonstrates the validity of one of Hazzard's points. Lack of courage on the part of the UN leadership was largely responsible for the success of the investigators in carrying out their activities. Myrdal never tolerated the slightest interference in his work and in ECE's affairs. Although Roy Cohn, then the right arm of Senator McCarthy, came to Geneva, he did not get very far within the *Palais des Nations*. UNESCO officials were not as lucky, but their lot was certainly better than that of officials working at UN headquarters.

It would therefore have been useful for Hazzard to have drawn attention to what was going on outside her own place of work. It would indeed be wrong if the reader were left with the impression that all was darkness. That point is particularly important at this stage of the development of the UN, because more and more activities are taking place outside of headquarters. The trend toward decentralization is not altogether alien to the differences of atmosphere and environment between New York and Geneva.

If the ill effects of the purges are to be eradicated, the UN Secretariat and its leadership will certainly have to go through a public denunciation of what was done in the 1950's, or at least through a reasoned analysis of these events. Such an investigation could perhaps help to explain the weakness and absence of moral stamina on the part of those who were supposedly charged with the duty of upholding the principles of an international Secretariat. Hazzard may be judged by some as being too passionate, but in the face of the hypocrisy which characterizes so many pronouncements about the international civil service, such passion is not altogether unjustified. If a balance is to be struck, the UN archives must be allowed to tell the story of why the UN ideals were defeated when they confronted the spirit of inquisition that characterized the McCarthy era.

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Henry Cabot Lodge writes of a diplomatic career that seems largely based on an excellent knowledge of French and hereditary membership in the powers-that-be in the United States after the second World War. His election to the Senate before the war may have been the natural outcome of his upbringing and family tradition, but one would have liked to have his own clarification of the basis of that career and his fifteen years as an American diplomat under both Republican and Democratic administrations. His memoirs do not attempt such a clarification.

His ambassadorship to the United Nations was his longest single period of service, but he devotes to it only thirty-odd pages of his narrative out of almost two hundred describing his adult life. The information and interpretation he gives are certainly interesting, but I cannot help expressing my irritation with the flippancy which characterizes much of what Lodge writes. That may be connected with his class origins, but I think of upper-class New Englanders generally as serious and dedicated people. I do not think one can doubt Lodge's dedication, but his analyses of people and events reflect an attraction for the trivial in public life. It certainly makes for some amusing reading, and Lodge does have a writer's talent; however, I do not find that his memoirs compare favorably with those of other American diplomatists who have written theirs during the past few years.

The book by Richard Symonds and Michael Carder on the United Nations and the population question is basically a historical account, accompanied by critical analyses of attempts to establish international programs in the area of birth control. It covers the League of Nations period briefly and, much more extensively, the United Nations and Specialized Agencies from 1945 to 1970. Symonds was himself a prominent actor in this field for some time, and he has been in the service of the UN for the better part of its existence. In 1968, he was appointed by the Secretary General as a consultant to advise on the use of the Trust Fund for Population Activities. His report led to recommendations that the Fund be used to support activities by the Specialized Agencies. Before that time, Symonds had been serving in various capacities under the UN technical assistance programs, and he had had a close exposure to population problems as they were viewed from the vantage point of the developing countries.

In 1932, a League of Nations Assembly document defined birth control as "a practice abhorrent to a large section of religious belief and contrary to the national laws of certain countries." For the most

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part, this view characterized the usual response, until very recently, of UN organs and Specialized Agencies dealing with population problems whenever they received proposals for international action. A coalition of religious forces and policies based on certain Marxist interpretations of population issues consistently blocked a more positive response. The international secretariats were often chided for undertaking studies which, in some views, constituted outrageous interference with moral and religious beliefs.

Symonds and Carder describe the long drawn-out battle to change this policy. They stress the fact that the Secretariat of the UN and some of the Specialized Agencies held a much more positive view toward birth control than did the League Secretariat. During the interwar period, the intergovernmental bodies were leading in this field. Since 1945, however, the roles have been reversed, and it is the international bureaucracies which have been pursuing studies and making recommendations—very often in the face of harsh difficulties. The breakthrough came in the mid-sixties, but it was only in 1969 that the UN really embarked on such programs. Symonds and Carder offer the reader a vivid image of the opposing forces at work, and they discuss in detail the substantive aspects of UN work in this field.

The study by UNITAR on the UN and the news media, under the direction of Alexander Szalai, with Margaret Croke and associates, represents the first large-scale, systematic attempt to analyze relations between the UN and the news media. The volume contains much that is of value, and some of its analyses are undoubtedly interesting. On the whole, however, it falls short of being a satisfactory study, probably because of the constraints under which its authors were working. To some extent, the cause lies in the non-availability of some of the most pertinent data. It is quite clear that the UNITAR research team was in no position to overcome the difficulties arising from the lack of cooperation of certain member countries; it is even more evident that many important points are made in a way which can only be understood by those already familiar with UN machinery.

In spite of these shortcomings, the study does contain most valuable information, particularly if one takes the trouble to interpret some of the collections of data. At the same time, many important questions remain unanswered. One of these relates to the evolution of news coverage of UN affairs since 1946. It would seem that the diachronic aspect of the study was left aside because of the absence of serious data reflecting this evolution. It would have been interesting had the authors

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carried out this analysis in relation to at least one or two major newspapers. I am thinking here of the *New York Times*, whose coverage of the UN has diminished considerably. Would it not have been of value to offer the reader some statistical evidence of this change of emphasis on the part of one of the world's major newspapers? In the case of *Le Monde*, the proportion of UN news has probably grown over the years. That too would have been interesting to analyze. Another question which remains unanswered refers to the nature of a "UN item." Is it of equal importance to the UN if a given newspaper reports the speech of that particular country's delegate, or a major statement by the Secretary General? If the UN is made up of member states, it also has a voice of its own; it is intellectually disappointing that, in the study, "UN items" were not broken down to distinguish between references to national initiatives within the UN and those relating to actions of the Secretary General or other executive heads. One could list many other shortcomings, but on the whole the book does offer useful material. The collection of data deserves to be completed and analyzed by scholars who may want to answer different sets of questions.

In many respects, all of these works offer insights into the affairs of the UN Secretariat, either by what they do or by what they do not discuss. A case in point is the low profile given to the UN Secretariat in the books by Szalai and Lodge. For example, in the treatment of the 1956 Suez crisis and the establishment of UNEF, Brian Urquhart presents the major decisions as being the result of Hammarskjöld's initiatives, in close cooperation with Lester Pearson and other friendly delegates. On the other hand, Henry Cabot Lodge clearly states (pp. 132ff.) that although Lester Pearson "has rightly been given the lion's share of the credit," the real initiative for the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution leading to the establishment of the Force was taken in Washington, and that the first draft resolution was probably prepared by Joseph Sisco, who was then handling UN affairs at the State Department.

Lodge describes events leading to the adoption of the resolution in a particularly lively manner when he writes that the choice of the man to present the American draft was left to him and that he "bumped into Mr. Pearson" by sheer chance. "I gave him the text of the resolution and said that the United States Government hoped he would sponsor it. His clear and penetrating mind quickly grasped the significance of the paper and he immediately agreed to sponsor it, with-

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out the usual time-consuming changes of commas here and words there. He seemed to see in a flash, while we were standing there, how much the cause of peace would be helped by his sponsoring a resolution to which the United States was already committed. Due to his perspicacity and leadership a new step was taken in peace-keeping which under ordinary conditions would have taken years of arguing and pettifogging" (pp. 132-33). Urquhart states (p. 176) that even before the emergency meeting of the General Assembly, Pearson had told Hammarskjöld "that he thought a UN Force might become necessary." He also indicates that, as far back as November 1955, "General Burns had discussed with Anthony Nutting, the British Minister of State, the possibility of introducing UN troops between the armed forces of Israel and Egypt." More generally, Urquhart's description of Hammarskjöld as the man who masterminded the UNEF operation is in no way confirmed by Henry Cabot Lodge, and Lodge's casual dismissal of planning finds no support in Urquhart's careful analysis.

As for the situation inside the UN Secretariat during the McCarthyite purges, Lodge makes no reference to his or the United States role in introducing into the United Nations the practices so passionately decried by Shirley Hazzard. Urquhart indicates that Hammarskjöld "wrote to Lodge asking that the remaining UN investigations of American employees be speeded up so that the process could be ended as soon as possible . . ." (p. 73). On the whole, Urquhart does not devote enough attention to Hammarskjöld's stand on this issue, although the information he offers the reader does confirm the image many of us had of Hammarskjöld: he was certainly not happy with the situation he had inherited but, in opposing the U.S. authorities, he was not prepared to go beyond the payment of indemnities decided upon by the UN Administrative Tribunal.

Another point that deserves to be mentioned relates to the information media. At least three authors (Lodge, Szalai, and Urquhart) deal directly with relations between the UN and the media. It would, however, be very difficult to find a point on which their observations converge. Lodge had an intimate knowledge of American information media before he entered government service. This acquaintance certainly gave him an advantage over other ambassadors who did not have a similar experience, and it undoubtedly helps to explain his lengthy stay in office as a political appointee. Urquhart describes and analyzes the intricate relations between Dag Hammarskjöld and the press. Hammarskjöld was the one Secretary General whose personality appealed to the media, and he was adroit at exploiting that fact. Szalai

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and his colleagues offer us some useful analyses of how the media view the UN, but their book is essentially based on objective data and does not attempt to relate them to any more subjective analyses of the UN's image in the media. It would, for instance, have been interesting if Szalai had been able to go beyond his quantitative data, connecting them with the outcome of certain UN initiatives. More particularly, the image of the Secretary General and the projection of that image still remain to be studied.

None of these books is really "scientific," either from a "traditional" or from a social science point of view. Hazzard, Lodge, and Urquhart have written personal accounts which contain both very valuable information and useful insights. Brian Urquhart's book, in particular, must become standard reading material for all students of the UN and for diplomats, journalists, and politicians interested in the organization. The UNITAR study and the Symonds and Carder book both fall short of being truly scientific—to a large extent because of the close connection of the authors with the subject matter. Richard Symonds, who has been so intimately involved in UN affairs, particularly with population questions, could hardly have been expected to do away with his past before he sat down to write the story of UN action in this area. The UNITAR team was dealing with an even more sensitive subject; it could at no time forget that more than one UN delegate is keeping a careful eye on what is being published by UNITAR. Such close connections may explain the shortcomings of some of the works discussed here, but the successes of these volumes also suggest that a sharper scholarly inquiry of the UN family can still be undertaken.

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

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In questo numero

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